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WELCOME ADDRESS 
 
We are pleased to welcome you at the Fourth International Conference on 
Game Theory and Management (GTM2010) which has been organized by the Graduate 
School of Management (GSOM), St. Petersburg University in collaboration with the 
Faculty of Applied Mathematics - Control Processes and with the International Society 
of Dynamic Games (Russian Chapter). 
The Conference is designed to support further development of dialogue between 
fundamental game theory research and advanced studies in management. Such 
collaboration had already proved to be very fruitful, and has been manifested in the last 
two decades by Nobel Prizes in Economics awarded to John Nash, John Harsanyi, 
Reinhard Selten, Robert Aumann, Eric Maskin, Roger Mayerson and few other leading 
scholars in game theory. In its applications to management topics game theory 
contributed in very significant ways to enhancement of our understanding of the most 
complex issues in competitive strategy, industrial organization and operations 
management, to name a few areas. 
Needless to say that Game Theory and Management is very natural area to be 
developed in the multidisciplinary environment of St. Petersburg University which is the 
oldest (est. 1724) Russian classical research University. This Conference was initiated in 
2006 at SPbU as part of the strategic partnership of its GSOM and the Faculty of 
Applied Mathematics - Control Processes, both in internationally recognized centers of 
research and teaching. 
We would like to express our gratitude to the Conference’s key speakers – 
distinguished scholars with path-breaking contributions to economic theory, game theory 
and management – for accepting our invitations. We would also like to thank all the 
participants who have generously provided their research papers for this important event. 
We are pleased that this Conference has already become a tradition and wish all the 
success and solid worldwide recognition. 
 
Co-chairs GTM2010 
Professor Valery S. Katkalo,   Professor Leon A. Petrosyan 
Dean, Graduate School of Management Dean, Faculty of Applied 
Mathematics & Control Processes 
St. Petersburg University 
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WELCOME 
 
On behalf of the Organizing and Program Committees of GTM2010, it gives us 
much pleasure to welcome you to the International Conference on Game Theory and 
Management in the Graduate School of Management and Faculty of Applied 
Mathematics - Control Processes of St. Petersburg University. This conference is the 
third of the St. Petersburg master-plan conferences on Game Theory and Management, 
the first one of which took place also in this city three years before. It is an innovated 
edition as to investigate the trend and provide a unique platform for synergy among 
business and financial systems, on one hand and industrial systems, on the other, in 
game-theoretic support of national economies in the recent process of globalization. 
Mathematical and especially game-theoretic modeling the globalized systemic structure 
of the world of the future, and managing its conduct towards common benefits is 
becoming a primary goal today. 
This conference held in new millennium is not unique as the fourth international 
conference on Game Theory and Management since after the conferences GTM2007, 
GTM2008, GTM2009 other international workshops on Dynamic Games and 
Management were held in Montreal Canada.  Because of the importance of the topic we 
hope that other international and national events dedicated to it will follow.  Starting our 
activity in this direction three years before we had in mind that St. Petersburg University 
was the first university in the former Soviet Union where game theory was included in 
the program as obligatory course and the first place in Russia where Graduate School of 
Management  and Faculty of Applied Mathematics were  established. 
The present volume contains abstracts accepted for the Fourth International 
Conference on Game Theory and Management, held in St. Petersburg, June 28-30, 2010.  
As editors of the Volume IV of Contributions to Game Theory and Management we 
invite the participants to present their full papers for the publication in this Volume. By 
arrangements with the editors of the international periodical Game Theory and 
Applications the conference may recommend the most interesting papers for publication 
in this journal. 
St. Petersburg is especially appropriate as a venue for this meeting, being   
“window to Europe” and thus bridging the cultures of East and West, North and South.  
Acknowledgements. The Program and Organizing Committees thanks all 
people without whose help this conference would not have been possible: the invited 
 11
speakers, the authors of papers all of the members of Program Committee for referring 
papers, the staffs of Graduate School of Management and Faculty of Applied 
Mathematics - Control Processes. 
We would like to thank Maria Dorokhina, Margarita Gladkova, Anna Iljina, 
Andrey Zyatchin and Maria Yurova for their effective efforts in preparing the 
conference. 
We thank them all. 
 
Leon A. Petrosyan, GTM2010 Program Committee 
Nikolay A. Zenkevich, GTM2010 Organizing Committee 
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Graph Searching Games with a Radius of Capture 
 
 
Tatiana Abramovskaya1 and Nikolai Petrov2 
 
1,2St. Petersburg University  
Russia 
1tanya.abramovskaya@gmail.com  
2nikolai.petrov@pobox.spbu.ru  
 
 
 
Keywords: Guaranteed search, Search numbers, Radius of capture, Golovach function, Unit 
jumps 
 
 
The problem under investigation belongs to pursuit-evasion differential games 
theory on graphs with no information on the evader. A team of pursuers tries to catch an 
evader who is "invisible" for those. The search problem is to determine for each graph 
the minimum number of pursuers needed to capture an evader. Such problems attach the 
attention of many researchers because of their connections with different problems of 
Graph theory. Detailed annotated bibliography on guaranteed graph searching is given in 
[1]. 
Golovach stated a search problem called ε -search problem (see [2]). The goal 
of the team of pursuers is construction of the program which ensures the approach of the 
evader and one of the pursuers within distance (in the inner metric of graph) less than or 
equal to the given nonnegative number ε  called the radius of capture. The search 
problem is to determine for each topological graph ε -search number, that is, the 
minimum number of pursuers needed to catch the evader. 
We name the function which associates each nonnegative number ε  with ε -
search number as Golovach function. It is known that Golovach function is piecewise 
constant, non-increasing and right-continuous. The next property of Golovach function 
regards to its jumps. 
Let G  be a graph and k  be the ε -search number of G . We say that there is a 
jump of height h  of Golovach function at ε  if there exists ε ' < ε  such that for each δ , 
ε ' < δ  < ε , a team of k h+  pursuers succeed in ε -search whereas team of 1k h+ −  
pursuers can't do it. 
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As it was proved by Golovach and Petrov in [3] Golovach function for a 
complete graph with more than 5 nodes may have non-unit jumps. The authors are also 
aware of certain examples of trees that disprove the conjecture that Golovach function 
for any planar graph has only unit jumps. Nevertheless, a subclass of trees for which the 
Golovach function has only unit jumps is specified. 
The given counter-examples have the minimum number of edges. The first 
counter-example consists of 28 edges (it has a vertex with degree 4). The assertion that 
Golovach function for trees consisting of no more than 27 edges has only unit jumps is 
true. The second counter-example consists of 29 edges and degrees of its vertices are no 
more than 3. The assertion that Golovach function for trees containing no more than 28 
edges and vertices with degrees ≤  3 has only unit jumps is true. 
The lengths of edges play a significant role in characterization of subclasses of 
trees with non-degenerate Golovach function. We can ask about a graph with degenerate 
Golovach function: do exist arbitrarily small variations of lengths of its edges such that 
Golovach function for "deformed" graphs has no non-unit jumps. The authors 
constructed appropriate variations for counter-examples mentioned above. 
 
References 
 
[1] F. V. Fomin, D. M. Thilikos, An annotated bibliography on guaranteed graph searching, 
Theoretical Computer Science, 399 (2008), pp. 236 –245. 
[2] P. A. Golovach, An extremal search problem on graphs (Russian), Vestnik Leningrad. Univ. 
Mat. Mekh. Astronom., (1990), pp. 16 –21. translation in Vestnik Leningrad. Univ. 
Math. 23 (1990), no. 3, 19 –25. 
[3] P. A. Golovach, N. N. Petrov, The search number of a complete graph, Vestnik Leningrad. 
Univ. Mat. Mekh. Astronom., (1986), pp. 57 –60. 
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Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions,  
Coalitions, and Clubs 
 
 
Daron Acemoglu1, Georgy Egorov2 and Konstantin Sonin3 
 
1MIT,  
United States 
 
2Northwestern University,  
United States 
 
3New Economic School,, 
Russia 
 
 
 
Keywords: Commitment, Dynamic coalition formation, Political economy, Voting 
 
 
A central feature of dynamic collective decision-making is that the rules that 
govern the procedures for future decision-making and the distribution of political power 
across players are determined by current decisions. For example, current constitutional 
change must take into account how the new constitution may pave the way for further 
changes in laws and regulations. We develop a general framework for the analysis of this 
class of dynamic problems. Under relatively natural acyclicity assumptions, we provide 
a complete characterization of dynamically stable states as functions of the initial state 
and determine conditions for their uniqueness. We show how this framework can be 
applied in political economy, coalition formation, and the analysis of the dynamics of 
clubs. The explicit characterization we provide highlights two intuitive features of 
dynamic collective decision-making: (1) a social arrangement is made stable by the 
instability of alternative arrangements that are preferred by sufficiently many members 
of the society; (2) efficiency-enhancing changes are often resisted because of further 
social changes that they will engender. 
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The Incompatibility Banzhaf Value 
 
José Alonso-Meijide1, Mikel Álvarez-Mozos2 and  
Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro3 
 
Department of Statistics and Operations Research, 
University of Santiago de Compostela,  
Spain 
1Faculty of Sciences of Lugo 
2Faculty Mathematics 
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Keywords: Cooperative games, Banzhaf value, Incompatibilities, Axiomatic characterization 
 
 
The classical Transferable Utility cooperative game (TU Game from now on) is 
a model in which agents bargain and are able to make binding agreements, and hence, 
players may enforce cooperative behaviour and form coalitions. The structure of the 
game is described by means of a characteristic function which is an assessment of the 
profit that each coalition can obtain by its own. It is also assumed that the joint profits 
can be divided and transferred among the members of the coalition. However, there are 
many real-life situations in which not all coalitions are possible.  
Therefore, there have been several proposals to extend the original model to a 
more general one in which not all coalitions are possible. We will call such models TU 
games with restricted cooperation. The first such attempt was the model of games with 
coalition structure proposed in Aumann and Drèze (1974) where a partition of the set of 
players is assumed to be given describing blocks of players that will form and bargain 
for the division of the worth of the grand coalition. The second and one of the most 
studied proposals so far is the model of TU games with graph restricted communication 
proposed in Myerson (1977). Here, it is assumed that players can only communicate, and 
hence, cooperate using a given communication graph. In Bergantiños et al. (1993) TU 
games with incompatibilities are introduced. In this model it is assumed that an 
incompatibility graph is given which describes the pairs of players which are 
incompatible, and hence, they can not cooperate at all. Another way to define a TU game 
with restricted cooperation was proposed in Gilles et al. (1992). The so called games 
with permission structure assume the existence of an ordering of the set of players which 
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describes when is each player able to join a coalition. The model of games on 
augmenting systems proposed in Bilbao (2003) is an interesting way to extend some 
models of games with restricted cooperation described above. 
One of the most interesting questions in these contexts is how to allocate the 
joint profit generated from the cooperation. One of the most important answers to it was 
given in Shapley (1953) and it is known as the Shapley value. Another interesting value 
was introduced by Banzhaf (1965), initially proposed in the context of voting games and 
later on extended to general TU games by Owen (1975). A player's assessment by means 
of these values is the average of his marginal contribution to any coalition to which the 
player does not belong. But they differ in the weights associated to each marginal 
contribution. The main difference between these two values is that the Shapley value is 
efficient, while the Banzhaf value satisfies the total power property. Both the Shapley 
and the Banzhaf value have been extended to different models of games with restricted 
cooperation. In Owen (1977) the Shapley value is extended to games with coalition 
structure and in Owen (1982) and Alonso-Meijide and Fiestras-Janeiro (2002) the 
Banzhaf and Shapley values are extended to games with coalition structure. For games 
with graph restricted cooperation Myerson (1977) proposed an extension of the Shapley 
value and Alonso-Meijide and Fiestras-Janeiro (2006) proposed an extension of the 
Banzhaf value. 
Bergantiños et al. (1993) introduced the games with incompatibilities and 
proposed and characterized a modification of the Shapley value for such situations. In 
Alon so-Meijide and Casas-Méndez (2007) a modification of the Public Good Index for 
simple games with incompatibilities was proposed. In this paper, we define a 
modification of the Banzhaf value for this kind of situations and provide two 
characterizations of it. Comparing the characterizations of the Incompatibility Shapley 
value and the Incompatibility Banzhaf value we see that the differences between the 
original Shapley and Banzhaf values are transferred to this setting.  
Finally, we illustrate the proposed solution concept with a real world example. 
Since the Banzhaf value is of particular interest when we come to study the decisiveness 
of agents in a voting body, the proposed example is the Basque Country Parliament in its 
III term of office. 
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We study a bilateral trade problem that is repeated finitely many times. In each period 
seller may sell to a buyer a unit of indivisible good; the valuations for the goods are 
independent both across agents and across periods. We assume that the budget needs to 
be balanced in every period. After each period, either player can refuse the exchange; 
thus, we impose per-period ex-post IR constraints. In the last period of relationship, 
imposing We study a bilateral trade problem that is repeated nitely many times.In each 
period seller may sell to a buyer a unit of indivisible good; the valuations for the goods 
are independent both across agents and across periods.We assume that the budget needs 
to be balanced in every period. We assume that the agents' announcements can be made 
simultaneous and the terms of trade are non-negotiable once the announcement is made, 
hence we impose interim IC constraints. After each period, either player can refuse the 
exchange; thus, we impose per-period ex-post IR constraints. The relationship breaks 
down exogenously after a (commonly known) number of repetitions. In the last period of 
relationship, imposing budget balance, IC and IR leads to inecient trade, as described by 
Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) and Gresik (1991). However, in any period but last, 
the agents value future relationship. The ex-ante surplus that this relationship generates 
enters per-period ex-post IR constraint, thus relaxing it and allowing for more trade in 
each round but the last, as compared to static bound found by Myerson and 
Satterthwaite. We show that if the relationship lasts long enough, trade in the rst periods 
is fully ecient. We thus can conclude that, as the number of periods gets large, trade 
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approaches the fully ecient level and the speed of convergence is exponential. Our result 
does not rely on the assumption that, if an agent deviates and does not follow the 
prescription of the mechanism, her future surplus is set to zero. In fact, we assume that 
agents are able to return to the equilibrium path in case of the deviation by the start of 
the next period. However, the mechanism sets a disagreement point for the deviation: it 
prescribes that the continuation play after the deviation is take-it-or-leave-it offers, made 
by the party who has not deviated, until the end of the relationship. As exante surplus of 
take-it-or-leave-it offers is higher than ex-ante surplus of anecient mechanism for the 
party making offers (Williams 1987), that party needs to be compensated to return to the 
equilibrium path (We assume a worst-case scenario that the deviator holds all the 
bargaining power as the parties divide an extra total surplus generated by moving from 
take-it-or-leave-it offers to an ecient mechanism, yet the party that is to make take-it-or-
leave-it offers would need to be compensated for the lost surplus. Note that they are to 
agree to switch back to the equilibrium path before the beginning of the next period. So, 
there is no incomplete information at this stage.). This compensation gives us the ex-ante 
surplus that would enter into per-period ex-post IR constraint and allow to generate 
higher levels of trade. The relaxation of IR constraint is akin a subsidy discussed by 
Myerson and Satterthwaite; thus, it is a straightforward extension of their results to show 
that relaxed IR leads to higher levels of trade. We show how the relaxation comes 
naturally when relationship is repeated. 
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We study optimal bidder collusion at first-price auctions when the collusive 
mechanism only relies on signals about bidders' valuations. We build on Fang and 
Morris [Fang, Hanming and Morris, Stephen, 2006. Multidimensional private value 
auctions. Journal of Economic Theory 126, 1-30] when two bidders have low or high 
private valuation of a single object and additionally observe a noisy signal about their 
opponents' valuations. We investigate the general case when the signals are chosen 
independently and identically out of 2n ≥  possible values. We demonstrate the unique 
symmetric equilibrium of the first price auction. We characterize the signal structure 
which provides the least revenue for the seller for arbitrary n . As a corollary, we show 
that bidders are strictly better off as signals can take on more and more possible values. 
Nevertheless, we provide an example which shows that the seller's revenue drops below 
the above optima even with only 2, but correlated signals. 
JEL Classification Numbers: D44:D82 
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Abstract: The result that the Folk Theorem can also be achieved by only employing pure 
strategies (Fudenberg and Maskin, 1991) is extended in this study where players have 
heterogeneous discount factors. It is shown as a consequence that this diversity in time preferences 
among players provides a larger feasible set of perfect equilibrium payoffs. Lehrer and Pauzner 
(1999) showed, under integrable continuous-time payoff stream for two players, that this set is 
indeed bigger than the perfect equilibrium set generated within the typical convex hull of a single-
stage game. While this paper, on the other hand, maintains the use of the normal discrete-time 
framework, it generalizes Lehrer and Pauzner’s result to n players and so as the Folk Theorem to 
a repeated game with heterogeneous time preferences. 
 
 
Fudenberg and Maskin (1991, henceforth F&M) showed that it is possible for 
the Folk Theorem to be sustained even without public randomization. They proved this 
by showing that in a game with very patient players, any correlated mixed action can be 
represented by a cyclical combination of pure strategy actions with appropriate 
frequency. In other words, whatever feasible payoffs players could obtain in the long-run 
by throwing a die could also be generated when they simply program their actions over 
time in a recurring fashion. A very important assumption in their framework is that 
players have common discount factor and that this is very close to one. 
Now suppose we allow the discount factor to vary across players while 
maintaining them to be sufficiently high. The normal intuition is that it will fail to 
achieve the result of F&M since some players, particularly the less patient ones, may not 
have the incentive to remain in an infinitely-repeated game. However, Lehrer and 
Pauzner (L&P) argued that when there is difference in the discount factors between two 
players, a strategy can be sustained in equilibrium in an infinitely repeated game by 
trading player’s payoffs overtime. This means that the more patient fellow could allow 
the less patient one to earn higher payoff during the beginning stages provided that she 
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(the more patient one) be reciprocated to earn higher payoff towards the latter part of the 
game. While this set-up is shown to be subgame-ε-perfect and beneficial to both players, 
it is also shown that this intertemporal trading of payoffs could even broaden the 
possibilities for stable cooperation. 
To ensure that this intertemporal trading can target any payoff (i.e. average 
discounted income over infinite time) within the convex hull of the set of pure-strategy 
actions, L&P makes use of a continuous-time payoff stream for two players. We show in 
this paper that this is not necessary and the typical use of discrete stages is sufficient to 
achieve this result and which can even be generalized to n players. Ultimately, this 
objective shall lead us to a generalization of pure-strategy Folk theorem with 
differentiated discount factors. 
The main challenge in pursuing this goal is to convexify or “fill-up the inside” 
of the feasible space generated by the pure-strategy actions of n players. Our main 
ingredient for achieving this is a generalization of an F&M result which can be restated 
that for all discount factors sufficiently high, every payoff within the feasible space can 
be represented by the discounted average of a deterministic sequence of pure-strategy 
payoffs. Other subsequent step to our proof, for example, is to select only those payoffs 
that are individually rational. 
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Abstract: We consider an infnite horizon dynastic production economy with capital, labor. The 
economy is populated by dynasties consisting of a sequence of identical generations, each living 
one period, each caring about its own and successor generation. Sizes of each generation are 
equal and normalized to unity. The main results of the paper establish conditions sufficient for 
existence and uniqueness of measurable Markov perfect Nash equilibria. The results are 
constructive, i.e. we provide two approximation results allowing to construct the bounds of 
Markov Perfect Nash Equlibria set or to calculate the unique Markov Perfect Nash Equlibria. 
Moreover, our results emphasize both order-theoretic and geometrical properties of nonlinear 
fixed points operators, hence can be used to build globally stable asymptotically uniformly 
consistent numerical schemes for approximate solutions via Piccard iterations on approximate 
versions of our operators. Our results provide a new catalog of tools for the rigorous analysis 
(both theoretical and numerical) of Stationary Markov equilibrium for overlapping generations 
with stochastic production without commitement.. 
 
 
In this paper we analyze equilibria in an infinite horizon stochastic production 
overlapping generations (OLG henceforth) economy with capital and labor and without 
commitment. Specifically from the game theoretical perspective we study a large class 
of stochastic intergererational paternalistic altruism games without commitment. In its 
deterministic incarnation, the model we consider dates back to the work of Phelps and 
Pollak [20], and consists of a sequence of identical generations, each living one period 
and deriving utility from its own consumption and leisure, as well as the consumption 
and leisure of its successor generation. The agents in the environment face a time-
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consistency problem between generations. In particular, each current generation has an 
incentive to deviate from a given sequence of bequests, consume a disportionate amount 
of current bequests, leaving little (or nothing) for subsequent generations.  
Although existence and uniqueness of Markov perfect Nash equilibria (MPNE 
henceforth) in such models with inelastic labor supply is well known for both 
deterministic (see Leininger [15], Kohlberg [12]) and stochastic setting (papers of Amir 
[2], Nowak [17], or Balbus, Reffet and Wony [5]), surprisingly no existence and 
characterization are available for the case of elastic labor supply. In response to this 
predicament in this paper we establish conditions sufficient for existence of continuous, 
monotone MPNE as well as conditions guaranteeing uniqueness of MPNE in the space 
of a Borel measurable strategies. Finally we show conditions for existence of a unique 
corresponding invariant distribution on both the bounded or unbounded state space case. 
Let us mention that results are constructive, i.e. we provide two approximation results 
allowing to construct the bounds of MPNE set or to calculate the unique MPNE. Finally 
with a series of examples we show application and limitations of our results. 
These results are important for a numerous reasons. Firstly they provide a 
rigorous set of tools allowing for a applied study of OLG economies with only partial 
commitment. Secondly the uniqueness and approximation results allow for a rigorous 
numerical characterization (including obtaining uniform error bounds) of MPNE in this 
class of economies. And thirdly the methods developed in this paper are general and 
hence can shed some new light on linked economic (e.g. dynamic economies with time 
consistency issues of Phelan and Stacchetti, Atkeson [19], studies on hyperbolic 
discounting Peleg and Yaari or Kusell and Smith [18,13]) or game theoretical problems 
(e.g. stochastic discounted supermodular games considered by Curtat [8], game of 
capital accumulation considered by Amir or resource extraction of Levhari and Mirman 
[16]) and others. 
Specifically from the technical perspective our study of MPNE reduces to the 
analysis of fixed points for a appropriately defined operator on the strategy space. Hence 
we build on the decreasing operators methods applied first by Balbus, Reffett and 
Wozny [5] to a similar partial commitment economies with inelastic labor supply into a 
setting with two-dimensional choice variable space. This can be hence seen as a 
contribution to the literature of monotone operators similar to the one proposed (in case 
of elastic labor supply) by such authors as Coleman and Datta, Mirman and Reffett ([7] 
and [9]). Similarly to previous paper of Balbus, Reffett and Wozny [5] the fixed point 
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theorems used here to show uniqueness are base on geometrical properties of monotone 
mappings defined in abstract cones found in the works of Guo and Lakshmikantham or 
Guo, Cho and Zhu([11] or [10]). 
Our analysis of an optimization and fixed point problem with two choice 
variables for each generation interestingly stresses the discrepancies between methods 
used here or in Balbus, Reffett and Wozny [5] as opposed to the ones applied by Amir or 
Nowak ([2] or [17]). Specifically the operator used in our proof of uniqueness theorem is 
defined on the set of bounded functions on the states spaces and assigns for any expected 
utility of the next generation its best response expected utility of a current generation. 
This operator is hence a value function operator defined on the space of functions, whose 
construction is motivated by Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti [1] (APS henceforth) operator 
that could be defined (in this example) on the set of subsets of the value functions. This 
is a striking difference to the ‘‘direct methods’’ applied by Amir or Nowak ([2] or [17]). 
As a result, on the one hand, methods we develop in this paper can be seen as a 
generalization to a two dimensional setting of an ‘‘inverse procedure’’ linking choice 
variables with their values proposed by Coleman [6]. But on the other, and more 
important, hand our contribution can be seen as a consistent way of sharpening the 
equilibrium characterization results obtained by Kydland and Prescott [14] or APS type 
methods for the study of consistency problems. Specifically when applying APS 
techniques, although existence arguments can be addressed under very general 
conditions, the rigorous characterization of the set of dynamic equilibrium policies 
(either theoretically or numerically) is typically weak. Further, it has not yet been shown 
how to apply APS to obtain any characterization of the long-run stochastic properties of 
stochastic games (i.e., equilibrium invariant distributions and/or ergodic distributions). 
Once again value function methods proposed in this paper should be seen as a way of 
circumventing the mentioned APS predicaments. 
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In a moneyless market, a non storable, non transferable homogeneous 
commodity is reallocated between agents with single-peaked preferences. Agents are 
either suppliers or demanders. Transfers between a supplier and a demander are feasible 
only if they are linked, and the links form an arbitrary bipartite graph. Typically, supply 
is short in one segment of the market, while demand is short in another.  
Information about individual preferences is private, and so is information about 
feasible links: an agent may unilaterally close one of her links if it is in her interest to do 
so.  
Our egalitarian transfer solution rations only the long side in each market 
segment, equalizing the net transfers of rationed agents as much as permitted by the 
bilateral constraints. It elicits a truthful report of both preferences and links: removing a 
feasible link is never profitable to either one of its two agents. Together with efficiency, 
and a version of equal treatment of equals, these properties are characteristic. 
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This paper analyzes the shift from competitive retailing to a dominant retailer in 
a standard industrial organization model of monopolistically competitive manufacturing. 
The model approximates the changing conditions in retailing markets in contemporary 
Russia and other developing markets of the FSU. 
In 2000-s, Russia and other developing markets of FSU have shown dramatic 
growth of chain-stores and similar retailing firms. Inspired by Wal-Mart and other 
successful giants abroad, Russian food traders like Perekrestok and Pyaterochka has 
gained considerable shares of the market and noticeable market power, both in Moscow 
and in province. This shift in the market organization was suspected by newspapers for 
negative welfare effects, for upward pressure on prices and inflation. Public interest to 
this question is highlighted by anti-chain-stores bill currently debated in Russian 
Parliament (Duma). 
Leaving aside the empirical side of this question, this paper focuses on 
constructing and analyzing the adequate model of vertical market interaction, suitable for 
Russian retailing markets of food, clothes and durables. We step aside from the 
traditional models of monopolistic or oligopolistic vertical interaction or franchising, and 
stick instead to more modern monopolistic-competition model of an industry in the 
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Dixit-Stiglitz [3] spirit, but combined with vertical interaction (this combination is rather 
new, being pioneered by Chen [1] and Hamilton-Richards [4]).  
Our departure from the Chen- Hamilton-Richards approach is that it is the 
retailer who is exercising the monopsony power, while the production is organized as 
monopolistic-competition industry with free entry. This hypothesis seems rather 
realistic, at least for developing markets. Indeed, there are numerous evidences in 
economic newspapers that each of several big retailers has much stronger bargaining 
power than quite numerous manufacturers and importers of consumer goods like 
sausages, shirts, etc. (even such big international companies as Coca-Cola are not strong 
enough to enforce their terms of trade to Russian retailers). 
Therefore our stylized model of market concentration considers a 
monopsonistic /monopolistic retailer (as a proxy of an oligopsonistic/oligopolistic 
retailer) dealing with a continuum [0, N] of Dixit-Stiglitz manufacturers and a 
representative consumer. The consumer’s labor is supplied to the market inelastically, 
being the only production factor. There are two types of goods. The first “commodity” 
consists of many varieties, for instance, milk of different brands, and the number of 
firms/varieties is determined endogeneously by the free entry or similarly, taking into 
account the fixed and variable costs of manufacturers. The second commodity is the 
numeraire representing other (perfectly competitive) goods. The income effect is 
neglected. “Very many” similar manufacturers are playing a sequential game with one 
retailer. Each manufacturer has a fixed cost and a variable cost, he produces a single 
variety of the “commodity” and sets the price for this variety. The most natural timing of 
the model is when the retailer starts with announcing her markup policy correctly 
anticipating the subsequent manufacturers' responses, and simultaneously chooses the 
scope of varieties/firms to buy from. Then the manufacturers come up with their prices 
and the market clears the quantities. Both sides take into account the demand profile 
generated by a consumer's quasi-linear utility function. This organization of the industry 
is compared to the pre-concentration situation, modeled as leading manufacturers. This 
type of interaction is similar in some sense with the concept of “common agency” 
considered in contract theory. Another model version concerns the myopic (Nash) 
behavior of both sides being unable to predict and influence the market. 
The questions addressed are: Does the emergence of the monopsonistic retailer 
enhance or deteriorate welfare, and how much? Which retailer is worse: the myopic or 
the wise one? What should be the guidelines for public regulation (if any) in this area? 
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In the special case of quadratic valuations (linear demands, see Section 3.2 of 
the book P.-P. Combes, T. Mayer and J.-F. Thisse [2]) it turns out that generally the 
concentration enhances social welfare. This effect, unexpected for non-economists, 
actually is not too surprising, because it reminds the switch from a two-tier monopoly to 
a simple monopoly. The welfare increase here, however, can go not only through the 
growth of the total quantity, but in some cases through growing total profits and, 
notably, through decreasing excessive diversity. The retailer is shown to be interested in 
restricting the diversity, but it is not harmful itself. 
In the case of the governmental regulation of the monopsonistic retailer through 
Pigouvian taxes, it turns out that subsidies instead of taxes are needed, that also reminds 
similar effect known for a simple monopoly/monopsony. 
A possible extension is to find similar result under another kind of utility: CES 
function. Another extension is to find, whether the modern practice of the entrance fee 
levied on the manufacturers by the retailers brings welfare gains or losses. 
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The goal of this paper is to model the effects of wholesale price and retail price 
controls on manufacturer's and retailer's profits, taking explicitly into account the 
retailer's sales motivation and performance. We consider a stylized distribution channel 
where a manufacturer sells a single kind of good to a retailer and consider the 
manufacturer-retailer relationship is modeled as a differential game. 
To earn  a reasonable profit the members of a distribution channel often adopt 
rather simple pricing techniques. For example, manufacturers may use cost-plus pricing, 
defining the price by simply adding a desired profit margin to the marginal cost. In a 
similar fashion, retailers very often determine shelf prices adding a fixed percentage 
markup to the wholesale price. 
The main advantage of simple policies is that they are...easy to be applied. But 
this blind approach to pricing does not provide tools to manufacturers in order to 
encourage retailers to sell and retailers, in turn, cannot adequately stimulate consumer to 
buy. 
In this paper we consider a vertical control distribution channel where a 
manufacturer sells a single kind of good to a retailer. We will focus on the effects of 
trade promotions, a widely used dynamic pricing strategy that manufacturers can exploit 
to raise sales. With trade promotions an incentive mechanism is used to drive other 
channel members' behaviors. 
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In particular we investigate the relationships between the members of a 
distribution channel by means of optimal control models in a stylized vertical 
distribution channel: a manufacturer serves a single segment market through a single 
retailer and a contract fixes a trade discount policy which will be followed by the 
contractors. 
We assume that a discount in wholesale price increases the retailer's sales 
motivation and consequently it increases sales. We study both the manufacturer's and 
retailer's profit maximization problems as optimal control models. Our starting point is 
given by a couple of models presented in [1] and [2]. In those models the manufacturer 
sells to a single product to a single retailer: her aim is to maximize the total profit in a 
given time period. The manufacturer controls the discount on wholesale price (trade 
discount) allowed to the retailer, this way she can raise her sales because the retailer 
transfers a part of the discount to the shelf price (pass-through). Moreover, if the retailer 
controls the amount of trade discount transferred by the to the market price (pass-
through) he can decide to keep part of the incentive for himself and will be therefore 
more motivated in selling the specific product, thus giving another upward push to sales. 
The optimal control of manufacturer's and retailer's profit via trade discount and pass-
through is embedded in a differential game framework. We consider in particular the 
case when feasible controls of the manufacturer and the retailer are constant and/or 
piece-wise constant. Some preliminary results can be found in [3]. 
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We consider negotiations selecting one-dimensional policies. Individuals have 
single-peaked preferences, and they are impatient. Decisions arise from a bargaining 
game with random proposers and (super) majority approval, ranging from the simple 
majority up to unanimity. The existence and uniqueness of stationary sub-game perfect 
equilibrium is established, and its explicit characterization provided. We supply an 
explicit formula to determine the unique alternative that prevails, as impatience vanishes, 
for each majority. As an application, we examine the efficiency of majority rules. For 
symmetric distributions of peaks unanimity is the unanimously preferred majority rule. 
For asymmetric populations rules maximizing social surplus are characterized. 
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We consider a setting in which two players must take a single action. The 
analysis is done within a private values model in which (i) the players' preferences over 
actions are private information, (ii) utility is non-transferable, (iii) implementation is 
Bayesian and (iv) the welfare criterion is utilitarian. We characterize an optimal 
allocation rule. Instead of asking the agents to directly report their types, this allocation 
can be implemented dynamically. The agents are asked if they are to the left or to the 
right of a given cutoff, if both reports agree, the section of the interval which none 
preferred is discarded and the process continues until one agent chooses left and the 
other right. In that case, this last cutoff is implemented. When types are uniformly 
distributed, this implementation can be carried out by a Principal who lacks 
commitment, implying this process is an optimal communication protocol. 
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We consider the game problem  
 
0 1 2
1 21, 1,
( , ) , sup inf,
i j uI I v
i k j l
u v f ud vdα η β η
∈ ∈
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎟Φ →⎟⎜ ⎜⎜ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎜ ⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠∫ ∫  (1) 
where u U∈  and .v V∈  In addition, U  and V  are nonempty sets of real-valued 
functions on 
1
I  and 
2
I  respectively 
1 2
( , ).I I≠ ∅ ≠ ∅  Moreover, the concrete choice of 
u  and v  should be satisfy to the constraints  
 
1 2
1 21, 1,
,
i jI I
i p j q
ud Y vd Zγ η ω η
∈ ∈
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎟ ⎟∈ ∈⎜ ⎜⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠∫ ∫ , (2) 
 where Y  and Z  are nonempty closed sets in p\  and q\  respectively. We suppose that 
1
η  and 
2
η  are nonnegative real-valued finitely additive measures (FAM) defined on the 
semialgebras 
1
L  and 
2
L  of subsets 
1
I  and 
2
I  respectively. So,  
 
1 1 1 2 2 2
( , , ), ( , , )I L I Lη η  (3) 
 are finitely additive spaces with a measures. 
In particular, in (3) the case of standard measure spaces in assumed. We 
suppose that 
0
f  is a continuous function on ,k l×\ \  U  and V  are nonempty subsets of 
the manifolds of step-functions on 
1
I  and 
2
I  respectively, and, moreover, , , ,
i j i j
α β γ ω  
are uniform limits of the corresponding sequences of step-functions. We suppose that for 
some ]0, [a ∈ ∞  and ]0, [b ∈ ∞   
 
1 2
1 2
| | & | |
I I
u d a u U v d b v Vη η⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎟ ⎟≤ ∀ ∈ ≤ ∀ ∈⎜ ⎜⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠∫ ∫ . (4) 
We investigate the influence (on the result) of the constraint weakening in (2). Namely, 
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we consider the replacements  
 ,Y Y Z Zε δ→ → , (5) 
 where > 0ε  and > 0.δ  The limit relations under 0ε ↓  and 0δ ↓  are investigated (the 
problem (1) under constraints (2) can be unstable; see example in [1]). The 
representation of asymptotics of maximin (1) under constraints with the replacements (5) 
is established. In this representation, the extension construction in the class of FAM is 
used. For this we consider the spaces 
1
( )A L  and 
2
( )A L  of real-valued FAM of bounder 
variation defined on 
1
L  and 
2
L  respectively. Under constructing the generalized 
problems the replacements  
( , ) ( , ),u v μ ν→  
where μ  and ν  are FAM, is used. Here Uμ ∈   and Vν ∈   where U  and V  are realized 
as * -weak closures of U  and V  under the immersion in ( )A L  by indefinite integrals 
with respect to 
1
η  and 
2
η  respectively: 
1 2
, .u u v vη η→ ∗ → ∗  In this connection, see 
[2]. By (4) the sets U  and V  are nonempty  
* -weak compactums. We replace (2) by conditions  
 
1 21, 1,
,
i jI I
i p j q
d Y d Zγ μ ω ν
∈ ∈
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎟ ⎟∈ ∈⎜ ⎜⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠∫ ∫ . (6) 
By analogy with (1) is replaced by the generalized game problem  
 
1 2
0
1,1,
( , ) , maxmin
i jI I
j qi k
f ud d
ν μ
μ ν α μ β ν
∈∈
⎞⎛⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜ ⎟Φ →⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎟⎝ ⎠∫ ∫   (7) 
in addition, Uμ ∈  and Vν ∈   satisfy to (6). Then maximin of (7) fully defines 
asymptotics of realized maximins under weakening constraints (see (5)). We note that 
the maximin (7) can be differ from usual maximin under constraints (2). But, under some 
additional conditions the coincidence of usual and generalized maximins takes place. In 
the following, we suppose that along with the equalities  
1 1 2 2
cl({ : }, ( )), cl({ : }), ( ),U u u U L V v v V Lη τ η τ∗ ∗= ∗ ∈ = ∗ ∈   
where 
1
( )Lτ∗  and 2( )Lτ∗  are the ∗ -weak topologies of 1( )A L  and 2( )A L  the equalities  
 
1 0 1 2 0 2
cl({ : }, ( )), cl({ : }, ( ))U u u U L V v v U Lη τ η τ= ∗ ∈ = ∗ ∈   (8) 
are required; here 
0
( )
i
Lτ  is topology of ( )
i
A L  defined in [3, (4,2,9)] (
0
( )
i
Lτ  is topology 
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of the Tichonoff degree subspace of real line in the discrete topology for which 
i
L  is 
used as the index set). We note that the conditions (8) are valid in many practically 
interesting cases. Now, we give the following examples (we denote by 
0
( , )
j j
B I L  (by 
0
( , )
j j
B I L+ ) the sets of all step-functions (all nonnegative step-functions) on 
j
I  in the 
sense of ( , )
j j
I L ): 
0 1 1 1
1
0 1 1 1
1
0 1 1 1
1
1 ) = ( , ) | | | ,
2 ) = ( , ) | ,
3 ) = ( , ) | = ,
I
I
I
U u B I L u d a
U u B I L ud a
U u B I L ud a
η
η
η
+
+
⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪′ ∈ ≤⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪′ ∈ ≤⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪′ ∈⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
∫
∫
∫
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=1
= ,
r
i
i
I L∪  then we can be 
suppose that 
0 1 1 1
= ( , ) | | | 1, ;
kL
k
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0 2 2 2
2
0 2 2 2
2
0 2 2 2
2
1 ) = ( , ) | | | ,
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3 ) = ( , ) | = ,
I
I
I
V v B I L v d b
V v B I L vd b
V v B I L vd b
η
η
η
+
+
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4 )′′  if 
1, 1,
, ( ) : 1, , ( ) : 1, [0, [ii i s i ss L s L c s∈ ∈∈ → → ∞
i`  and 
2
=1
= ,
s
i
i
I L∪  then we can be 
suppose, that 
0 2 2 2
= ( , ) | | | 1, .
kL
k
V v B I L v d c k sη⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪∈ ≤ ∀ ∈⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭∫   
In addition, we can be use 1 )′  - 4 )′  and 1 )′′  - 4 )′′  in arbitrary combinations: for 
example the variant 1 ), 3 )′ ′′  is possible. Moreover, we suppose that iγ  and jω  are step-
functions. Namely, let  
 ( ) ( )0 1 1 0 2 2( , ) 1, & ( , ) 1,i jB I L i p B I L j qγ ω∈ ∀ ∈ ∈ ∀ ∈ . (9) 
Under the above-mentioned additional conditions (8) and (9) and under the 
compatibility of (2), the usual and generalized maximins coincidence: we have the 
stability by maximins. 
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The problem of strategically strongly provided cooperation in n-persons 
differential games with integral payoffs is considered. Based on initial differential game 
the new associated differential game (CD-game) is designed. In addition to the initial 
game it models the players actions connected with transition from the strategic form of 
the game to cooperative with in advance chosen principle of optimality. The model 
provides possibility of refusal from cooperation at any time instant t for each player. As 
cooperative principle of optimality imputation from the core selected in appropriate 
manner is considered. In the bases of CD-game construction lies the so-called imputation 
distribution procedure described earlier in [1] (see also [2]). The theorem established by 
authors says that if at each instant of time along the conditionally optimal (cooperative) 
trajectory the future payments to each coalition of players according to the imputation 
distribution procedure exceed the maximal guaranteed value which this coalition can 
achieve in CD-game, then for every 0e >  there exist a strong Nash equilibrium in the 
class of recursive strategies first introduced in [3]. In other words, the mentioned 
equilibrium exists, if in any subgame along the conditionally optimal trajectory the core 
is not void. The proof of this theorem uses results and methods published in [3], [4]. 
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Abstract: Our multipath multiuser routing optimization problem is based on Wardrop model of 
splittable traffic routing. Minimization of the end-to-end traffic delay for each user is the criterion 
of optimality. We consider a routing game with traffic delay functions 1 ie ee α δ−− . Wardrop 
Equilibria and their properties in this model are objects of the research. 
 
 
Our multipath multiuser routing optimization problem is based on Wardrop 
model [1, 2, 3] of splittable traffic routing. Minimization of the end-to-end traffic delay 
for each user is the criterion of optimality. 
The problem is considered as the game = , , ,n m w fΓ 〈 〉 , where n  users send 
their traffic through m  parallel routes from the source s  to destination t . Each user i  
wants to send traffic of the amount iw  from s  to t . Each path e  has a characteristic 
> 0ieα . 
Users act selfish and choose routes to minimize their maximal traffic delay. 
They can split their traffic and send it on several or all paths simultaneously. User's i  
strategy is = { 0}i iex x ≥ , where iex  is the traffic amount that he sends on the path e  so 
that 
=1
=
m
ie ie
x w∑ . Then 1= ( , , )nx x x…  is users strategy profile. Denote for the original 
profile x  the new profile 1 1 1( , ) = ( , , , , , , )i i i i i nx x x x x x x− − +′ ′… …  where the user i  changes his 
strategy from ix  to ix ′  and all other users keep their strategies the same as in x . 
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The load of the path e  is a function ( )e xδ  that is continuous and non-decreasing 
by iex . A continuous traffic delay function ( ) = ( ( ))ie ie ef x f xδ  is defined for each user i  
and each route e . It is non-decreasing by the path load and hence by iex . 
Function ( )iPC x  defines an individual i -th user's costs. Each user i  tries to 
minimize his individual costs – the maximal traffic delay among the routes that he uses  
:
max( ) = ( ).
>0i iee xie
PC x f x  
A strategy profile x  is a Wardrop equilibrium iff for each i  holds: 
> 0, ( ) = ( ) =minie ie il i
l
if x f x f x λ  = 0, ( ) .ie ie iif x f x λ≥  
Social costs are the total costs of the system as a result of using parallel routes 
of the network:  
=1 =1
( ) = ( ).
n m
ie ie
i e
SC x x f x∑∑  
A social optimum is a solution of a minimization problem 
is a strategy profile
( ) min
x
SC x → . Price of Anarchy is a ratio of equilibrium social costs in the worst 
case equilibrium and optimal social costs.  
is an equilibrium
( )
max( ) = .
x
opt
SC x
PoA
SC
Γ  
In this work we consider a routing game with traffic delay functions 1 eiee α δ−−  
in case where for each path e  its traffic delay is the same for each user. Experimental 
modeling confirms an adequacy of such delay function and explains a sence of 
parameters α . Wardrop Equilibria and their properties in this model are objects of the 
research. We obtain that a Wardrop equilibrium is any situation where loads are 
distributed by routes as follows:  
=1
=1
= ( ) = , {1, , },1
n
mie e
i
e
e e
W
x x e mδ
α α
∀ ∈∑ ∑ …  
and the equilibrium social costs are  
1
1
( ) = 1 .( )
W
e
m
e
SC x W e α
−
=
−
∑
 
Also we prove, that the Price of Anarchy is about 1.3 for this model. 
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Abstract: I investigate an oligopoly model with homogeneous goods, sequential actions and 
simultaneous price and quantity choice. In a duopoly game a pure-strategy noncooperative 
equilibrium with both firms making positive profits is derived. Furthermore it can be shown that 
when the number of firms converges towards infinity, the leader sets a price equal to marginal 
cost and is the sole firm serving the market. 
 
 
The simultaneous choice of prices and quantities has become relevant for 
research with Levitan/Shubik (1978). Ten years later Milton Friedman establishes that 
"there is no pure-strategy noncooperative equilibrium" in those games Friedman (1988). 
He calls the potentially existing mixed-strategy equilibria not plausible and therefore 
investigates two models with two firms choosing first quantities simultaneously and then 
prices simultaneously and vice versa. 
 Several models are developed dealing with the difficult question of the right 
strategic variable and the right timing of decisions. For instance, Tasnádi (2006) 
analyzes a mixed oligopoly with one firm choosing its price and the other firm choosing 
its quantity. In an extension of his model, the choice of the strategic variable itself is 
endogenized. Looking at a price choice as well as a capacity choice in a dynamic setting, 
Benoit/Krishna (1987) figure out that equilibrium outcomes depend on the flexibility of 
the capacity choice. 
If goods are assumed to be heterogeneous, the research is often focussed on the 
question which type of competition is the best with regard to social welfare. Singh/Vives 
(1984) show that it is a dominant strategy for the firms to set quantities. Claiming that 
these results are sensitive to duopoly assumptions, Hackner (2000) points out that neither 
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price nor quantity competition can be said to be more efficient in general. Finally, 
Hsu/Wang (2005) show that total surplus is always higher under price competition than 
under quantity competition. 
Bárcena-Ruiz (2007) introduces a public firm maximizing social welfare in the 
competition with private firms. He shows that in this situation, firms prefer to set prices 
simultaneously in contrast to the classical competition with only private firms, where 
sequential price setting is prefered. 
 In my model, the firms have to choose quantity and price simultaneously but in 
an exogenous order. The derivation of that equilibrium is widely in line with the idea 
introduced by Levitan/Shubik (1978).  
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Abstract: In many real-life bargaining situations, in business life as well as in the political arena, 
the negotiating parties are typically not individual agents but rather groups of possibly 
heterogeneous individuals. In such situations, an agreement must reflect consensus not only 
between groups but also among members of the same group. We focus on the simplest of such 
scenarios, and extend Rubinstein's (1985) bilateral bargaining model with incomplete information 
to the case in which one of the negotiating parties is a couple. We investigate how the choice of 
negotiation format (specifically, open- vs. closed-door negotiations) affects the individual welfare 
of the participants, as well as the overall efficiency of the bargaining process. 
 
 
Situations in which a group of agents shares a joint entitlement to the outcome 
of a negotiation are not rare in everyday life, and include all those cases in which 
negotiations over public goods or resources are conducted through representatives, as 
typically happens in domestic or international political negotiations. In such cases, 
incomplete information and moral hazard often play a significant role. 
Evidence from social psychology suggests that the strategic behavior of groups 
tends to differ significantly from that of individuals in comparable experimental settings. 
Yet, with a few notable exceptions, which are limited to finite-horizon settings (Putnam 
(1988), Perry and Samuelson (1994)), the theoretical literature on bargaining has mostly 
focused on the analysis of negotiations among individual agents. 
As a first step towards the study of more general group bargaining situations we 
would like to investigate the simplest case of an infnite-horizon group bargaining 
problem: namely, the case of bilateral bargaining between an individual and a couple. 
Our starting point is Rubinstein's (1985) infinite-horizon, alternating-offers bargaining 
problem with one-sided incomplete information about time preferences. In our setting, 
player 1 is an individual who bargains against a couple, players b  (he) and g  (she). The 
couple shares a joint entitlement to the outcome of the negotiation: it is impossible for a 
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member of the couple to strike an agreement with player 1, unless the other partner also 
agrees. While the types of players 1 and b  are commonly known, player g  can be either 
more patient or more impatient than her partner, and this is private knowledge of the 
couple. An offer is a proposal on the share of (unit) pie that player 1 should receive. In 
odd periods player 1 makes an offer, and b  and g  both reply with a Yes or No; in even 
periods b  and g  make (counter-) offers, and player 1 decides whether to accept the 
minimum of the two counteroffers (by replying Yes), or refuse both (by replying No). 
The game ends when either the current offer by player 1 is jointly accepted by the 
couple, or the minimum counteroffer by the couple is accepted by 1. For definiteness, we 
assume that the two members of the couple consume their share concurrently as a public 
good. Alternatively, one could assume that they further subdivide it between themselves 
through a subsequent non-cooperative negotiation. 
With respect to what player 1 learns in the process of negotiations one can 
distinguish two representative scenarios. In the first scenario (open-door), player 1 learns 
both replies and both counteroffers. This case intuitively corresponds to situations in 
which the three players must all negotiate in the same room. In the second (closed-door), 
player 1 only learns the joint reply (whether both members of the couple agree, or not), 
and the minimum counteroffer. Intuitively, this is the case if the couple retires in a 
separate room whenever it is time to deliberate, and only transmits to player 1 a joint 
reply, or counteroffer, which has the approval of both partners. We show that even in 
such minimalistic setting the format of negotiations plays a significant role. In particular, 
we show that the choice of format (open- vs. closed-door) may have an impact on the 
efficiency of the outcome. 
Our results imply that: (i) if the outcome in the open-door scenario is 
inefficient, it would also be inefficient when g  bargains against 1 alone. Moreover, there 
exist cases in which a delay occurs when g  bargains alone, but not when b  and g  
bargain as a couple with open doors; and (ii) if the outcome with closed doors is 
inefficient, it would also be inefficient with open doors. Moreover, there exist cases in 
which a delay occurs with open doors, but not with closed doors. Hence, the closed-door 
scenario is always weakly more efficient than the open-door one, and in some cases 
strictly more efficient. The result supports the long-standing view that closed-door 
negotiations are generally more efficient than transparent ones. 
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In [1] we investigated the model of multistage bidding where r  types of risky 
assets (shares) are traded between two stockmarket agents. The agents have different 
information on liquidation prices of traded assets. Before bidding starts the prices are 
determined by a chance move for the whole period of bidding according to a known to 
both players probability distribution over r -dimensional integer lattice. Player 1 is an 
insider. He knows the prices of all types of shares. Player 2 has no such information. 
Player 2 knows that Player 1 is an insider. At each step of bidding both players make 
simultaneously their bids, i.e. they post their prices for each type of shares. The player 
who posts the larger price for a share of given type buys one share of this type from his 
opponent for this price. 
Any integer bids are admissible. Players aim to maximize the values of their final 
portfolios, i.e. money plus liquidation values of obtained shares. Both players are 
supposed to remember all previous bids. This allows Player 2 draw conclusions on real 
share prices from the actions of Player 1 and forces Player 1 to prevent such deduction. 
The described model was reduced to the zero-sum repeated games with lack of 
information on one side and with r -dimensional one-step actions with components 
corresponding to bids for various assets. In [1] it was established that 
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1) if expectations of share prices are finite, then the values of n -stage bidding 
games with assets of several types exist and does not exceed the sum of values of 
bidding games with one-type asset. 
2) if share prices have finite variances, then the values of n -stage games do not 
exceed one half of the sum of variances of share prices. This makes reasonable to 
consider the bidding of unbounded beforehand duration that are modeled by the games 
with infinite number of steps. 
Here we investigate the multistage bidding with risky assets of two types. 
We get the solutions for infinite games with probability distributions over two-
dimensional integer lattice having finite component variances. The value of such game is 
equal to the sum of component variances for distributions with integer component 
expectations and its linearization for other distributions. Therefore, this is equal to the 
sum of values of games with one risky asset (see [2]). Thus, the profit that Player 2 gets 
under simultaneous n -step bidding in comparison with separate bidding of each type of 
shares disappears in the game of unbounded duration. 
Both players have optimal strategies. The optimal strategy of Player 2 is a direct 
combination of his optimal strategies for the games with one-type asset. 
For constructing the optimal strategy of Player 1 we get the canonical symmetric 
decomposition of probability distributions over two-dimensional integer lattice with a 
fixed integer expectation vector, into a convex combination of extreme points, i.e. 
distributions with not more than thre-point supports. 
The optimal strategy of Player 1 for the bidding game for shares of two types with 
arbitrary distribution is the convex combination of his optimal strategies for such games 
with distributions having not more than three-point supports. The last are the elements of 
the symmetric representation of the initial distribution. 
The martingale of posterior mathematical expectations generated by the optimal 
strategy of Player 1 for the game with the three-point support distribution represents a 
symmetric random walk over points of integer lattice lying within the triangle spanned 
over the support points of distribution. The symmetry is broken at the moment when the 
walk hits the triangle boundary. Starting at this moment, the game get over one of games 
with distributions having two-point supports. 
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Different reasonable power indices provide different orderings of importance 
for voters, so that the evaluation of (a priori) power in (binary) voting systems is quite 
arbitrary since the rankings highly depend on the particular power index chosen. One is 
left with the hope that such discrepancies occur because the voting system at hand is rare 
enough. To better understand what happens, we analyze the ordinal equivalence of 
families of power indices. These families include the following indices: Shapley-Shubik, 
Banzhaf, the Johnston, Rae, Coleman to prevent, and Coleman to initiate. 
Power indices based on symmetric probabilistic values (or semivalues) with 
positive coefficients (regular semivalues), as the Banzhaf index or the Shapley-Shubik 
index, share the same rankings of voters within the class of weakly complete games. 
Weakly complete games contain weighted and complete games and, therefore, the most 
common real voting systems. This partially solves the problem because power indices 
are mostly applied to non-complicated voting systems derived from real problems which 
always are weakly complete. However, the analytical problem of studying the ordinal 
equivalence, even for regular semivalues, is still not solved outside weakly complete 
games. We give an extension which implies the ordinal equivalence of the Banzhaf and 
Shapley-Shubik indices (and also of the Rae and the two Coleman indices). 
The Johnston index also shows a good behavior since it is ordinally equivalent 
to Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik indices in a sufficiently large class of games containing 
complete games. Necessary and sufficient conditions are given to determine such a class. 
Oppositely, families of power indices based only on minimal winning coalitions, as 
Holler, Deegan-Packel or the Shift indices, show a non-desirable ranking behavior. 
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This paper analyzes auctions where bidders face financial constraints that may 
force them to resell part of the property of the good (or subcontract part of a project) at a 
resale market. We show that the interaction between resale and financial constraints 
changes previous results on auctions with financial constraints and those in auctions with 
resale. The reason is the link between the resale price and the auction price introduced by 
the presence of financial constraints. Such link induces a potential loser to increase the 
auction price in order to fine-tune the winner's resale offer, which may require forcing 
the winner to be financially constrained. We characterize equilibria and show how the 
auction price is related to the buyers' valuation considering the resale stage. 
Competition for acquiring a public firm or winning the allocation of a big 
facility is often characterized by the presence of a small number of qualified bidders who 
assign a large value to the good although they may face financial constraints. Because of 
this, the acquirer can share the property of the good with other buyers. One specific 
example is the allocation problem of the European Spallation Source that has to be 
allocated to a single country or location but whose property can be shared after the initial 
allocation, to alleviate the winner's financial constraints. Similarly, operating licences 
(e.g., in the telecommunications sector) are awarded to one firm, and (some or all of) the 
actual services can be subcontracted. Horizontal subcontracting is a common 
phenomenon in many industries (see, e.g., Kamien et al., 1989; Spiegel, 1993; and Chen 
et al., 2004, for further discussion and examples). There is horizontal subcontracting or 
horizontal outsourcing whenever a fraction of the final production of a good is 
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subcontracted to rival firms. Beyond these particular examples, this framework fits 
privatization processes involving the sale of a public firm to a single buyer meeting the 
(legal, administrative) requirements or the procurement of large-scale production 
contracts in the public sector. Previous work on auctions with resale relies mostly on the 
potential inefficiencies of the auction allocation mechanism to provide the basis for 
resale. An inefficient allocation may result from noisy signals at the time of the auction, 
as in Haile (2000, 2001, 2003), from bidders’ asymmetries when the auction is 
conducted as first price, as in Gupta and Lebrun (1999) or Hafalir and Krishna (2008), or 
from the presence of speculators who value the object only by its resale price, as in 
Garratt and Tröger (2006). In contrast, in our model the auction is a second price auction 
and there are no pure speculators, all participants value the good, and the resale market is 
justified by the presence of financial constraints which may force the winner of the 
auction to sell part of the property of the good. That is, if bidders were wealthy enough 
the resale market would be inactive and it is the presence of financial constraints which 
makes participants aware that there will be partial resale. 
The literature on auctions with resale has focused on the case of total resale of 
the good and to the best of our knowledge this is the first paper introducing partial resale 
in an auction framework under incomplete information. However, partial resale (or 
horizontal subcontracting) is a common assumption in two-stage contract games under 
other modes of competition. Kamien, Li and Samet (1989) study a procurement auction 
for an endogenously determined quantity of a perfectly divisible good with two identical 
and completely informed bidders. They show that decreasing returns create a need for 
subcontracting, the same role played by financial constraints in our model. Our model 
contributes to the literature on horizontal subcontracting where the object to be procured 
has a fixed size, while relaxing the important assumptions of symmetry and complete 
information. By considering a double source of asymmetry (in use-values and in 
wealths) our paper is also close to that of Spiegel (1993) where firms are supposed to 
compete in quantities rather than prices again under complete information. As in our 
model, incentives to resale arise from asymmetries and at the bidding stage firms take 
advantage of their (relative) strength. Finally, another related paper is Meland and 
Straume (2007) who analyze outsourcing in contexts in which the final allocation may 
depend on the effort undertaken by competing suppliers; as it is also the case in our 
model, they find that resale (outsourcing) increase aggregate firms profits due to 
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improved allocative efficiency. Nevertheless two important differences are noteworthy: 
first, we consider a second price auction and not an all-pay auction; second, we assume 
that use-values are private information whereas they analyze a complete information 
context. 
The main purpose of the paper is to highlight the link between the resale price 
and the auction price introduced by the presence of financial constraints. Such link 
induces a potential loser to increase the auction price in order to fine-tune the winner's 
resale offer, which may require forcing the winner to be financially constrained. We first 
compare the outcomes of the auction with resale and financial constraints, to those 
without resale or without financial constraints, and find that the loser's incentives to 
modify the resale price may preclude a truth telling behavior and also bidding the 
minimum between valuation and wealth as part of the equilibrium. We also find that the 
presence of financial constraints may eliminate the speculative equilibria à la Garrat and 
Tröger in auctions with resale. The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the 
model, which is solved in Section 2 under complete information. In Section 3 we solve 
the resale stage and the bidding stage under private information on use values and 
present the main results of the paper. Section 4 concludes. 
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The structure of the environment individuals navigate determines the 
opportunities they have to interact, a prerequisite for many economic processes. A 
network can provide a very general representation of the structure of an environment: the 
nodes are the possible states individuals can find themselves in and individuals' 
probabilities to transition to different states are determined by the links in the network. 
Here we formulate a general framework to investigate how an environment, modeled by 
a network, determines the mean time T an individual has to wait between two meetings. 
We derive an expression to compute, for any given network, how T is determined by the 
underlying network structure, and we show how T changes if we vary the network by a 
mean-preserving spread of the degree distribution. If the number of individuals is low 
(high), then a mean-preserving spread of the degree distribution of the network reduces 
(increases) the expected time between meetings. The applicability of this framework is 
illustrated by two stylized models of trading and learning. In the trading model T 
determines traders' outside option in bilateral bargaining. An extension shows how T 
changes if we introduce capacity constraints to the number of traders that can occupy a 
node in the network. In the learning model T determines the speed of convergence to the 
truth about an unknown state of the world. An extension shows how the presence of a 
small number of influencers, individuals with an extreme view and a tendency to 
gravitate toward more connected nodes, pulls a society away from the truth. 
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The Problem 
Various management cases may be described by mean of games in 
characteristic function form: see for instance Gambarelli (1982), and Gambarelli and 
Owen (1994). It is interesting for the manager to be aware not only of the resulting 
solutions, but also of the behaviour patterns that may lead him to them. However, this 
strategic aspect is lacking in the classical solutions for games in characteristic function 
form (core, values and so on). In fact, the latter are "coalition-oriented", i.e., they are 
constructed solely from the viewpoint that each coalition must satisfy all its members. 
The Approach 
The approach proposed by Gambarelli (2007) enables strategies to be placed in 
the hands of the decision-makers and therefore gives a "man –oriented" solution, which 
is generally different from classical ones. The model is developed on the basis of a 
transformation of the original game, in characteristic function form, into a corresponding 
game in normal form, thereby generalizing an analogous transformation introduced by 
von Neumann and Morgenstern for finite superadditive constant-sum games (see pp. 
238-245 of the third edition). 
The Transformation 
The transform is carried out as follows. Each player, in a preliminary 
examination of the game, asks himself the question: how much should I demand as my 
price for taking part in each coalition? If I ask too little I will be unable to optimise my 
winnings, while if I ask too much the coalition will reject me. More precisely, the more I 
 59
demand, the less probability I have of belonging to a coalition which will actually be 
formed, leading to the extreme case in which I belong to no such coalition and therefore 
can obtain nothing. The strategy profiles of each player are his claims, while the 
(expected) payments consist of these claims multiplied by the probability that the player 
belongs to a coalition that will actually be formed. 
The Solution 
The solution for the transformed game is defined as the set of Nash equilibria 
leading to Pareto optimal payments. Such payments are considered to be the solution of 
the original game. In this sense the solution can be considered very stable. 
Existence and Uniqueness 
A solution constructed in this way is not generally unique. Existence has been 
proved for a wide range of games: all the inessential games, all the subadditive games, 
all the 2-person games and, regarding equiprobable coalition games, all the 3-person 
simple games and all the n-person games with a non-empty interior of the core. A game 
lacking such a solution has yet to be found. 
In this talk 
Various questions thus remain open, including the search for solutions for the 
remaining classes of games (or counter-examples of non-existence) and of conditions for 
the uniqueness of the corresponding imputations. In this talk, some ideas will be 
presented as a response to the foregoing observations. Put briefly, conditions of 
constraint or relaxation of the solutions of the transformed game are being studied, in 
order to guarantee uniqueness and possibly existence. The solution thereby obtained 
might well become a very stable game value” of the original game in characteristic 
function form. 
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Abstract: A linear game on a plane with two pursuers and one evader is considered. The work 
deals with a numerical study of the problem based on maximal stable bridge construction. 
 
 
In work [1], a problem with two pursuers 1P  and 2P  and one evader E  is 
considered. It is supposed that all three objects move in some fixed plane. Evader heads 
the pursuers. Initially, velocities of all objects are parallel. The case is most interesting 
when the evader is located between the pursuers. The closing velocities are significantly 
great, but the control lateral accelerations are quite small, so the passing instants can be 
considered as fixed. Assuming the initial instant as zero, denote the passing instants by 
1fT  and 2fT . 
A model problem of this type can arise when studying a pursuit of an aircraft by 
two others in the horizontal plane. 
In difference coordinates, the linearized dynamics looks like  
1 1 2 2
1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2
= , = ,
= ( )/ , = ( )/ ,
= ( )/ .
P E P E
P P P P P P P P
E E E E
y a a y a a
a A u a l a A u a l
a A v a l
− + − +
− −
−
 
 

 
 Here, 1y  and 2y  are the lateral deviations of the first and second pursuers from 
the evader; 1Pa , 2Pa , Ea  are the current lateral accelerations of the pursuers and evader; 
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1u , 2u , v  are the controls; 1PA , 2PA , EA  are the maximal value of accelerations; 1Pl , 
2Pl , El  are the time lag constants. All controls have bounded absolute values:  
1 2| | 1, | | 1, | | 1.u u v≤ ≤ ≤  
In [1], a case is considered when each pursuer is stringer than the evader. This 
means that if at some instant the lateral deviation of the evader form a pursuer becomes 
zero then this pursuer provides exact capture. The game objective is to capture exactly 
the evader by at least one pursuer. 
For the case 1 2=f fT T , an analytic description is suggested in [1] for the set of all 
initial positions, from which the game can be successfully solved. With that, a passage to 
two equivalent coordinates 1x  and 2x  is applied. Each of these coordinates is one-
dimensioned and describes the forecasted lateral deviation at the passing instant. Also, 
some reasonings are given for the case 1 2f fT T≠ , which is more difficult. The most 
difficult situations (from the point of view of analytical investigation) are when one or 
both pursuers are weaker than the evader. 
This work deals with a numerical study of the problem. Numerical procedures for 
constructing maximal stable bridges [2] are involved. If 1 2=f fT T , we meet the problem 
of constructing a stable bridge in a linear game with fixed terminal time and non-convex 
cross-like terminal set. If 1 2f fT T≠ , then the problem is of guiding the system to a target 
set, which consists of the axis 1Ox  at the instant 2fT  and the axis 2Ox  at the instant 1fT . 
As a result of the investigation, the case is completely studied when both pursuers 
are stronger than the evader and 1 2f fT T≠ . Pictures of time sections of the stable bridges 
are given. 
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We observe the process and algorithm design of the dynamic change from 
information flow network to core-periphery network and program a dynamic procedure 
by Maple. The problem is one of the two main concerns that Goyal S. proposed in his 
recent research[3]. In this paper any network is chosen as the initial network, the player 
adopts optimum reaction in order specifically for current network, equilibrium network 
is formed finally only when the network structure and information volume of the player 
have reached a steady state. Based on the established model, a new incomplete 
cooperative information flow network game model which algorithm and procedure of 
dynamic generation are achieved will appear. 
While inspecting the convergence process of dynamic procedure, we also give a 
non-equilibrium example with stable topology structure, where the information content 
of players with positive information moves endlessly in circles. The conditions of the 
particular case need to be followed closely. 
At the same time a network game model about global greenhouse gas emissions 
based on bilateral quota trade is proposed. Because in fact they need more greenhouse 
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gas emission quota than what reality gains, developed country plan to set up bilateral 
trade with other countries holding quota when they shoot for quota. We try to set up 
network game model based on the multilateral quota trade; of course it is also helpful to 
carry out the research simulating the trade. 
MSC(2000): 91D30 91A25 
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Abstract: In a basic model of organizational systems control theory a system is considered where 
a sole principal controls several agents. In a wide range of practical situations the agents try to 
build some network structure by establishing bonds to each other. The principal's role (the control 
problem) is to force formation of certain bonds between agents. Given the control action the 
agents play a network formation game (NFG). Control theory imposes strong requirements on the 
game-theoretic solution concepts employed. Traditional solution concepts, like Nash equilibrium, 
when applied to NFGs, fail to satisfy these requirements. Thus, several special strategic solution 
concepts were developed in the literature for NFGs. In the report these concepts are compared 
and aligned into the line from the weakest to the strongest A general setting is considered of 
incentive problem where the principal can immediately set the bonus to the agents for the 
formation of specific networks. This problem is solved in complete information framework for 
several NGG solution concepts. 
 
 
In a basic model of organizational systems control theory [8] a system is 
considered where a sole principal controls 1n ≥  agents. The principal chooses a control 
u U∈  to maximize his/her utility function ( ,  )x uΦ , where x X∈  is a state of the 
system. Each agent has a utility function 1( ,...,  ,  )i nf y y u  that can depend on his or her 
action i iy Y∈ , actions of others agents, and the principal’s control u U∈ . Agents’ 
actions vector 1,...,  ny y  along with the control u (and, in general, some uncertain 
external parameters θ ∈ Ω ) leads to the result 1( ,...,  ,  , )nx y y u θ . Thus, given the control 
u  agents play a game with the outcome x . If the principal uses some game-theoretic 
solution concept ( )P u X⊆  to predict the outcome of the game, then the control problem 
is to find the optimal control 
( )
max min ( , )
u U x P u
u Arg x u
∈ ∈
∈ Φ . The set U  may allow for 
loopback controls ( )u x  if they make sense in a considered setting. 
If agents are involved in some network interaction (choose a path through a 
transportation network [5], participate in a process of intercommunication in a social 
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network [10], or share information with colleagues in models of information security [2], 
etc), the output x  describes the resulting parameters of this network (equilibrium traffic 
densities in networking games, sustained opinion in the models of intercommunication 
…). Specific solution concepts (like Wardrop equilibrium or information equilibrium 
[5]) allow predicting the rational actions of agents. In these models the principal 
influences agents’ behavior by directing traffic in transportation network, injecting the 
judgments into a social network, or choosing the information security policy.  
In a wide range of problems the agents form the network structure itself. For 
example, in the problem of road building investment agents must agree on the structure 
of a roads system and then share the construction costs among the parties. Agents choose 
the circle of acquaintance (and then communicate with the neighbors) in the models of 
social networks, or support the communication channels in the models of local network 
security. The principal role is to force formation of certain bonds between agents by tax 
policy or public-private partnership agreements in the problem of road investment, by 
promoting some types of bonds in social network, by limiting access in the problem of 
information security, etc.  
Often the framework of network formation employs some model of network 
interaction (game-theoretic or simulation, and sometimes rather complicated) to 
calculate the agents’ payoffs, but to stress the structure formation aspects it is supposed 
below that agents’ payoffs 1( ,...,  ,  )i nf y y u  depend solely on their network formation 
efforts yi and on control variable u. The state of the system x is a network – a directed or 
undirected graph built over the set of agents (some extensions involve the vector weights 
attached to the edges of the graph), and the problem of the principal is to find a control 
maximizing his or her utility function ( ,  )x uΦ . 
The tradition treats network formation game (NFG) as a generalization of 
cooperative game in characteristic function form, although NFGs admit purely strategic 
analysis. The mechanism of network formation (i.e. the relation between the agents’ 
efforts 1,...,  ny y  and the resulting network x( )⋅ ) can be very complicated. Typical 
mechanisms involve mutual agreement on bond formation (for example, both agents 
must agree to become friends), and unilateral formation of directed arc (usually no 
approval is required from recipients of local corporate e-mails). In the former the actions 
set of every agent includes the binary vector of offers and the vector of acceptance of 
other agents’ offers, while in the latter a binary vector of intentions is enough. 
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Control theory imposes strong requirements on the solution concepts employed 
[8]. Existence of solution guarantees the predictability of agents’ behavior, while the 
uniqueness (or narrowness) of solution concept assures the controllability of the system. 
Traditional solution concepts, like Nash equilibrium, when applied to NFGs, fail to 
satisfy these requirements (for example, the empty network is a Nash equilibrium of 
mutual agreement game irrespective of agents’ payoffs). Thus, several special strategic 
solution concepts were developed in the literature for NFGs (see the survey in [11]): 
pairwise stability [12], strong Nash stability [3], hybrid stability, and k-stability [6].*  
All these solution concepts have their own pluses and minuses. In the report I 
discuss and compare these concepts, align them into the line from the weakest to the 
strongest. This allows the principal to choose the concept that describes best agents 
capabilities in a specific setting.  
Rather common control problem is the problem of maximizing the total value of 
network – the sum of agents’ payoffs. Although in this case the goals of principal do not 
conflict with the goals of controlled system, the problem of stabilizing the effective 
network is far from trivial, and the principal has to reallocate the payoff among the 
agents in a very sophisticated way to resolve the conflict of efficiency and stability 
[4,11]. 
In the report a more general setting is considered of incentive problem where 
the principal can immediately set the bonus to the agents for the formation of specific 
networks [7]. This problem is solved in complete information framework for several 
solution concepts including pairwise stability, strong stability, and hybrid stability. The 
problem is reduced to the set of discrete optimization problems, their complexity is 
estimated, and in some cases closed form solutions are obtained. Some applications of 
the theoretic results are discussed. 
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In this paper we investigate, in a game theoretical context, the wheat market in 
South Italy. In particular we consider the ‘‘Tavoliere’’ area in the Region Puglia, this 
area is also known as ‘‘granaio d'Italia*‘‘. The ‘‘Tavoliere’’ economy is based on 
agriculture and in particular wheat-growing. Typically the farmer is also the owner of the 
land. The farmer has to choice the wheat variety to raise and consequently the quantity to 
be produced according to land availability. The selection of wheat variety is crucial since 
the European Community provides incentives only if the wheat produced satisfies 
specific characteristics in terms of protein, gluten and others. Once the wheat has been 
harvested the farm could sell it in the market at the current price which is determined in 
a specific Exchange. Nevertheless, the farmer uses to sell the wheat produced to an 
intermediate trader that will sell it, later, in the market. This is due to impossibility, for 
the farmer, to stock the harvested wheat and wait for selling it since small farmers, in 
this area, do not have grain bins. In this paper we consider a model in which there are 
two agents: the trader and the farmer. We suppose that they interact following a Leader-
Follower structure, where the trader is the Leader and the farmer is the Follower. The 
farmer has to decide the quantity to sell considering also the Communitarian incentives, 
as a best reply to the announced price asked by the trader.  
Subject Classification: 91A35; 91B32; 91A65. 
JEL Classification: C72; Q10; Q31. 
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Abstract: The main purpose of this work is to optimize cash flow in case of the encashment 
process in the ATMs network with prediction of ATMs refusal. The solution of the problems is 
based on some modified algorithms for the Vehicle Routing Problem and use statistical methods to 
compile the requests from the ATMs network. A numerical example is considered. 
 
 
In this work we consider a problem in which a set of geographically dispersed 
ATMs with known requirements must be served with a fleet of money collector teams 
stationed in the depot in such a way as to minimize some distribution objective. This 
problem is combined with the problem of composition service requests from the ATM 
network. We assume that the money collectors teams are identical with the equal 
capacity and must start and finish their routes at the depot. To estimate an average cash 
amount in each ATM and form the requests for the money collectors team we use 
following factors:  
• ATM locations and working time; 
• Irregular number of operations per week; 
• Increasing of operations number in holidays and salary days. 
Moreover we define the necessity of servicing each ATM and predict the future 
requests for the collectors teams, based on the statistical data and restrictions, which are 
proposed above. The optimal routes to load ATMs depend on the current requests and 
predictable requests.  
The main purpose of this work is to optimize cash flow in case of the 
encashment process in the ATMs network with prediction of ATMs refusal. To solve the 
problems we base on some modified algorithms for the Vehicle Routing Problem and 
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use statistical methods to compile the requests from the ATMs network. A numerical 
example is considered. 
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In this report the problem of achieving stable activities of the depositary bank 
by controlling the volume of its reserves is considered. For this we construct a model of 
the depositary bank and show how to change the distribution of the random variable 
characterizing its profits with the change of reserve. Next, using an operational measure 
of risk, described in [1], we consider how to change the riskiness of the random variable 
obtained depending on the reserve. Finally, we show the risk management strategy based 
on bank reserves, which, if it is theoretically possible, brings avoiding bankruptcy for the 
bank. 
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This presentation concerns a class of stochastic games that can be used to assess 
the impact of uncertainty in the negotiation of self enforcing international environmental 
agreements (IEA) among different groups of countries. The uncertainty in the model 
concerns the access, through R&D investment, to a new backstop technology permitting 
a clean generation of energy and also the possible occurrence of catastrophic climate 
regime change triggered by the accumulation of GHGs. The negotiation is represented 
by a cost-benefit analysis performed on optimal economic growth models for two groups 
of countries. The uncertainty is modeled as a controlled jump process. The IEA is 
represented by a Nash equilibrium in the class piecewise open-loop strategies for a 
piecewise deterministic differential game. The presentation is focused on the numerical 
method implemented to solve the large-scale dynamic programming equations 
characterizing Nash equilibrium solutions. The results are interpreted in terms of 
“optimal timing” of abatement policies in developed or developing countries.  
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Volunteers are an important resource for nonprofit organizations (npos). 
Therefore, appropriate management of volunteers can help nonprofit organizations to 
achieve their mission. However, volunteers will not blindly obey any instruction given 
by the management, as they are also rational utility optimizing agents. If volunteers are 
to exert effort then they must consider this as their optimal choice. Formal control 
systems may be problematic because they undermine the employees' intrinsic motivation 
(Frey, 1997; Frey and Jegen, 2001). Our paper may offer an explanation for ‘crowding-
out’ of intrinsic motivation. If the absence of formal control systems in a npo is viewed 
by the volunteer as a positive signal of the manager's objectives, the volunteer may 
prefer higher effort when there is no formal control system. In this perspective our paper 
is similar to Bénabou and Tirole (2003) who investigate the effects of rewards on the 
agent’s motivation. Rewards may have a hidden cost if they serve as a signal that 
reduces effort. Not only rewards serve as signals. Every action by the manager can be a 
signal if it satisfies two requirements: 1) the action is observed by the volunteer 2) the 
manager’s whose objectives are most appreciated by the volunteer has the lowest 
signaling costs. 
We construct a signaling model (Spence, 1973) of a npo involving a manager 
(she) and a ‘motivated’ volunteer (he). We assume there are two types of managers, the 
identical type who shares the same goals as the volunteer and the non-identical type who 
does not share the same goals. The order of the game is as follows: Nature chooses the 
type of the manager which is not revealed to the volunteer. The manager can send a 
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signal to the volunteer to convince him that she is of an identical type. Given the signal, 
the volunteer chooses his optimal amount of effort.  
The volunteer is by definition unpaid, but he can receive intrinsic rewards from 
the output that is produced by his effort (Besley and Ghatak, 2003), thus satisfying a 
number of functions that serve as the volunteer’s goals e.g. values, understanding, 
career, enhancement, social and protective functions (Clary et al., 1996). The volunteer’s 
goals are the functions that he wants to satisfy. Whether or not the volunteer is able to 
satisfy these goals when working for the npo, depends on the type of manager. The 
volunteer only prefers high effort when he is working for an identical manager. The 
manager can try to signal that her goals are the same as the volunteer’s. 
The signal is assumed to consist of two parts: the internal and the external 
signal. The internal signal is under control of the manager and can be increased at a cost. 
Human resource management policies (Guzzo and Noonan, 1994), mission statements or 
advertisements (Rousseau, 1995) can be viewed as part of the internal signal. The 
external signal is not under control of the manager but is sent by external actors such as 
other agents of the npo (recruiters, co-workers or former volunteers) or other 
stakeholders (donors, media, etc.). The external signal can even be unintended signals 
sent by the manager (Rousseau, 1995). We assume the external signal to be different for 
each type of manager and not necessary in line with the internal signal. This gives the 
identical manager a cost advantage when sending the signal because she benefits more 
from the external signal than the non-identical manager does. 
In solving this model we find that only three equilibriums remain: 1) a lower 
bound pooling, 2) a lower bound separating equilibrium, and 3) an upper bound 
separating equilibrium. Which of these equilibriums is chosen depends on the incentive 
compatibility constraints of the managers. The lower bound separating equilibrium 
Pareto dominates the other equilibriums. It is optimal for the identical manager to find a 
separating equilibrium at the lowest possible signaling cost. To realize this she must 
determine the optimal signal and the optimal size of the signal. Any action taken by the 
identical manager can serve as a signal of the manager’s type when it meets the 
following requirements: the action is observed by the volunteer and the identical 
manager has a relative cost advantage compared to the non-identical manager. This 
means that if the identical manager wants to move to a more favorable equilibrium, the 
range of possible actions can be large.  
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The absence of formal control systems may be a positive signal of managerial 
objectives if the volunteer can observe it and if the increase in shirking caused by this 
absence is more costly for the identical manager than for the non-identical manager. 
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A model of learning, adaptation and innovation is used to simulate the evolution 
of finite automata (executing strategies), in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma stage-game. 
A finite automaton is a mathematical model with discrete inputs and outputs. The 
specific type of finite automaton used here is a Moore machine (Moore 1956). Moore 
machines are considered a reasonable tool to formalize an agent's behavior in a 
supergame (Rubenstein 1986). A Moore machine consists of a finite set of states and a 
set of transitions from state to state that occur on input symbols chosen from an 
alphabet.  
The simulation is based on a thought experiment. Each of thirty agents is to 
choose a machine, at random, in order to play the Prisoner's Dilemma stage-game 
against each other in a round-robin structure. The period-to-period encounters occur with 
a continuation probability of delta=0.995, for an expected 200 periods. With the 
completion of all round-matches, the actual scores and machines of every agent become 
common knowledge. Based on this information, the agents update their machines for the 
next generation. The update is carried via a genetic algorithm. 
Genetic algorithms are evolutionary search algorithms that manipulate 
important schemata based on the mechanics of natural selection and natural genetics. 
Thus, genetic algorithms have the capacity to model strategic choices using notions of 
adaptation, learning and innovation explicitly. The mechanics of genetic algorithms 
involve copying machines and altering states through the operators of selection and 
mutation. Initially, reproduction is a process where successful machines proliferate while 
unsuccessful machines die off. Copying machines according to their payoff or fitness 
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values is an artificial version of Darwinian selection of the fittest among structures. After 
reproduction, selection results to higher proportions of similar successful machines. On 
the other hand, mutation is an insurance policy against premature loss of important 
notions. Even though reproduction and selection effectively search and recombine extant 
notions, occasionally they may become overzealous and loose some potentially useful 
material. In artificial systems, mutation protects against such an irrecoverable loss. 
Consequently, these operators bias the system towards certain building blocks that are 
consistently associated with above-average performance. 
In contrast to previous simulations that assumed perfect informational and 
implementation accuracy, the agents' machines are prone to errors. Bounded rationality 
is thus introduced, as random noise. This random noise takes the form of action-
implementation errors and perception errors. Implementation errors are errors in the 
implementation of actions along the lines of Selten's trembling hand; I want to cooperate 
but (maybe due to pressure), my hand trembles so I choose defection instead. On the 
other hand, perception errors are errors in the transmission of information; an opponent's 
cooperation is misperceived as a defection. 
The impact of bounded rationality on the agents' machines is then examined 
under different error-levels. In the first set of computational experiments, the machines 
are subjected to a constant independent chance of implementation and perception errors 
of 4%, 2%, 1%, 0.5% and 0%, respectively. In the second set, the errors are affected by 
an on-off switch. When the switch is on, the machines are subjected to a 4% independent 
chance of implementation and perception errors, whereas when the switch is off the 
machines have perfect informational accuracy. 
The computations indicate that the incorporation of bounded rationality is 
sufficient to alter the distribution of outcomes as well as the distribution of the agents' 
machines. In particular, the evolution of cooperative machines becomes less likely as the 
likelihood of errors increases. These results are important because they show that the 
evolution to cooperation is considerably weaker than expected; and the change in the 
model is ecologically plausible: errors are common in strategic situations. In addition, 
the prevailing (surviving) machines tend to be less complex as the likelihood of errors 
increases, where complexity is measured by the average number of accessible states. If 
one considers the measures used in the existing literature to characterize basic statistical 
properties of the equilibria, then the results are striking. 
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Furthermore, the computational experiments indicate that machines in the noisy 
environments tend to converge faster to a prevailing structure than in the error-free 
environment. Nevertheless, the prevailing structures in all conditions tend to exhibit low 
cooperation-reciprocity and low tolerance to defections. In addition, the prevailing 
structures contain more defecting than cooperating states, with the understanding that the 
cooperating states are meant to establish some consistent mutual cooperation, whereas 
the defecting states are meant as punishment-counters in case of non-conformity to the 
cooperative outcome by the opponent. Finally, in the presence of (as low as) 4% 
likelihood of errors, open-loop machines (independent of the history of play) emerge 
endogenously. The latter, cooperate for one period and defect for the next four periods 
without paying any consideration to the game-plan of the opponent. 
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Abstract: The problem of spatial competition was formulated in 1929 by Harold Hotelling. He 
considered two firms playing a two-stage game. They choose locations in stage 1 and prices in 
stage 2. If locations are chosen by competitors Nash equilibrium do not always exist. For studying 
these cases we employ the concept of the secure strategy equilibrium (SSE) which allows to solve 
the game of choosing prices for any locations. We examine a nontrivial particular case when 
prices grow if market moves from a monopoly to a duopoly. 
 
 
We study the classical problem of the effect of competition on locational 
decisions proposed by H.Hotelling in 1929 (The Economic Journal, 93, 153, (1929)). He 
considered two firms selling the same product and playing a two-stage game: in the first 
stage each firm chooses location of its sell point; in the second stage, the firm defines a 
price for its product. Consumers are spread equally along the interval and their choice is 
defined by prices and the travel costs proportional to the distance.  
One considers an interval [A,B] of length l  which can be interpreted as a street in 
a city, beech line, highway or some horizontally differentiated product in the model of 
monopolistic competition. Consumers are identical and uniformly spread on the interval 
with a particular density which can be taken as 1 without loss of generality. The sell 
points of players 1 and 2 are located at the positions a  and l b a− ≥  respectively.The 
distance between them is = 0d l a b− − ≥ . Each consumer pays some price for traveling 
for a unit distance, which can also be taken as 1 without loss of generality. Consumer at 
a given point buys the unit of product only if the sum of its price and the cost of travel to 
the sell point is less than the unit utility. Consumers have no preferences in choosing the 
firm other than minimizing the sum of the product price and travel cost. Therefore the 
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amount of the product sold by each player 1q  and 2q  equals the length of the line 
segment with the consumers who choose this player.  
One seeks for the subgame perfect equilibrium in the two-stage dynamical game: 
Stage 1. Sellers choose their locations a  and b  ( <a b l+ ). 
Stage 2. Sellers define prices for their product 1p  and 2p . 
The profit function of the first player is: 
1 1 1 1 2
1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
1 2
( ), if  ;
( , , , ) = = ( ), if  ;
0, if  
p w p p
u a b p p p q p r p p
p p
ν δ
ν δ
δ
⎧⎪ + < −⎪⎪⎪⎪ + − ≤⎨⎪⎪⎪ < +⎪⎪⎩
 
where { } { } { }2 11 1 1 1 1 1= min ,1 , = min ,1 , = min ,12p pa p w b p r pδν δ + −− + − −   
The profit function of the second player is symmetrical. 
The principal problem is that under Hotelling's assumptions the price-setting 
subgames posses equilibria in pure strategies for only a limited set of location pairs. 
D'Aspremont et al. (Econometrica, 47, 5, (1979)) defined conditions under which the 
price equilibrium in Hotelling's model fails to exist. Most of subsequent papers can be 
divided into three groups. 1) Modification of the travel cost function in such a way 
which ensures the Nash equilibria existence at all locations (D'Aspremont et al. 1979). 2) 
Solving Hotelling problem in the mixed strategies (Osborne M.J. and Pitchik C., 
Econometrica, 55, 4,1987)). 3) More sophisticated modifications of Hotelling model 
which for example take into account the preferences of consumers (Ahlin P., Duke 
Journal of Economics, IX, 1997). 
Our aim is to solve original Hotelling problem in terms of the equilibrium in 
secure strategies (ESS). The principle of ESS was proposed in (Iskakov M.B., 
Automation and Remote Control, 66, 3, (2005) and 69, 2, (2008)) as the generalization of 
Nash equilibrium. It coincides with the Nash Equilibrium when Nash Equilibrium exists 
and takes into account the intention of players to maximize their profit under the 
condition of security against the actions of other players. This approach reflects the 
natural logic of behavior of players in this model. We demonstrate that the ESS in the 
price-setting subgames exists for all location pairs in the original Hotelling model and 
provide symmetrical solution for the two-stage game. 
Below we provide principal definitions of ESS for the game = ( , , )i iG S u i N∈ . 
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Definition 1. The threat of player j  to player i  is the pair of strategy profiles 
{ ,( , )}j js s s−′  such that ( , ) > ( )j j j ju s s u s−′  and ( , ) < ( )i j j iu s s u s−′ . The profile s  is said to 
contain the threat to player i . The profile ( , )j js s−′  and the strategy js ′  of player j  is said 
to threaten to player i. 
Definition 2. Strategy is  of player i  is a simple secure strategy at a given is−  if 
the profile s  does not contain any threats for player i .  
Definition 3. The set ( )iW s  of preferable strategies secured against threats is the 
set of strategies is ′  of player i  at a given s  such that ( , ) ( )i i i iu s s u s−′ ≥  and provided that 
( , , ) ( )i i j ij iu s s s u s−′ ′ ≥  for any threat {( , ),( , , )}i i i j ijs s s s s− −′ ′ ′  of player j i≠  to player i  . 
Definition 4. The profile *s  is a simple Equilibrium in Secure Strategies (ESS) if 
and only if for all i  we have that  
*
* *
( )
arg max ( , ).
i i
i i i i
s W s
s u s s−∈
∈  
The symmetrical solution of the two-stage Hoteling game in secure strategies is 
given in the table below:  
l  0.8l ≤  [0.8,8/7]l ∈  [8/7,4/3]l ∈  [4/3,2]l ∈  [4/3,2]l ∈  
,a b  /4l  2 1
3
l −  1
2
l−  
4
l  , 0.5, 1a b a b l≥ + ≤ −  
1,2*p  l  
4 2
3
l−  
2
l  1
4
l−  0.5  
1,2*u  
2
2
l  (2 )
3
l l−  
2
4
l  (4 )
8
l l−  0.5  
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Abstract: The following game is considered. Each of n players independently observes one or two 
random variables. Getting the first observation the player have to decide either to stop or to 
continue for a second draw. No information about observations or decisions of the other players is 
available. The object of each player is to get the highest total score without going over 1. In the 
case the total scores of all players exceed 1, wins the player whose score is closest to 1. The 
regular and the disorder versions of the game are investigated. We propose the formula for 
optimal threshold strategy which maximizes the probability of winning in the n-person game. 
Numerical results are given. 
 
 
Kaynar [2] considered the version of the Showcase Showdown game of chance 
that played on every TV game show ''The Price is Right''. The game is as following. 
Each of n  players independently observes one or two random variables. Getting the first 
observation the player have to decide either to stop or to continue for a second draw. No 
information about observations or decisions of the other players is available. The object 
of each player is to get the highest total score without going over 1. In the case the total 
scores of all players exceed 1, wins the player whose score is closest to 1. 
To find out the optimal thresholds Kaynar enumerated all the winning 
probabilities and gave the final formulas for two- and three-person games. But the same 
approach couldn't be used to find out the optimal strategy for the game with arbitrary 
number of players. 
We use the dynamic programming approach to construct the final formula 
allowing to find the optimal thresholds for n -person game. Finally the solution of the 
following equation gives the optimal threshold t  maximizing the probability of the 
winning in the n -person game:  
 
2 2 1
2( 1)
1
1
= .
( 1) 2 (2 1)
n n
n
n
t t
t
n t n
−
−
−
− ++ −  
For the cases of two and three players it gives the same result as Kaynar got. 
Additionally we considered the disorder-versions of the game. We propose the 
formula for optimal threshold strategy which maximizes the probability of winning in 
the n -person game. Numerical results are also given. 
Some versions of the game of chance also have been analyzed by Coe and 
Butterworth [1] and Tijms [6]. The dynamic programming approach for optimal stopping 
problem have been considered in [3,4,5]. 
The research was supported by the Division of Mathematical Sciences (the 
program "Mathematical and algorithmic problems of new information systems"). 
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Abstract: The following version of the full-information best-choice problem with disorder is 
considered. A production system is working in the state 
1
S  and there is the constant probability 
α  that it falls into the state 
2
S . The system produces the iid random variables that distributed by 
the laws 
1
( )F x  and 
2
( )F x  in the states 
1
S  and 
2
S  respectively. The observer knows parameters 
1
( )F x , 
2
( )F x  and α  but the real state of the system is unknown. The aim of the observer is to 
maximize the probability of choosing the largest value from the finite random sequence. We find 
the optimal rule in the class of strategies where observer doesn't estimate the real state of the 
system. The numerical results are also given. 
 
 
The following version of the full-information best-choice problem with disorder 
is considered. A production system is working in the state 1S . In this state the system 
produces independent identical distributed random variables (i.i.d. r.v.) 1kX , = 1,2,...k  
with the absolutely continuous cumulative distribution function (cdf) 1( )F x . In the 
random time θ  ( = 1,2,...θ ) the system falls into the state 2S  (the disorder happens). In 
the state 2S  the system produces i.i.d. r.v. 2kX , = 1,2,...k  with the absolutely continuous 
cdf 2( )F x . The disorder moment θ  has a geometric distribution with the parameter 
(0 1)α α≤ ≤ , i.e. 1( = ) = (1 )jP jθ α α− − . 
At each time k , 1,2,...k =  the decision-maker observes the r.v. 
1 2
{ > } { }=k k k k kX X I X Iθ θ≤+  and have to choose either to STOP (and accept the value kX ) or 
CONTINUE (reject the kX  and observe 1kX + ). The decision-maker knows the cdfs 
1( )F x  and 2( )F x  and the parameter α  but the real state of the system is unknown. The 
                                                 
* The work is supported by Russian Found for Basic Research, project 10-01-00089-a. 
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object is to maximize the probability of choosing the largest value from the random 
sequence =1{ }nk kX . The time horizon is n : if the observer rejected 1n −  observations, 
she have to stop at n -th. The observation once rejected cannot be recalled later. 
We find the optimal rule in the class of strategies where observer doesn't 
estimate the state of the system. The numerical results are also given. 
This problem is the generalization of the full-information best-choice problem 
considered in [1] or [2] to the case of the disorder. The other versions of the best-choice 
problem with disorder are investigated in [3,4]. 
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Abstract: This paper deals with games with restricted cooperation. In a case of restricted 
cooperation only some coalitions (feasible coalitions) can cooperate. Three solutions for games 
with restricted cooperation will be presented. One of them (Myerson value) in well known. Two 
others based on the same principle: to construct some restricted game and use the Shapley value 
for this game. An axiomatic characterization for each possible solution which can be constructed 
by this way will be given. . 
 
 
Introduction 
The cooperative game theory usually deals with problems of a standart type: as 
a start point we have a set of players and a characteristic function (which shows how 
much profit each coalition can get in a situation of cooperation) and as a result we get a 
"fair" distribution of the profit between players. 
However, in many real life situations not every group of players has the 
opportunity to cooperate and to collect their own payoff. We say that we deal with 
cooperative games with restricted cooperation when not all coalitions can form. The 
reason of restrictions on the collection of feasible coalitions can be various, for instance 
restrictions induced by law, restrictions on the maximum number of players that are 
allowed to cooperate, restrictions because their is no full communication between 
players or restrictions because players need consent of their superiors to form coalitions 
with others. 
A situation which can be described by the player set N  and the characteristic 
function :2Nv → R  we call a classical cooperative game and a more general situation 
which can be described by triple ( , , )N v Ω  where 2NΩ ⊂  is a collection of feasible 
coalitions we call a game with restricted cooperation. The collection Ω  consists of 
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coalitions with the property that players of such coalition can cooperate together. The 
collection of all games with the restricted cooperation is denoted by GR . 
So finding of the fair distribution of the payoff for games with restricted 
cooperation is a more general problem that finding of this distribution for classic 
cooperative games. We will consider the generalization of the Shapley value for games 
with restricted cooperation. 
In this paper we use the next properties of solutions: 
Property 1 (Non-cooperative player property ) A solution x  has non-
cooperative player property if for every game with restricted cooperation ( , , )N v Ω  it 
holds that if \
S
i N S
∈Ω
∈ ∪  then ( , , ) = 0ix N v Ω . 
and just stronger 
Property 2 (Non-cooperative player out property) A solution x  has non-
cooperative out player property if for every game with restricted cooperation ( , , )N v Ω  it 
holds that if \
S
i N S
∈Ω
∈ ∪  then 
 1. ( , , ) 0ix N v Ω =  
 2. \{ }( \ { }, , ) ( , , )j N i jx N i v x N vΩ = Ω  for each \ { }j N i∈ .  
Property 3 (Weak efficiency ) A solution x  is weak efficient if for every game 
with restricted cooperation ( , , )N v Ω  with N ∈ Ω  it is true that  
( ) = ( )x N v N  
Examples of values 
Three values are defined in this section by the same way. For each of these 
values in the first we define a restricted game and after we consider the Shapley value of 
the restricted game. So the differences between three solutions are only in the ways to 
define the restricted game. 
For the Myerson value the restricted characteristic function ( , , )N v Ω  is defined 
as ( ) = ( )ir S v S∑  where iS  are components of S . For the union value ( ) = ( ( ))r S v Sσ  
where ( )Sσ  equal to union of all feasible subsets of S . Finally, for the max-value 
,
( ) = ( )max
T S T
r S v S
⊂ ∈Ω
. 
About a history of these three values: 
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Myerson (1980) defined and characterized the Myerson value for arbitrary 
collection of feasible coalitions with the only condition that all singletons are feasible. In 
this paper we consider the generalization of this value for the case of arbitrary set system 
(so we can delete the condition about a feasibility of singletons). 
The union value was defined and characterized in van den Brink, Katsev, van 
der Laan (2009) for situations where collection Ω  is union closed. In this paper we 
define this value for situation with an arbitrary set system Ω . 
The max-value value is defined in this paper. 
The max-value has the next properties: fairness, balanced contribution, non-
cooperative player out property and weak efficiency. But it don't have additivity. Instead 
of it the value has two another important properties: 
Property 4 (Independence of irrelevant coalitions) A value x  is independent 
of irrelevant coalitions is it doesn't change with changing of the characteristic function 
v  on non-feasible coalitions.  
Property 5 (Monotone positiveness) A value x  for games with restricted 
cooperation has a monotone positiveness property if for every monotone and non-
negative game ( , )N v  ( ( ) 0v S ≥  for all S ⊂Ω ) it is true that the value x  is also non-
negative ( ( , , ) 0ix N v Ω ≥  for all i N∈ ).  
It is simple to see that both Myerson and union values have not all of properties 
of the max-value. Moreover, it is possible to prove the next theorem: 
Theorem 2.1 There is no value for games with restricted cooperation with the 
next properties: additivity, fairness, non-cooperative player out property, independence 
of irrelevant coalitions, weak efficiency and monotone positiveness.  
This theorem shows that the considering of max-value has sense and we cannot 
find any solution with all properties of this value plus additivity. 
The general axiomatization 
Let us consider a class Ω  of solutions for games with restricted cooperation. A 
solution belongs to this class if it has next properties: balanced contribution and non-
cooperative player property. 
Let us formulate the main result of this paper: 
Theorem 3.1 For every pair of different solutions ,x y A∈  there is a game with 
restricted cooperation ( , , )N v Ω  such that ( ) ( )x N y N≠ . 
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The theorem says that if we know that a solution x  has balanced contribution 
property and non-cooperative player property then it is sufficient to know the value 
( )x N  for each situation ( , , )N v Ω  for finding x  on the class of games with restricted 
cooperation. For a characterization of 3 solution which was defined in the previous 
section we should give three different definitions of efficiency. 
Definition 3.2 A solution x  is 'Myerson efficient' if for every 2  we have  
( ) = ( )
( )C C
x N v C
N∈ Ω
∑  
Definition 3.3 A solution x  is 'union efficient' if for every ( , , )N v Ω  we have  
( ) =
S
x N v S
∈Ω
⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∪  
Definition 3.4 1 A solution x  is 'max-efficient' if for every ( , , )N v Ω  we have  
max( ) = ( )
S
x N v S
∈Ω
 
It should be noted that each of approaches looks reasonable. We can formulate 
an evident corollary of the theorem which gives us three characterization of values 
defined above: 
Corollary 3.52 1. The Myerson value is the unique value with balanced 
contribution, non-cooperative player property and Myerson efficiency 
2. The union value is the unique value with balanced contribution, non-
cooperative player property and union efficiency 
3. The max-value is the unique value with balanced contribution, non-
cooperative player property and max-efficiency 
Let us give one more theorem which says that there is a one-to-one 
correspondence between kinds of efficiency and solutions for games with restricted 
cooperation with balanced contribution property. 
Theorem 3.6 3 Consider a function :f GR → R . Let us suppose that f  has the 
next property: if =Ω ∅  then ( , , ) = 0f N v Ω . 
 Then there is a unique single-valued solution for games with restricted 
cooperation x A∈  such that for each game ( , , )N v GRΩ ∈  it holds that  
( , , ) = ( , , )i
i N
x N v f N v
∈
Ω Ω∑  
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Abstract: A game with restricted cooperation is a triple (N,v,K), where N is a finite set of players, 
K is a collection of feasible coalitions of players including the grand coalition N, and v is a 
characteristic function defined on the collection K. The definition implies that if K consists of all 
coalitions, then the game (N,v,K)=(N,v) is the classical cooperative game with transferable 
untilities (TU). The class G of all games with restricted cooperation with an arbitrary universe of 
players is considered. A solution PN_r called the restricted prenucleolus is defined for the class G 
by the same way as the prenucleolus is defined for classical TU games. For every game (N,v,K) 
the solution ( , , )rPN N v Ω  consists of all payoff vectors which lexicographically minimize ordered 
excess vectors for the coalitions from K. Necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of the 
restricted prenucleolus and those providing its single-valuedness are given. 
 
 
A game with restricted cooperation is a triple ( , , )N v Ω , where N  is a finite set 
of players, 2 ,NΩ ⊂  where ,N ∈ Ω  is a collection of feasible coalitions, :v Ω → R  is a 
characteristic function. The definition implies that if = 2 ,NΩ  then the game 
( , , ) = ( , )N v N vΩ  is a classical TU cooperative game. 
The restricted prenucleolus for a class of games with restricted cooperation is 
defined as a solution, consisting for each game ( , , )N v Ω  of the set of its payoff vectors 
which lexicographically minimize ordered excess vectors for the coalitions from .Ω  
For "poor" collections Ω  it may be set-valued and even may not exist. For 
example, for = {1,2,3}N , = {1,2},{2,3}Ω  for any characteristic function v  the 
restricted prenucleolus does not exist, because the minimum of 
max{ ({1,2}, ), ({2,3}, )}e x e x  over efficient payoff vectors is not attained since this 
maximum tends to −∞  when 2 .x → ∞  
Note that existence or not existence of the restricted prenucleolus depends only 
on ,Ω  but not on a characteristic function .v   
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Let N  be fixed, Ω  be a collection of coalitions of N  such that the restricted 
prenucleolus ( , , )rPN N v Ω  exists for all characteristic functions .v  Let ( , , ),rx PN N v∈ Ω  
1
( , , )x v Ω ⊂ ΩS  be the collection of coalitions on which maximal excesses for x  are 
attained:  
1
( , , ) = { | ( ) ( ) = max{ ( ) ( )}.
Q
x v S v S x S v Q x Q
∈Ω
Ω ∈ Ω − −S  
Lemma 1. The collection 
1
( , , )x v ΩS  is either balanced or equals Ω  and Ω  is 
weakly balanced.  
For an arbitrary collection of coalitions S  consider | | | |N×S  matrix 
|| ||=|| ||, .
S
Sχ ∈S S  We say that the collection S  has rank m, if the rank of matrix || ||S  
is equal to m. 
Theorem 1 Given an arbitrary game ( , , )N v Ω , its restricted prenucleolus 
( , , )rPN N v Ω  is single-valued if and only if the collection Ω  is balanced and has rank 
n N= .  
Let rbG  be the class of games with restricted cooperation defined by balanced 
and having the full rank collections of feasible coalitions. 
Proposition 1 The restricted prenucleolus for the class rbG  is efficient, anonymous w.r.t. 
the players and the coalitions, covariant, and consistent.  
Single-valuedness and anonymity of the restricted prenucleolus imply its equal 
treatment property defined by  
( { }) ( { })v S i v S j∪ = ∪  for all , , ( , , ) ( , , )r r
i j
S i j S PN N v PN N v∈ Ω ∉ ⇒ Ω = Ω . 
The class rbG  as a class of games with the single-valued restricted prenucleolus 
can be widen by extending the equal treatment property to another property of symmetry 
of a solution. 
Definition 1 Two players ,i j N∈  are identical in 2NΩ ⊂  if for each S ∈ Ω  
either , ,i j S∈  or { },i j S∩ = ∅ . 
Evidently, in classical TU games with 2NΩ =  there are no identical players in 
the definition. When 2NΩ ⊂ , 2NΩ ≠  identical players may exist. Such players have 
identical powers in all games with the feasible collection Ω  independently of their 
characteristic functions. 
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Definition 2 Given , ( )N v N  and a collection Ω  of coalitions from N , the set of 
egalitarian payoff vectors is the set  
( , , ) = { ( , , )| = if , are identical in }.i jS N v x X N v x x i jΩ ∈ Ω Ω  
Definition 3 A symmetric restricted prenucleolus ( rsPN ) for the game ( , , )N v Ω  
is the set of egalitarian payoff vectors defined by  
( , , ) = { ( , , )| = if , are identical in }.rs r i jPN N v x PN N v x x i jΩ ∈ Ω Ω  
In view of this definition it may turn out that the restricted prenucleolus for 
some game is set-valued, but the symmetric restricted prenucleolus is single-valued. Let 
us give the conditions providing single-valuedness of the .rsPN  
Theorem 2 | ( , , ) |= 1rsPN N v Ω  if and only if the collection Ω  is balanced and 
has rank ( ),k Ω  where ( )k Ω  is the number of classes of identical players.  
In cooperative game theory there are models named cooperative games with 
coalitional structures (CGCS). Such a model is a triple ( , , )N v B  where N  is a set of 
players, : 2Nv → R  is a characteristic function, 
1
= ( ,..., )
k
B BB  is a partition of .N  
Solutions for CGCS are defined as those for classical cooperative games with taking into 
account the partitions as the first level of cooperation. The most known value for CGCS 
is the Owen value (Owen 1977), and the "Shapley-Shapley" value (Kamijo 2009) both 
being modifications of the Shapley value. Note that the collections of feasible coalitions 
for these values differ: for the Owen value the collection Ω  consists of 1) all unions of 
the coalitions of the partition, 2) all subsets of each coalition of the partition, and 3) 
unions of one subset of a coalition and arbitrary coalitions of the partition. The Shapley-
Shapley value depends only on coalitions of 1) and 2) types. 
In the definition of these solutions it is possible to replace the Shapley value by 
any other TU game value. In all cases we obtain new values for CGCS. We replace the 
Shapley value by the prenucleolus and obtain two new solutions: the Owen-type 
prenucleolus and the Kamijo-type prenucleolus. Axiomatizations of both solutions have 
been obtained. 
Theorem 3 For the class of CGCS with an infinite universe set of players the 
Owen-type prenucleolus is the unique value satisfying the properties: non-emptiness, 
covariance, outer symmetry, inner symmetry, coalitional consistency, consistency games 
with only one coalition in a partition.  
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The new property - coalitional consistency - means that only coalitions of the 
partition may leave the game. 
Theorem 4 For an infinite universal set of players the Kamijo-type 
prenucleolus is the unique value for the class of CGCS satisfying the properties: non-
emptiness, covariance, anonymity w.r.t. the players, and consistency.  
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In standard cooperative game theory it is assumed that any coalition of players 
may form. However, in many practical situations the collection of feasible coalitions is 
restricted by some social, economical, hierarchical, communicational, or technical 
structure. The study of TU games with limited cooperation introduced by means of 
communication graphs was initiated by Myerson (1977). In this paper we restrict our 
consideration to the class of cycle-free directed graph games in which all players are 
partially ordered and a possible communication via bilateral agreements between 
participants is presented by a directed graph (digraph) without directed cycles. A cycle-
free digraph cooperation structure allows modeling of various flow situations when some 
links may merge while others split into several separate ones. Following Myerson, we 
assume that for a given game with cooperation structure, cooperation is possible only 
among productive coalitions of players, while in a directed graph not every connected 
coalition might be productive. 
We introduce values for cycle-free digraph games axiomatically and provide 
their explicit formula representation, we also study their stability. Furthermore, we show 
that the problem of sharing a river with a delta and with multiple sources among 
different agents located at different levels along the river bed can be embedded into the 
framework of a cycle-free digraph game. 
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Abstract: A two-person non-antagonistic positional differential game with simple dynamics and 
with cost functionals of players containing integral terms is considered. Besides, one of players 
has two goals (vector criterion).The formalization of players’ strategies in the game is based on 
the formalization and results of antagonistic positional differential game theory developed by 
Krasovskii and Subbotin. The analysis of the game uses also results of the non-antagonistic 
positional differential game theory obtained by the author. There are several stages in research of 
the problem. At the beginning, the set of attainability for given initial condition and given 
constraints is constructed. Then, so-called acceptable trajectories are selected. Thereafter, we 
separate out Pareto optimal trajectories, which are acceptable for both players. Finally, optimal 
strategies are constructed. 
 
 
Consider a two-person non-antagonistic positional differential game (NPDG) 
which dynamics is described by the following equation 
,x u v= +  2, ,x u v R∈ , u ,μ≤  v μ≤ , 0 0( )x t x= . 
Cost functionals of the first player (P1) 1I  and of the second player (P2) 2I  
are given 
0
2
1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) min,
t
I x w u v d
ϑ
ϑ τ τ τ τ= + + →∫  
0
2
2 ( ( ) , ( ) ( ) ( ) ) max
t
I x a w u v d
ϑ
ϑ τ τ τ τ= − − + →∫ ), 
where a  is a given point in the plane; ϑ  is the fixed final time of the game. 
Control u  is governed by P1, while P2 governs a pair of controls ( , )v w , where 
1 2wα α≤ ≤ . 
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One can interpret the problem in the following way. P1, who chooses his 
control u , tends to minimize the distance from the origin at the moment ϑ , and 
simultaneously to minimize the total “energy” cost under condition that energy 
“price”w  is chosen by P2. In turn, P2, who chooses his control v  and energy “price” w , 
has two goals (vector criterion): the first one is to minimize the distance from the aim 
point a  at the moment ϑ , and the second one is to maximize the total energy cost. 
Assume that both players know value of the phase vector ( )x t of the game at the 
current moment of time t . Besides, assume that P1 knows values of both controls of P2 
at the current moment of time t . The formalization of players’ strategies in the game is 
based on the formalization and results of antagonistic positional differential game theory 
[1,2]. The analysis of the game uses also results of the non-antagonistic positional 
differential game theory [3,4]. 
A particular case of the problem is when, firstly, ( )w t const≡ , and, secondly, 
P2 has only one goal, notably, second one, was considered in [3]. 
There are several stages in research of the problem. At the beginning, the set of 
attainability for given initial condition and given constraints is constructed. Then, so-
called acceptable trajectories are selected. Thereafter, we separate out Pareto optimal 
trajectories, which are acceptable for both players. Finally, optimal strategies are 
constructed. 
The report is supported by Russian Foundation of Basic Research, grant  
 09–01–00313. 
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This paper developes the graph-theory approach to multidimensional screening. 
It describes the graph-structures of solutions, their characterizationg and method of 
finding them through graphs, for revealing their properties and comparative statics. Our 
setting considers discrete consumer types, one outside option –non-participation, and one 
pricing tool –tariff for a quantity/quality bundle. Most results require only quasi-linearity 
of utilities and separability of costs w.r.t. bundles. 
A solution structure is a list of active incentive-compatibility and participation 
constraints percepted as a directed arc ( i j→ ) connecting two agent-nodes ,i j . This " 
A-graph" is a " river"when it is in-rooted and dicycles (closed directed paths) are absent. 
To overcome dicycles and other technical hardships, this paper applies a small parameter 
0ρ ≥  relaxing each constraint. 
Under quite weak assumptions on preferences and costs we find that any 
solution has an in-rooted A-graph, and under strict relaxation > 0ρ  any A-graph is a 
river, while bunching among predecesors and successors in the graph is excluded. Thus, 
two major impediments in characterizing and finding solutions are overcome: (1) unclear 
                                                 
*We gratefully acknowledge the research support from the University of Louisville, the Economic 
Education and Research Consortium (EERC), financed by the Eurasia Foundation; USAID; GDN; 
the World Bank Institute and the Government of Sweden (EERC grant R06-0561). We are grateful 
for the assistance and comments from Richard Ericson, Victor Polterovich and especially Alexei 
Savvateev. 
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existence of the Lagrange multipliers; (2) often more narrow list of positive multipliers 
than the list of active constraints. 
More surprizingly, the reverse is true: every river is a solution structure for 
some screening problem. We enumerate all possible rivers, i.e., different " regimes" of 
screening: 5 for two consumers, 79 for three consumers, 2865  for four, and so on. 
Based on these findings, we characterizes any solution through its spanning-tree 
without first-order conditions (FOC) and, under differentiability and relaxation > 0ρ , 
through FOC. Therefore, to find all solutions in (generally non-convex) optimization it is 
sufficient to try FOC for all rivers and then compare the resulting local optima. 
Related " trees-and-rivers" algorithm first classify the variety of solution 
structures (trees and rivers) according to longest-path preorder. Each preorder-family is 
explored starting with its spanning-tree. If the tree-specific solution to the optimization 
program turns out feasible (i.e., the unconstrained argmaximum of the profit function 
satisfies all inequalities), then studying the rest of this family becomes redundant. 
Otherwise we obtain the upper bound on profit attainable from this family. The whole 
family is rejected when this new family-specific upper bound is lower than any feasible 
lower bound obtained previously. Further, if the plan is found incompatible with any 
not-in-tree inequality but the family is not rejected, the tree-specific program is enriched 
by additional constraints starting with the violated one. Adding these " bypasses" 
transforms the tree-specific program into the river-specific program. Through 
supplementing the tree with all its downstream bypasses, all rivers in this family can be 
explored. But only some should be explored, since each trial updates the upper and lower 
bounds on profit for rejecting some families and sub-families of rivers without trying. 
Exhausting the list of all possible spanning-trees and related families of rivers completes 
the algorithm. 
We design also another, "relaxation" algorithm for finding the screening 
optima. It starts optimization with the first-best non-feasible solution, i.e., solution when 
all incentive compatibility constraints are relaxed for big =ρ ∞ . Then the relaxation is 
gradually decreased to = 0ρ  through certain steps. At each step one or several local 
optima emerge, their set is explored to find the true optimum. 
The comparison of the two algorithms in efficiency remains an open question. 
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Abstract: Problems concerning application of cooperative game theory's tooling under the 
simulation of relationships of public private partnership (PPP) are considered in the thesis. 
Special focus is devoted to the situation of non-deterministic utilities received by potential 
coalitions of participants. Under the terms of named situation an approach has been offered based 
on the concept of stochastic cooperative games. 
 
 
Under the conditions of modern Russian economy public private partnership 
(PPP) is becomming more and more popular and effective instrument for complex 
solving of infrastructure problems, that from one side are in the responsibility’s zone of 
the government, and from the other side are the tasks of entrepreneurial business of the 
firms. The importance of PPP’s role has strengthened at the stage of negotiation of 
Russian economy the consequences of world financial crisis. 
The problem of income’s distribution between participants of PPP project is 
among the topest-priority tasks arose under investigation of cooperation of participants 
that implement project by joining forces of government and private sector. Its 
formulation predefines to a considerable degree the choice of hardware tools that are 
adequate the environment of so complicate and diversified object as PPP used to be. 
Therefore the idea of use of cooperative game theory seems to be highly productive and 
attractive. In the simplest case the process of alliance of potential investors in 
partnerships can be presented in the form of a classical cooperative game consisted of n 
players with transferable utility. This model opens quite broad possibilities for analysis 
concerning relationships of uprising and evolution of PPP’s associations on the base of 
classical approaches to solving cooperative games. Primarily it’s C-core, N-core, K-core 
and vector Shapley. However it can not be denied that one of the crucial problems 
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among others that are emerged under implementation of game-theoretic approaches in 
modeling PPP becomes the problem of construction of characteristic function in a 
cooperative game. In particular admission, concerning possibility of describing of 
potential gains for each potential coalition, consisted of supposed participants of PPP’s 
projects with determinate values, seems to be quite disputable. Considerably supposal of 
stochastic character of these values appears to be more realistic and attractive. However 
under these assumptions we lost the possibility of direct introduction of classical 
cooperative game’s tooling. The pass to tools of stochastic cooperative games becomes 
one of the possible methods for overcoming of this difficulty. 
A setup consisted of set of players {1.. }I m=  and characteristic function ( )v S  
assigning to any subset (coalition) of players S I⊂  one gain attained by this coalition 
will be taken as stochastic cooperative game (SCG) with transferable utility. The 
principal distinction of suggested definition of stochastic cooperative game from the 
traditional definition of classical cooperative games with transferable utility lies in the 
fact that in given definition gain of coalition ( )v S  is supposed to be a random variable 
with any known distribution function ( )SF x . In the following stochastic cooperative 
game will be briefly denoted by ( , ).I v . 
A vector nx R∈  given distribution of utilities between participants of a game 
can be considered as an imputation in SCG. This vector fulfills the following conditions: 
(1) individual rationality of players 
{ }i ix v α≥ ≥P   or what is the same 1( )i ix F α−≥ ; 
(2) reachability of gain provided a imputation for a full (gross) coalition 
{ ( )}i
i
x v I α≤ ≥∑P   or 1( )i I
i
x F α−≤∑ , 
where 1( )iF α−  is a fractile for probability α  of distribution functions for a player 
i  ( 1( )IF α−  - for a full coalition, respectively) 
Under given approach to cooperative games such concepts as superadditivity 
and convexity can receive interesting development. 
Particularly a game will be named strongly superadditivity if for any α  
 1 1 1( ) ( ) ( )
S T S T
F F Fα α α− − −∪ ≥ + , (1) 
where 1 1 1( ), ( ), ( )S T S TF F Fα α α− − −∪  are fractiles for probability α  of distribution 
functions for coalitions S  and T , and also for a coalition S T∪ , that is formed in the 
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result of their alliance. A game will be named not strongly superadditivity (almost 
superadditivity) if condition (1) is fulfilled for all α , beginning from one α′ . 
In according with similar principles we can introduce a concept of convex 
(almost convex) SCG, understood under this games for which ( : ) :α α α α′ ′∀ ∃ ∀ ≥  
 1 1 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
S T S T S T
F F F Fα α α α− − − −∪ ∩≥ + − . (2) 
Finally approaches to definitions of solutions can be directly carried over SCG. 
In particular a stochastic Cα -core should be read as set of imputations: 
 ( ) { | , : { ( ) ( )} ;
{ ( ) ( )} }.
I
C v x R S I v S x S
v I x I
α α
α
= ∈ ∀ ≠ ∅ ≤ ≥
≥ ≥
P
P
 
  (3) 
In our judgment approaches to model development of PPP’s relationships, 
based on suggestion that a relationship between participants of PPP can be presented as 
stochastic cooperative game, seem to be enough useful and eventually, they allow to 
receive important conclusions in economical theoretical plan concerning regularities of 
development of such a form, found on interaction of government and private industry. 
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Abstract: Collective decision problem in which preferences of agents are private information is 
considered. In situation, when desired social choice function is not dominant strategy incentive 
one can try to virtually implement it – try to find another social choice function, that can be 
implemented in dominant strategies and arbitrary close to desired one. It is proved that iff social 
choice function is linear aggregation of agents best alternatives, then its best virtual 
implementation is direct mechanism, constructed from it. 
 
Collective decision problem in which preferences of agents are private 
information is considered. For society N with n agents facing a set A of alternatives, a 
social choice function determines what alternative to choose for each possible profile of 
preferences in case when there is no private information. Situation, when social choice 
function (SCF) is not dominant strategy incentive compatible (or strategy-proof) is 
considered – there is no mechanism that can implement it in dominant strategies [see 
Jackson (2001)]. And it can be very desirable SCF - for example, it can maximize total 
utility of the society (sum of utilities of agents) for any possible profile of preferences. In 
this case one can try to virtually implement [see, for example Jackson (2000)] this SCF – 
try to find another SCF, that can be implemented in dominant strategies and arbitrary 
close to desired one. 
I consider the setting when the set of feasible alternatives A is a Cartesian 
product range in mℜ (M – set of dimensions) and agent’s preferences multidimensional 
single-peaked (each agent i N∈  has unique most preferred alternative – agent’s top 
1( , , )mi i iτ τ τ= … ) with the added requirement that the unconstrained maximal element of 
these preferences belongs to A. Due to Barbera, Masso and Serizawa (1998) and Border 
and Jordan (1983), any SCF in this setting is strategy-proof if and only if it is a 
generalized median voter scheme. This result follows Moulin’s (1980) initial analysis of 
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the one-dimensional case (A ⊆ ℜ ). According to all this studies and Bossert and 
Weymark (2008) if SCF is strategy-proof, then it is tops-only – result of SCF depends 
only from profile 1( , , )nτ τ τ= …  of agent’s tops. 
I consider class ∏  of tops-only SCF : nf A A→ , that satisfies following 
conditions: 
1. monotonic over agent’s tops; 
2. continuous over agent’s tops; 
3. satisfies unanimity condition; 
4. separable over dimensions (for multidimensional case). 
For any SCF f , satisfying this condition I characterize strategy-proof SCF 
: nf A A→ , that is virtual implement it, minimizing following criteria: 
1
( , ) max ( ) ( )
n LA
K f f f f
τ
τ τ
∈
= −   
Using this characterization and results for equivalent direct mechanisms in 
Burkov, Iskakov, Korgin (2008), I extend Burkov’s (1989) initial results for 
SCF ( )
1
1 n
i
i
f
n
τ τ
=
= ∑  in one-dimensional case to multidimensional case and class of SCF 
of linear aggregation: 
1
1
( ) ( ( ), , ( )), # ,m
m
f f f m Mτ τ τ= =…  
1
( ) ,
n
k k k
k i i
i
k M f τ α τ
=
∀ ∈ = ∑  
1
1, 1.
n
k k
i i
i
k M i Nα α
=
∀ ∈ = ∀ ∈ ≥∑  
Following result is proved.  
Theorem. SCF 
( )
( ) arg min ( ( ), ( ))f K f
π τ
τ τ π τ∗
∈Π
=  is Nash implemented by 
mechanism { nA , f } if f  is SCF of linear aggregation. 
Other words – iff SCF is linear aggregation of agents best alternatives, then its 
best virtual implementation is direct mechanism, constructed from it. 
Practical corollary of this theorem is that any SCF of linear aggregation may be 
considered as weakly manipulated - best virtual implementation of such SCF f  - is 
direct mechanism, constructed from this SCF - { nA , f }. If such SCF is used for 
collective decision problem in case of full information, then in case of private 
information it is no need to change rules of decision making. 
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Abstract: The differential game of oligopolistic competition by advertising on fashion market is 
considered. The companies try to maximize their profit over an infinite horizon. The Nash 
equilibrium and the optimal expression for the optimal strategy have been found. 
 
This paper considers the model of competition by advertising. Fashion market is 
investigated. The model uses some of its specifications. The first specification is that 
customers are divided to those who are loyal to the whole fashion market and to those 
who are not loyal. The loyal customers to the market are those who buy more than two 
items a year in each firm from the industry. The second specification is that it is 
necessary to advertise the products of the firm only for the potential customers. 
It is supposed that there are n firms (players) on the market. The model assumes 
that market has its maximum sales potential N . The firms use advertising 
( ), 1,...,
i
a t i n= , as a strategic instrument with an effectiveness 
i
β  to find new customers 
and to increase their sales ( ).
i
s t  Players want to maximize their discounted profit 
i
V  
over an infinite horizon: 
2
0
0
max ( ) ,i
i
r t
i i ia
e q s a dt
∞
−
>
−∫  
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where
i
q is unit contribution and 
i
r  is discount rate of firm i . The cost of advertising is 
intended to be quadratic. 
The model considers the dynamic demand as 
1
, 1,..., ,
n
i i i i j
j
s a N s s i nβ ρ
=
= − + =∑  
where ρ  is the rate of the loyal customers. 
This model is a modification of the Vidale-Wolfe model, which takes in 
account the specifications of the fashion market. 
Using the models for 
i
V  and 
i
s we set the dynamic differential game: 
1
2
0
0
( ) , 1,..., ,
max ( ) .i
i
n
i i i i j
j
r t
i i ia
s t a N s s i n
e q s a dt
β ρ
=
∞
−
>
⎧⎪⎪ = − + =⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪ −⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
∑
∫

 
The Nash equilibrium and the expression for the optimal advertising strategies 
were found for this problem. Also the comparative analysis for the case of the symmetric 
competition has been performed.  
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The notion of the market equilibrium has been used in research on emission 
reduction games. An underlying phenomenon is the lack of well-established currency in 
the market of emission reductions; the market operation requires therefore special “rules 
of the game”, acceptable for all market players. One of the possible “rules of the game” 
suggests bilateral agreements on the rates of emission exchange. A set of bilateral 
emission exchange rates is understood as the market equilibrium if each player’s 
emission reduction exchanged to the emission reductions of all the other players 
maximizes the player’s utility under that set of exchange rates. Finding the market 
equilibrium without revealing the individual utilities can constitute the goal of various 
multi-round negotiation processes. 
In this talk, a brief outline of emission reduction games will be followed by a 
presentation of a dynamic game of interacting economic agents. The model suggests that 
each agent produces a unique good vital for the other agents. In that group of 
“monopolists” a market price formation mechanism can hardly emerge; the economic 
development is driven by bilateral rates of exchange in goods. The notion of the market 
equilibrium is used to define the growth dynamics acceptable for all the agents. The 
market equilibrium is formed as a set of time-varying bilateral exchange rates that allow 
each agent to produce his/her good via maximizing his/her individual integrated utility in 
response to the good offers from the other agents. In the talk, an illustrative example will 
be provided, and robustness properties of the market equilibrium will be discussed.  
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Abstract: One of the most important aspects of modeling of taxation – tax control is studied in the 
network of game theoretical attitude. Realization of systematic tax audits is considered as the 
interaction of two players – hiding (T – taxpayer) and seeking (A – authority) – in different 
statements of the search game. When the problem is stated it is assumed, that tax authorities know 
due to indirect signs, that some taxpayer T evaded from taxation in the given period (he put down 
his income too low in his tax declaration). Also it is assumed, that this taxpayer is quite a large 
company, having many branches. Company can distribute the hidden income among all or some of 
its branches or can hide it in the income of one of its branches. Different game cases, which 
conditions are determined by various possibilities of the evading taxpayer and the tax authority, 
are considered. In the conditions of the games considered, tax authorities A solve the problem of 
maximization of its income, using mixed strategies, which allow making optimal (in sense of 
evasion search) tax audits. Taxpayers T aspire to hide their income with the help of mixed 
strategies, allowing to reduce a probability of revealing of their evasion. While solving the task of 
tax audits it should be taken into account, that practically tax authorities are hierarchic structures 
and are solving tasks on different levels (federal, regional, district etc.). That’s why in the 
considered game-theoretical examples the solution of this task is made with the use of the search 
theory of immobile chain with the help of a big search system. Tax authorities’ task is to maximize 
the probability of revealing of evasion is solved with the help of the optimal (in the given sense) 
distribution of search efforts on the given period of time. A company solves the opposite task: to 
distribute evasion in the way, that minimizes probability of evasion revealing. Thus, different 
possibilities of solving the task of tax evasion search are considered.. 
 
 
Optimal search of possible tax evasion and dependence of this search's results 
on spent resources (number of searching units, finance etc.) are important questions of 
modeling of the tax auditing ([1,2]). The task of the search of tax evasions with the help 
of the different configurations of the search games ([3]), where the players are tax 
authority (A - authority) and taxpayer (taxpayers) (T - taxpayers) is studied below.  
At the end of the given tax period each taxpayer declares income and pays tax 
in compliance with them. Let's assume, that tax authority knows due to indirect signs, 
that some firm evaded from taxation in the given period (it put down lower than real 
income in the tax declaration). Let's also assume, that this firm is quite a large company, 
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having many branches. The company can distribute the concealed income among all or 
some of its branches.  
The tax authority has hierarchical structure and solves tasks on different levels 
(federal, regional, distirct e t.c.). Taking this feature into account, use of the described in 
[5] theory of search of immobile chain with the help of a big search system becomes 
acceptable to the task of tax audits.  
Let's suppose, that the firm conceals income only in one of n  branches. Let k  
be the number of this branch; the tax autority doesn't know it. The search of the object 
(concealed income) is realized in the discrete space of n  branches. Speaking, that the tax 
authority is a big search system, as in [5], let's assume, that the activity of the system's 
separate unit can be defined with the help of function of density or strategy of search 
( )i tλ . The vector 1= ( , , )nu u u…  characterizes a distribution of a tax evasion among 
branches (each its component iu  is the probability of evasion of the i -th branch). A 
posteriori distribution of the evasion is characterized by the function 
1( ) = ( ( ), , ( ))nu t u t u t… . 
After some transformations the probability of revealing of the company's 
evasion in the time interval (0; )T , which is a period of limitation for tax crimes, is 
found:  
 
0
=1
( ) = 1 exp( ( ) )
n T
i i
i
P T u dλ τ τ− −∑ ∫ . (1) 
Along with ( )i tλ  function ( )i tφ  is considered, which is the number of search 
resources, spent on the revelation of the tax evasion in the i -th branch during the time 
interval (0; )T . Then (1) gets the form  
 
=1
( ) = 1 exp( ( ))
n
i i
i
P T u Tφ− −∑ . (2) 
The tax authority's task is such a distribution of search resources ( )i Tφ  in the 
branch in the given period of time (0; )T , that maximizes the probability (2). The 
company's task is opposite: to distribute an evasion in such a way, that minimizes 
probability of revealing of evasion ( )P T .  
Then several models of the search of evasion, which based on the matrix search 
games, described in ([3]), are considered:  
• The model of search of evasion, which is concentrated in the one branch;  
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• The model of search of evasion, which is concentrated in one or two branches;  
• The model with the possibility of auditing of the nearest branches only;  
• The model with the distribution of the concealed income among m  branches;  
• The model with the distribution of equal or different parts of the concealed 
income among m  branches.  
Within the bounds of the mentioned models the search of the players' optimal 
mixed strategies and respective profits is realized. To solve the dependence of the 
evasion revealing probability on the spent search resources is taken into account in the 
solution of the appropriate games.  
The considered games demonstrate different possibilities of the application of 
the search theory to the modeling of the tax control.  
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Any computational program needs to be fed with input data. And this does not 
depend on the language and/or environment, which with the program is written. The 
simplest and the most wide-spread format of input data is ‘‘plain text’’, when the input 
file is just a serie of numbers, which sense is defined by their positions in the serie. For 
example, if our program solves a linear differential equation =x Ax  with an initial 
condition (0) =x y , it needs 2 1n n+ +  numbers: at first, an integer n  describing 
dimension of the vector x , then 2n  reals describing the matrix A , and, finally, n  reals 
describing the initial value y . 
Such a simplicity of the format makes reading the file very easy: at first, read one 
number, then 2n  numbers, and finally n  numbers more. And since there is no any 
additional marking information, all correctness checking must be made when preparing 
the input data. But when the amount of the data is large, the user can easily err; in our 
example, if there are only 2n n+  numbers in the file, it is very difficult to understand 
what exactly number is lost. 
Another problem is that if we wish to solve a non-autonomous equation 
= ( )x A t x , then our file should include both numbers and formulae, and the programmer 
(who is not a professional usually, but a mathematician) must write a formula parser and 
evaluator. 
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The main objective of our work is to create a library, which undertakes reading 
the input file, parsing descriptions of data, storing read objects, and providing convenient 
access to the stored values (including recomputing formulae according to the current 
state of variables defining these formulae). Such a library is developed using C#. This 
language has been chosen due to the following. At first, it provides a very flexible and 
comprehensive realization of object-oriented paradigm allowing to create ‘‘smart’’ 
object, which work almost in the same way as usual variables and hide all internal 
processes from the programmer. At second, it provides portability of programs, because 
the .Net platform is fulfilled both for Windows and Linux popular operational systems. 
The description language for the input file is based on XML, because the latter is 
very convenient both for preparing data and for reading them. Description has two parts. 
The first one, a file of the structure of the input data, tells what data are necessary for a 
program. In out example with differential equation, it includes description of three 
variables: an integer n , a real matrix A  of size n n× , and a real vector y  of size n . 
(So, one can see, that values of some variables can define parameters of others.) The 
second part contains certain values of the variables described in the structure file; the 
values corresponds to a certain example to be computed (in the case of equation, the file 
of data contains numerical of formula data defining a concrete differential equation). Of 
course, the file of structure is unique for each program, and files of data can be multiple. 
The library worked out is used in a serie of programs for solving linear 
differential games. The talk gives some numerical examples computed by these 
programs. 
Plans for future extending this work includes developing a graphical environment 
for convenient preparation of input data for programs, which use our library. 
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Abstract: The paper describes a quality-price competition duopoly model. The firms interact in a 
two-staged game, the cases of non-cooperation and cooperation are considered. The existence and 
stability of the equilibrium in punishment strategies is analyzed. 
 
 
The paper examines equilibrium solutions for quality-price competition models of 
product differentiation. The aim is to compare different cases of strategic interactions 
between the players. 
We consider a duopolistic market of two firms producing vertically differentiated 
product. The firms compete in qualities and prices. The competition between firms takes 
place in a two-staged game. In the 1st stage they decide on the quality , 1,2iq i =  to 
produce (let 1 2q q< ). At this stage each firm faces R&D costs. In the 2nd stage choose 
simultaneously their prices , 1,2ip i = . Before the 2nd stage begins, , 1,2iq i =  become a 
common knowledge. Each firm’s strategy is maximizing its profit. There is a continuum 
of consumers characterized by a parameter t  - willingness to pay, uniformly distributed 
within the interval: [0,1]t ∈ . [Motta, 1993; Ronnen 1991] 
The model is extended to the case of cooperation of the players. Before the 1st 
stage of the game begins, players communicate with each other and decide to form some 
kind of cartel. Two firms form a coalition when the main goal of each player is 
maximizing not its own profit but summarized profit of both firms. Then some profit 
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allocation procedure takes place. This “cooperative” solution 1 2 1 2( , , , )C C C Cq q p p  is compared 
with the non-cooperative one: 1 2 1 2( , , , )q q p p .  
Cooperation brings better payoffs for both players only if each firm plays 
honestly and chooses strategies ( , ), 1,2C Ci iq p i =  that bring optimal solution. In order to 
stabilize the collusion the concept of punishment strategies is used. Thus if both players 
play honestly they choose cooperative qualities at 1st stage of the game: ( , ), 1,2C Ci iq p i = . 
Let the 1st player to abort the agreement and deviate from the “cooperative” 
solution: 1 1Cq q≠ . In this case at the next stage of the game the 2nd firm plays against its 
rival and chooses 2 2Pp p=  that minimizes the profit of the 1st firm: 1 minΠ → .  
The paper considers several variants of strategic interaction between the firms, 
comprehension takes place. The question of Pareto optimality of the solutions is 
examined. 
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Abstract: In the paper some game models of testing are constructed and their reliability is shown. 
The matters of investigation are statistical games between Nature and Statistician. Solution of the 
games (the worst a priori distribution, optimal decision function) is found. There is no assumption 
about distribution of level of knowledge of test-takers. The method of game solution is simple in 
realization. The papers of author [1, 2] are used. 
 
 
Introduction 
The main goal of any testing is assessment intended to measure the test-takers' 
knowledge, skills, aptitudes, or classification in many other topics. The problem is 
especially important if test score is used for administrative decision. There are many 
papers devoted to this theme for example [3]. But estimation of accuracy and reliability 
is made with additional assumption that level of knowledge of examinees has normal 
distribution. However it is difficult to agree with this preposition. At the test control of 
level of knowledge of pupils the essential part of training is devoted to preparation for 
testing. But, knowing the form of the test pupils can so transform their knowledge that 
the objective measure of knowledge is complicated. Thus, we have a conflict situation 
(game), which participants are the Statistician and the Test-taker. The second wants to 
get the highest test score spending minimal time for training. The first wants to find an 
accuracy estimation of level of knowledge.  
 
Solution of finite statistical games 
Let's reduce a classification problem to a problem of estimation. For this purpose 
we introduce following notations. We denote a finite set of possible levels of knowledge 
of the pupil by { }1 2, , , mθ θ θΘ = …  (set of parameters); set of possible values of a random 
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variable θX  by { }1 2, , , NX x x x= …  (set of observation) and family of distributions of the 
variable θX  on set X  by { }( )P xθ θ∈Θ . So ( )P xθ  returns probability that test score of a 
pupil θX  is equal to x  if his level of knowledge is θ . We denote set of admissible 
estimations of knowledge of the pupil by { }1 2, , , nD d d d= …  (set of decisions). Function 
: X Dδ →  is called decision function. Then ( )xδ  is the decision of the Statistician if 
value of a random variable θX  is equal to x . We denote set of decision functions by 
XD=D . It is possible to present each decision function in the form of a vector 
( )1 2, , , Nδ δ δ δ= … , where ( )k kx Dδ δ= ∈ . 
With each decision d D∈  we tie a subset ( )dΘ ⊆Θ  of levels of the knowledge 
admissible for this decision. By the set family of subsets { }( )
d D
d ∈Θ  we construct a pay-
off function of the Statistician: 
( )
1, ( ),
( , ) ( )
0, ( ).d
if d
h d
if d
θθ θ θΘ
⎧⎪ ∈ Θ⎪= = ⎨⎪ ∉ Θ⎪⎪⎩
1  
Thus, the pay-off of the Statistician is equal to unit only if the examinee is correctly 
estimated. 
Let's make statistical game , , HΓ = ΘD , where pay-off function has the 
following form  
( )( )( ) ( ) ( ( ), ) ( , )
x X
P x h x Hθ θθ δ δ θ δ θ
∈
∈ Θ = ⋅ =∑P X . 
Value of the game is probability that measurement of examinee is correct for any a 
priori distribution of parameter θ .  
It is well-known that Statistician can use mixed strategies of the form 
( )1 2, , , Nμ μ μ μ= … , where | |N X=  is a number of elements of set X  and kμ , 1,k N=  
are probability measures on the set of decision D . 
If the sets X , ,D Θ  are finite and numbers of their elements equal respectively to 
, ,N n m , then Γ  is matrix game with pay-off matrix of the size Nn m× . We denote 
elements of matrix B  by 
,
( , )
i j i j
b h dθ= , 1,i m= ; 1,j n= , nonzero elements of diagonal 
matrix kΛ  by 
,
( )
i
k
i i k
P xθλ = , 1,i m= , 1,k N= ; elements of randomized decision function 
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by ( )1 2, , , Nμ μ μ μ= … ; 1,k N=  with ( )1 2, , , tnk k k kμ μ μ μ= … ; vector a priory distribution of 
parameter θ  by ( )1 2, , , tmν ν ν ν= … ; column of m units by m1 . 
To solve matrix game we construct a pair of dual problems. We find the best 
randomized decision function ( )1 2, , , Nμ μ μ μ= …  and the worst a priori distribution ν  
from the first and the second problem respectively. The common value of two problems 
is the value of game Γ . 
Primal problem Dual problem 
1
max,
N
k
k m
k
v
B vμ
=
→
Λ ≥∑ 1  1 min,
N
k
k
v u
=
= →∑  
1
1
n
j
k
j
μ
=
=∑ ; 0jkμ ≥  1,k N= ; 1,j n= ; t k tk nB uν Λ ≤ 1 ; 1,k N= ; 
1
1
m
i
i
v
=
=∑ . 
A lot of methods of solution of problems of linear programming are known. The 
dynamic method that is worked out by the author [2] especially for statistical games with 
threshold pay-off functions would be the most convenient here. But in simple cases the 
statistical game can be solved by means of MS Excel. Though this method often does not 
give the exact solution, but it always specifies feasible solutions of problems and the 
upper and lower estimations of matrix game’s value. 
Example. We suppose that a test contains 10 items and Statistician makes a 
decision by results of the test. Observation set X  has 11 numbers from zero to ten. The 
probability of correct response to an item of test is a measure of respondents' knowledge. 
The possible values of levels of knowledge form a parameter set 
{ }0,95; 0,85; 0,75; 0,65; 0,55; 0,45; 0,35; 0,25; 0,15; 0,05;Θ = . The probability that 
examinee gives exactly k corect responses is given by formula  
( ) 1010 (1 )x xP x
xθ
θ θ −
⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ ⎟⎜= = ⋅ −⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠
X , 0;10x =  
Thus each examinee has one of 10 possible levels of knowledge of value which vary 
from 95 % to 5 %. In this example we will consider that decision set and parameter set 
coincide ( DΘ = ). The admissible interval includes only those values of parameter θ  
which deviates from d  on distance not more than 10 %, that is 
( )
1, | | 0,1;
( , ) ( )
0, | | 0,1.d
if i j
h d
if i j
θ θΘ
⎧⎪ − ≤⎪= = ⎨⎪ − >⎪⎪⎩
1  
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Let's make statistical game , , HΓ = ΘD  and solve it in the mixed strategies by 
means of MS Excel. The pay-off matrix in the game has the size 110 10× . We get upper 
and lower estimations of value of game (0,771 and 0,788), randomized decision function 
and the worst aprioristic distribution of parameter θ .  
The received values of game can be improved if a priori distribution of parameter is 
known. Let's notice that value of game change at increase in number of items in the test 
a little. 
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Abstract: The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution for the bargaining problem is generalized to the 
multicriteria problems. 
 
 
Introduction: An extremal property of the KS-solution.  
The KS-solution has been proposed in [1]. See too [2], [3]. 
Let nX +⊂ R  be a convex compact and comprehensive set. Put  
1( ) = max{ | }, ( ) = ( ( ), , ( )),i i na X x x X a X a X a X∈ …  
and  
= max{ | ( ) }.t ta X Xλ ∈  
Then the KS-solution * = ( )x KS X  is determined by the following manner:  
* = ( ).x a Xλ  
Let : nφ + +→R R  be the Minkovsky function of the set X . 
Lemma 1. KS-solution *x  is the solution of the following optimization 
problem:  
 ( ( ) ) min,a X x x Xφ − → ∈ . (1) 
The vector ( )a X x−  is called the loss of the vector x .  
The multicriteria problems with nontrasferable utilities (NTU-problems).  
Definition. The NTU-problem is a pair ( , )X F , where mX ⊂ R  is the set and 
: 2
n
F X → R  is the multi-valued map. 
Further we shall suppose that the map F  fulfils to following conditions: 
C1. The graph G  of the map F  is the convex compact set in n m×R R . 
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C2. ( ) mF x +⊂ R  is the comprehensive set for all x X∈ . 
Put  
= ( ).
x X
Y F x
∈
∪  
The set mY ⊂ R  is convex compact comprehensive set. Let xφ  be the Minkovsky 
function of the set ( )F x  and φ  be the Minkovsky function of the set Y . 
Lemma 2. ( ) = ( )min x
x X
y yφ φ
∈
. 
Definition. The KS-solution of the NTU-problem ( , )X F  is the pair * *( , )x y G∈  
such that *y  is the KS-solution for Y . 
Let ( , )X f  be a TU-problem. 
Definition. The NTU-problem ( , )fX F  where ( ) = { | ( )}nfF x y y f x+∈ ≤R  is 
called the NTU-problem corresponding to TU-problem ( , )X f .  
The concave TU-problem  
Consider the TU-problem ( , )X f , where = nX R  and : n mf →R R  are the strictly 
concave functions having the maxima. The class such problems (or functions) we denote 
by mnC . Put  
1max= arg ( ), ( ) = ( ), = 1, , , ( ) = ( ( ), , ( )),
i i
i i i mx
x f x a f f x i m a f a f a f… …
 1( ) = ( ), = 1, , , ( ) = ( ( ), , ( )).min ki i m
k
q f f x i m q f q f q f… …  
1= { | ( ) ( )}, = ( ).mZ z q f z a f X f Z−∈ ≤ ≤R  
Let ( )fR  be the set of the Pareto-optimal points in the problem f . 
Lemma 3. The set X  is the convex compact set and ( )f Xε ⊂ . 
Let ( , )fX F  be the NTU-problem for the TU-problem f  and φ  the Minkovsky function 
for ( , )fX F . 
Suppose that ( ) = 0q f . 
Definition. The generalized KS-solution *x  of the TU-problem f  is solution of 
the following optimization problem:  
 ( ( ) ( )) min,a f f x x Xφ − → ∈  (2) 
(see (1)). 
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From definitions of the Minkovsky function and the NTU-problem ( , )fX F  it follows 
that *x  fulfils to the following problem:  
 1 2 1 2( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( )), min, ,a f f x f x q f x x Xλ λ− ≤ − → ∈ , (3) 
where * 1*=x x . 
Theorem. For existing the KS-solution for the problem f  it is necessary and 
sufficient that in problem (3) it is fulfilled 1* 2*=x x . 
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In this paper а game of group pursuit in which players move on a plane with 
bounded velocities is studied. The game is supposed to be a nonzero-sum simple pursuit 
game between a pursuer and m evaders acting independently of each other. Here we 
assume that the evaders are discriminated and dictated the extremely disadvantageous 
behaviour by the pursuer who has an element of punishment at his disposal. The case of 
complete information is considered. This means that each player choosing control 
variables at each time instant t > 0 knows the moment t and his own and all other 
players’ positions. This game was considered in [1] [2].  
In paper [3] Nash equilibrium was constructed for this game and a maximum 
number of evaders that have to obey the pursuer was estimated. A notion of the 
punishment strategy of the pursuer was introduced in the paper. Furthermore, for every 
evader a realizability area of the punishment strategy was constructed. 
In this work we propose to consider a cooperative version of the described 
game and define its solutions. It is important to get a reasonable answer to the following 
question: if cooperation is profitable for the players in this differential pursuit game. We 
consider all possible cooperation between the players in the game. In our interpretation, 
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the pursuer can promise some amount of the total payoff to the evaders for cooperation 
with him. Our conjecture is that for the evaders this offer might be advantageous. 
With every a nonzero-sum pursuit game we associate a corresponding game in 
characteristic function form. In fact we have the whole family of games depending on 
initial positions of the players. We consider the core [4] as a main solution concept in 
this game. In case the core of the game is empty the extended core [5] is considered as a 
solution concept. Note that the extended core is never empty. Moreover, we describe 
some conditions under which in this game there exists the nonempty core for any initial 
positions of the players. It is notable that there is an interconnection between existence 
conditions of the Nash equilibrium and non-emptiness of the core. Finally, we give 
several examples that illustrate the obtained results. On the top of this, the described 
approach is applied to the travel agency problem. 
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Abstract: Previous results on non-constant discounting in continuous time are extended to the the 
case of more general time-inconsistent preferences. A dynamic programming equation providing a 
time-consistent solution to the problem is derived. Cooperative differential games are studied 
within this generalized setting.  
 
 
Variable rate of time preferences have received considerable attention in 
recent years. The most relevant effect of non-constant discounting is that 
preferences change with time: an agent making a decision at time t  has different 
preferences compared with those at time s , for s t≠ . Therefore, we can 
consider her/him at different times as different agents. An agent making a 
decision at time t  is usually called the t -agent. A t -agent can act in two 
different ways: naive and sophisticated. Naive agents take decisions without 
taking into account that their preferences will change in the near future. Then, 
they will be continuously modifying their calculated choices for the future, and 
their decisions will be in general time inconsistent. The solution is obtained by 
solving the family of associated optimal control problems for each t -agent, and 
patching together the optimal decision rules at time t . In order to obtain a time 
consistent strategy, the t -agent should be sophisticated, in the sense of taking 
into account the preferences of all the s -agents, for >s t . Therefore, the 
solution to the problem of the agent with non-constant discounting should be 
constructed by looking for the subgame perfect equilibria of the associated 
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perfect information sequential game with a continuous number of players (the t -
agents) making their decisions sequentially. This prompts the use of a dynamic 
programming approach, applying the Bellman optimality principle. As a result, 
the standard Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman in optimal control theory is replaced by 
the much more complicated dynamic programing equation (DPE) introduced in 
Karp (2007) (see also Marn-Solano and Navas (2009) and Ekeland and Lazrak 
(2008)). 
In this paper we extend previous results in non-constant discounting in 
continuous time to the case of a general discount function ( , )d s t , where t  
denotes the time in which the agent is taking her/his decision, so that ( , )d s t  
denotes how the t -agent discounts utilities obtained at time s , for >s t . If 
( , )d s t  is a function of the distance between s  and t , ( , ) = ( )d s t d s t− , then we 
recover the problem with non-constant discounting. For the general case we 
derive a DPE in a rigorous way whose solution describes the equilibrium rule. 
Our approach (in the spirit of and Marn-Solano and Navas (2010)) is similar to 
that in Ekeland and Pirvu (2008) for the non-standard stochastic optimal control 
problem with non-constant discounting. Our DPE generalizes the DPE obtained 
in Rincón-Zapatero (2009) for the simple variational problem in finite horizon in 
which the Lagrangian depends just on the velocities, = ( )L L x . Although the 
notion of equilibrium is not so natural as in the approach introduced by Karp 
(2007), we reproduce the results for the case of non-constant discounting in a 
mathematical rigorous way, with the advantage that it allows for more general 
versions of the problem. 
Finally, we address our attention to cooperative differential games. The 
notions of dynamically stable cooperation, time consistency and time consistent 
payoff distribution procedures (see e.g. Petrosyan and Zaccour (2003) or Yeung 
and Petrosyan (2006)) are analyzed for the general problem. 
 
References 
 
[1] Ekeland, I. and Lazrak, A. (2008). Equilibrium policies when preferences are time 
inconsistent.  
[2] Ekeland, I. and Pirvu, T.A. (2008). On a Non-Standard Stochastic Control Problem. 
[3] Karp, L. (2007). Non-constant discounting in continuous time. Journal of Economic 
Theory 132, 557-568. 
 127
[4] Marn-Solano, J. and Navas, J. (2009). Non-constant discounting in finite horizon: The 
free terminal time case. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 33 (3), 666-
675. 
[5] Marn-Solano, J. and Navas, J. (2010). Consumption and portfolio rules for time-
inconsistent investors. European Journal of Operational Research 201 (3), 860-872. 
[6] Petrosjan, L.A. and Zaccour, G. (2003). Time-consistent Shapley Value Allocation of 
Pollution Cost Reduction. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 27, 381 –
398. 
[71] Rincón-Zapatero, J.P. (2009). Hopf-Lax formula for variational problems with non-
constant discount. Journal of Geometric Mechanics 1, 357-367. 
[8] Yeung, D.W.K. and Petrosyan, L.A. (2006). Cooperative Stochastic Differential Games. 
Springer. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Journals in Game Theory 
 
 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY 
 
 
 
Editor 
Shmuel Zamir 
 
 
SPRINGER 
 
 
 128
Bargaining Powers, a Surface of Weights,  
and Implementation of the Nash Bargaining Solution 
 
 
Vladimir D. Matveenko 
 
St. Petersburg Institute for Economics and Mathematics RAS 
Matveenko@emi.nw.ru 
 
 
 
Keywords: Bargaining powers, Nash bargaining solution, Implementation 
 
Abstract: In the present paper new approaches to the problem of implementation of the Nash 
bargaining solution (N.b.s.) are proposed. Shapley (1969) introduced weights of utilities and 
linked the N.b.s. with utilitarian and egalitarian solutions. This equivalence leaves open a positive 
question of a possible mechanism of the weights formation. Can the system of weights be received 
as a result of a recurrent procedure of reconciliation of utilitarian and egalitarian interests? Can 
a set of feasible weights be a result of a game independent on a concrete bargaining situation? We 
answer these questions in the paper. 
 
 
The Nash bargaining problem takes an important place both in the theory of 
cooperative games and in practical applications of the game theory. In the present paper 
new approaches to the problem of implementation of the Nash bargaining solution 
(N.b.s.) are proposed. 
We consider an n person bargaining problem with the feasible set nS R+⊂  and 
the disagreement point 0d = . Nash (1950) formulated a list of properties (“axioms’) a 
symmetric N.b.s has to satisfy. A weaker set of axioms corresponds to a family of 
asymmetric N.b.s.’s with bargaining powers, 1 21 2argmax ... na a an
x S
x x x x
∈
=  (here 1,..., na a  are 
bargaining powers of the players). Nash (1953) initiated a, so called, Nash program or 
implementation, trying to construct new games (usually, non-cooperative) leading to the 
N.b.s. Shapley (1969) linked the N.b.s. with utilitarian and egalitarian solutions (see also 
Yaari, 1981 and Binmore, 1998, 2005 who discuss the N.b.s and the Shapley’s approach 
in a broad context of social justice and social contracts). With bargaining powers, the 
benchmark result can be formulated in the following way. 
Let the set S be restricted by coordinate planes and by a surface 
1( ,..., ) 0nx xϕ = , where ϕ  is a strictly convex function, and let 1,..., na a be positive 
bargaining powers. Then the following two statements are equivalent.  
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1. For a point x  such weights 1,..., nλ λ  exist that x  is simultaneously (a) a “utilitarian” 
solution 1 1argmax( ... )n n
x S
x xμ μ
∈
+ +  with weights i i iaμ λ= ( i = 1,…,n), and 
(b) an ”egalitarian” solution argmaxmin i iix S
xλ
∈
 or, what is the same, a point where  
1 1 ... n nx xλ λ= = . 
2. x  is an asymmetric N.b.s. with bargaining powers 1,..., na a .  
This equivalence leaves open a positive question of a possible mechanism of the 
weights formation. Can the system of weights be received as a result of a recurrent 
procedure of reconciliation of utilitarian and egalitarian interests? We construct such 
iterative procedure, which has a natural economic sense and leads to the set of weights 
corresponding to the N.b.s., if some natural sufficient conditions are satisfied; the latter 
are formulated in terms of the elasticity of substitution of function 1( ,..., )nx xϕ in point x . 
Another question is: can a set of feasible weights be a result of a game 
independent on a concrete bargaining situation? In reality, bargains often have a routine 
character and are accomplished in presence of an arbiter (such as a court or an 
international community). Decisions of the arbiter depend in much on assessments which 
relate to reputations of the players but are defined concretely in each concrete bargain 
We consider a two-stage game. On the first stage the players form a surface Λ  
of admissible sets of weights. The weights are interpreted as admissible reputation 
assessments created by players by use of mechanisms of propaganda. On the second 
stage, an arbiter (the society) chooses an admissible set of weights Sλ ∈ and an outcome 
x S∈  to achieve  
maxmax min{ }i i
x S L
x
λ
λ
∈ ∈
. 
On the first stage each player is evidently interested in decreasing her weight 
and in increasing the opponent’s weight. However, when forming the surface Λ , player i 
agrees to a decrease in the opponent’s weight, jλ , in a part of the curve at the expense of 
an increase in his own weight, iλ , as far as player j similarly temporizes in another part 
of curve Λ . With constant bargaining powers, the process is modeled by an equal-
elasticity-condition leading to the differential equation: ji K
j i L
d a
const
d a
λλ
λ λ = − = . Solving 
this equation we get the surface Λ  described by equation  
1 2
1 2 ... n
a a a
n C constλ λ λ = = . 
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On the second stage of the game, the set Λ  leads automatically to the 
asymmetric N.b.s. with bargaining powers 1,..., na a . 
 
References 
 
[1] Binmore K. Egalitarianism versus utilitarianism. Utilitas, 10, 1998, 353-367. 
[2] Binmore K. Natural justice. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005. 
[3] Nash J.F. The bargaining problem. Econometrica, 18, 1950, 155-162. 
[4] Nash J.F. Two-person cooperative games. Econometrica, 21, 1953, 128-140. 
[5] Shapley L.S. Utility comparison and the theory of games. In: La decision: Agregation et 
dynamique des orders de preference. Paris, 1969,251-263. 
[6] Yaari M.E. Rawls, Edgeworth, Shapley, Nash: Theories of distributive justice re-examined. J. 
of Economic Theory, 24, 1981, 1-39.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
РОССИЙСКИЙ ЖУРНАЛ МЕНЕДЖМЕНТА 
 
 
 
Главные редакторы: 
В.С. Катькало 
Д.Дж. Тисс 
 
 
Издательство Высшей школы менеджмента Санкт–Петербургского университета 
 
 
 
 131
Bargaining Models with Correlated Arbitrators 
 
 
Vladimir V. Mazalov1 and Julia S. Tokareva2 
 
1Institute of Applied Mathematical Research 
Karelian Research Center of Russian Academy of Sciences 
Pushkinskaya str. 11, Petrozavodsk 185910, Russia  
e-mail: vmazalov@krc.karelia.ru 
 
2Zabaikalsky State Humanitarian Pedagogical University 
named after N.Tchernishevsky 
Babushkin str. 129, Chita 672007,Russia 
e-mail: jtokareva2@mail.ru 
 
 
 
Keywords: Final offer arbitration, Equilibrium, Optimal strategies, Correlation 
 
 
We consider a version of arbitration procedure with correlated arbitration. 
There are the players L and M who present their offers x  and y  ( y x≤ ) to some 
arbitration committee which consists of some members. Each member after observing 
the offers x and y  decides which offer must be selected. Let the solutions of the 
arbitrators are presented by correlated random variables 1,..., nα α  with continuous 
distribution function 1( ,..., )nF a a . Each arbitrator chooses an offer using the final offer 
arbitration scheme. After that the committee determines the final solution using the 
majority rule. The objective of the paper is to find the equilibrium in this arbitartion 
game and estimate the effect of correlation for the final solution. 
For example, consider a case with two arbitrators and normal distribution 
2 2
1 2 1 1 2 222
1 1
( , ) exp ( 2 )
2(1 )2 1
f a a a a a aρρπ ρ
⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ ⎟= − − +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ −⎝ ⎠−  
where ρ  - correlation factor between random variables 1a  and 2a . Then the equilibrium 
is 
* *
2
1 1
.
4 2 1
x y arctg
ρ
π ρ
⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ ⎟= − = + ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ −⎝ ⎠  
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Abstract: The zero-sum differential search game with discrete moments of detections is 
considered. Player P tries to maximize the probability of detection of the evader E. Mixed 
strategies of the pursuer is determined using the auxiliary game with a team of pursuers. The 
mixed strategies of the evader is determined with help of the an auxiliary game with a team of 
evaders. For the game with a team of pursuers or evader we construct the information set for the 
position of the evader. 
 
 
Introduction 
The zero-sum differential search game between pursuer P  and evader E  in the 
class of mixed strategies with finite spectrum is considered([1]; [2]; [3]). Each player has 
only a priory information on the initial position of the other. The evader is considered 
detected if he is found in the disk of radius l  centered at the position of the pursuer. We 
assume that the moments of detection are discrete ([6]). Player P  tries to maximize 
(player E  tries to minimize) the probability of detection of the evader using mixed 
strategies. The mixed strategies of the pursuer (evader) determined with help of the an 
auxiliary game with a team of pursuers (evaders). In this paper for the game with a team 
of pursuers (evader) we construct the information set for the position of the evader and 
study properties and approximation problems of this information set. In articles ([4]; [5]) 
differential search games with continuous moments of detections are investigated. 
The dynamics of the game and information 
The dynamic of the game is described by the following differential equation  
0 0
: = ( , , ), , ,nP x f t x u u U x X R∈ ∈ ⊂  
0 0
: = ( , , ), , ,nE y g t y v v V y Y R∈ ∈ ⊂  
where U (V ) is a compact set in the Euclidean space pR  ( qR ), 
0
X  (
0
Y ) is a compact 
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set, 
0
[ , )t t∈ ∞  ([3]). 
The detection set S(x) of player P  is the disk of radius l  centered at the 
position of the pursuer. 
We suppose that player P  detects a player E  in the discrete times 
0 1
= { < < < < }t t tγσ … …  where tγ  is a ordinal, < =sup tγ δ δ σ∈ . Introduce the function 
1
( ( ), ( ))F x t y tσ  that is defined at the states ( )x t  and ( )y t  as follows, t σ∈ :  
1
1, ( ) ( ( )),
( ( ), ( )) =
0, .
if y t S x t
F x t y t
otherwise
σ
⎧ ∈⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
 
We define the following functional on trajectories ()x ⋅  and ()y ⋅  
2 1
[
0
( (), ()) = ( ( ), ( )),max
, )t t
F x y F x t y tσ σ
∈
⋅ ⋅
∞
 
,
2 1 0
[
0
( (), ( )) = ( ( ), ( )), .max
, ]t t
F x y F x t y t tσ τ σ τ
τ∈
⋅ ⋅ ≥  
Information sets in a discrete differential search game with a team of 
pursuers 
We consider an auxiliary game between evader E  and some team 
1
= { , , }
k
P P P…  of similar pursuers acting as one. We say that the a strategy P  of team 
guarantees 
*
k -detection at least 
*
k , 
*
k k≤  pursuers detects of evader. 
For the the fixed strategy 
0 1
= (( , , , ))
k
a x u x…  of team P , the information set 
, , 1* *
0 0 0 1
( ) = ( )( , ,( , , ), , . )
k k k k k
k
t t t t x x u uσ σΩ Ω … …  at time 0t t≥  is defined to be set  
 , ,*
0 0 3 1 *
( ) = { | ( ) = ( , , ), (( (), , ( )), ( )) < }.
k k n
k
t y R y t y Y t t y F x x y kσ τσΩ ∈ ∃ ∈ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅…  
where 
0 0
( , , )Y t t y  is the attainability set of player E  at time 
0
[ , )t t∈ ∞  and  
, ,
3 1 2
=1
(( (), , ( )), ( )) = ( (), ()).
k
k i
i
F x x y F x yσ τ σ τ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅∑…  
Let the information set , * ( )k k tσΩ  is empty for the auxiliary game with a team P  
there are k  pursuers. Then a mixed strategy 
1
= ( , , )
k
μ μ μ… , = 1/
i
kμ , = 1, ,i k…  of 
player P  given on 1
0 1 0
{( , ( )), ,( , ( )}k
k
x u x u⋅ ⋅…  guarantees detection probability  
*k
k
ν ≥  
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Using the principe of transfinite induction (as in article (Mestnikov, 1995)) we 
construct the approximation set for this information set , * ( )k k tσΩ . In the case that the 
detection set S(x) is open it is proved that the approximation set and the information set 
,
* ( )
k k
tσΩ is equal. 
Information sets in a discrete differential search game with a team of 
evaders 
We consider an auxiliary game between pursuer P  and some team 
1
= { , , }
m
E E E…  of similar evaders acting as one. We say that the a strategy b  of team 
guarantees 
*
m -evasion at least for 
*
m  evaders of team to avoid capture. 
The information set , * ( )m mG tσ  at time 0[ , )t t∈ ∞  is defined to as follows  
,
*
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
( , , ) = { | ( ) = ( , , , ) ( , , ), , = 1, ,
m m n i i i
i i i
G t t Y y R y t y t t y v Y t t y y Y i mσ ∈ ∃ ∈ ∈ …  
3 1 *
,
( ) ( ( ( ),( (), , ( ))) )},
m
t
x F x y y m mσ∀ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ≤ −…  
where 
0 0
( , , )Y t t y  is the attainability set of player E  at the time 
0
[ , )t t∈ ∞  and  
, ,
3 1 2
=1
( ( ),( ( ), , ( ))) = ( (), ()).
m
m i
i
F x y y F x yσ τ σ τ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅∑…  
Let the information set , * ( )m mG t  is not empty for the auxiliary game with a team 
E  there are m  evaders . Then a mixed strategy 
1
= ( , , )
m
ν ν ν… , = 1/
i
mν , = 1, ,i m…  
of player E  given on 1
0 1 0
{( , ( )), ,( , ( )}m
m
y v y v⋅ ⋅…  guarantees detection probability 
*m m
m
ν −≤ . 
We construct the approximation set for this information set , * ( )k k tσΩ  using the 
principe of transfinite induction (as in article (Mestnikov, 1995)). In the case that the 
detection set S(x) is open it is proved that the approximation set and the information set 
,
* ( )
m m
G t  is equal. 
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Abstract: Two extensions of consensus value to CS-games in spirit of Owen value are introduced. 
The first CS-value arises from applying the consensus value twice: in game between coalitions as 
well as within coalitions. In contrast, the second CS-value uses the Shapley value in games within 
coalitions. We proved the axiomatic characterization of new solution concepts. 
 
 
We study a CS-game ( , , )N Cν  where ( , )N ν  is a TU game and 1= { , , }mC C C…  is 
a coalition structure. Most known CS-values satisfy the dummy player property: if 
( ) = ( )S i Sν ν∪  for all \S N i⊆  then player i  (dummy) gets nothing even though its 
coalition is in very strong position. However, for some real situations the dummy axiom 
does not seem good (van den Brink, 2007). Despite the existence efficient CS-values 
without dummy player property, they are not reflect the outside options of players within 
the same structural coalition pC C∈  (Kamijo, 2007). For a construction of new CS-
values we use the consensus value ( , )K N ν  of game ( , )N ν  (Ju et al., 2007) being the 
average of the Shapley value ( , )Sh N ν  and the equal surplus solution ( , )E N ν , which 
correspond to polar principles of distributive justice (utilitarian and egalitarian), i.e.  
 ( , ) ( , )( , ) =
2
Sh N E N
K N
ν νν + . (1) 
Let pS C C⊂ ∈ . Consider three types of TU games: the reduced game ( , )p pC ν  
within coalition pC , the game ( , )CM ν  between components of C  and the game ( , )SCpM ν  
between components of 1 1 1= { , , , , , , }Sp p p mC C C S C C− +… …  were  
 
= {1, , }, ( ) = ( , ),
( ) = ( ) ,
p p SC
p
C e
e Q
M m S K M
Q C for all Q M
ν ν
ν ν
∈
⊆
…
∪  (2) 
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 \
( ) = ( )
( ) = ( ) \ .
S eC
p e Q p
S CC
p
Q S C for Q p and
Q Q for Q M p
ν ν
ν ν
∈
∪ ∋
⊆
∪
 (3) 
 Given pi C C∈ ∈  we define the consensus CS-value ( , , )KK N Cν  and the 
consensus-Shapley CS-value ( , , )KSh N Cν  of game ( , , )N Cν  by  
 ( , , ) = ( , ), ( , , ) = ( , )
i i p p i i p p
KK N C K C KSh N C Sh Cν ν ν ν . (4) 
 By means of (1)-(4) and the formulas for ( , )Sh N ν  and ( , )E N ν  we can express 
new CS-values through ν . Hence, these values can be easy computed. Let ( , )Du N ν  be 
the set of all dummy players in game ( , )N ν  and ( , , )F N Cν  be a CS-value. For the 
characterization of ( , , )KK N Cν  and ( , , )KSh N Cν  we use four standard axioms 
(efficiency ( E), additivity ( A), external symmetry ( ES), internal symmetry ( IS)) and 
two modified versions of dummy player property ( MD1, MD2). 
MD1. If ( , )p pi Du C ν∈ ≠ ∅ then 
( , ) ( , )
( , , ) = .
2 | |
jp C pj C Cp p
i
p
K M K M
F N C
C
ν ν
ν ∈
−∑
 If 
( , )pC Du N ν⊆  then 
( , )
( , , ) =
| |
p C
i
p
K M
F N C
C
νν . 
MD2. If ( , )p pi Du C ν∈ ≠ ∅  then ( , , ) = 0iF N Cν . If ( , )pC Du N ν⊆  then 
( , )
( , , ) = .
| |
p C
i
p
K M
F N C
C
νν  
Unlike a dummy axiom, MD1 and MD2 define a payoffs not all dummy players 
in game ( , )N ν . Moreover, these payoffs can be nonzero. Next lemma show that dummy 
player in ( , )N ν  not always remains dummy in game within his coalition. Let 
( , ) pi Du N Cν∈ ∩ ≠ ∅ . Then ( , )p pi Du C ν∈  iff \( \ ) = ( )p ee M pN C Cν ν∈∑ . The 
consensus CS-value is the unique value on the class of CS-games satisfying E, A, ES, IS 
and MD1. The consensus-Shapley CS-value is the unique value on the class of CS-
games satisfying E, A, ES, IS and MD2. De Waegenaere et al., (2007, Example 5) 
consider the situation with the investor set = {1,2,3}N , the capital endowments 
60,40,40 and the investment opportunity set which contains: a 10 percent bank deposit 
and a production process that requires an initial investment of 100 and yields a 20 
percent rate of return. This situation is modelled by game ( , )N ν  where  
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(1) = 66, (2) = (3) = 44, (1,2) = (1,3) = 120,
(2,3) = 88, ( ) = 164N
ν ν ν ν ν
ν ν . 
For clarity, shall go to zero-normalized game:  
( ) = 0, , (2,3) = 0, (1,2) = (1,3) = ( ) = 10i i N Nν ν ν ν ν′ ′ ′ ′ ′∈ . 
The unique core element (10,0,0)  gives the worth of grand coalition to the first 
investor, ignoring the productive role of other players. ( , ) = (5,2.5,2.5)K N ν ′ . To show 
a difference between new CS-values and the collective value ( , , )Sh Sh N Cω ω ν ′  as well 
as the two-step Shapley value ( , , )ShSh N Cν ′  (Kamijo, 2007), consider the structure 
= {{1,2},{3}}C . We have ( , , ) = ( , , ) = (7.5,2.5,0)KK N C KSh N Cν ν′ ′  and 
( , , ) = ( , , ) = (5,5,0)ShSh N C Sh Sh N Cω ων ν′ ′ . Thus, it is difficult to disagree that for 
given game the solution concepts based on the consensus value prescribes a rather 
natural and desired outcomes.  
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Simple games cover voting systems in which a single alternative, such as a bill 
or an amendment, is pitted against the status quo. A simple game or a yes-no voting 
system is a set of rules that specifies exactly which collections of ‘‘yea’’ votes yield 
passage of the issue at hand. A collection of ‘‘yea’’ voters forms a winning coalition. 
In this work we perform a complexity analysis on problems defined on such 
families of games. In the case that the number of players is large, as pointed out in 
E.Elkind et al., from a computational point of view, the key issues relating to coalitional 
games are, first, how such games should be represented (since the obvious representation 
is exponentially large in the number of players); and second, the extent to which 
cooperative solution concepts can be efficiently computed. We undertake here this task. 
This analysis as usual depends on the game representation used as input. We consider 
four natural explicit integer representations: winning, losing, minimal winning, and 
maximal losing. 
We analyze the complexity of testing whether a game is simple and testing 
whether a game is weighted. It is showed that, for the four types of representations, both 
problems can be solved in polynomial time. We also provide results on the complexity 
of testing whether a simple game or a weighted game is of a special type. We analyze 
strongness, properness, decisiveness and homogeneity, which are desirable properties to 
be fulfilled for a simple game. 
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Finally, some considerations on the possibility of representing a game in a more 
succinct representation are also studied in depth. 
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There is a huge literature on bargaining games as non-cooperative games. In some 
of these articles, the interactions between cooperative and non-cooperative games 
emerge. However, traditional game theorists usually start their analysis by exogenously 
specifying that the strategic interaction among players belongs to the family of non-
cooperative games or to the one of cooperative games. However, in real life strategic 
interactions, the nature of the game itself is an endogenous feature and it often happens 
that players start to act competitively, realizing only ex-post that they were playing a 
‘cooperative game’, because the outcome they reach is always more collusive than what 
they imagined at the beginning. The ‘confirmed proposal’ mechanism we introduce in 
this paper is a non-cooperative process leading to cooperative results. Through our 
bargaining process, we analyze how players could ‘switch’ from a non-cooperative to a 
cooperative game only by ‘bargaining’ with their opponents, without changing the rules 
of the strategic interaction in which they are involved. The paper is both theoretical and 
experimental. 
The theoretical part of the paper concerns the construction of optimal contracts in 
simple two players dynamic bargaining games, in which at least one player, in order to 
let the game end, must confirm her strategy once known the strategy chosen by her 
opponent. We define this family of games as Games with Confirmed Proposals (GCP 
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henceforth). These interactive strategic situations can be games with perfect/imperfect 
information and/or with complete/incomplete information. When information is 
incomplete, players can exploit the bargaining process by extracting information through 
their opponent’s proposals. We use a simple two players static or dynamic game (we call 
it constituent game) to ‘describe’ the payoffs of the bargaining game built on it. There is 
a constituent game (whose execution leads to the players’ final payoffs) and a dynamic 
game whose actions in each bargaining period are ‘proposals’ of the actions specified in 
the constituent game. Notice that even though we deal with constituent games whose 
players’ strategy space is finite, in the supergame (bargaining game) built on them each 
player’s strategy space is infinite and the supergame itself is infinite (even though the 
constituent game is finite). We call ‘confirmed agreement’ the related equilibrium 
contract (on the action profiles to play) signed by the players. In the paper, we show that, 
under mild assumptions, the equilibrium outcome of the bargaining process is unique. 
Nonetheless, we show that in social dilemma games (as the prisoner’s dilemma) 
applying the “confirmed proposal” rules leads to the cooperative and Pareto-efficient 
outcome with respect to the standard one-shot social dilemma game (constituent game). 
The experimental part of the paper concerns the laboratory analysis of the GCP 
mechanism applied to a prisoner’s dilemma strategic situation (the prisoner’s dilemma is 
the constituent game). More precisely, we have three different treatments: 
(a) Almost Infinitely Repeated Game: the one-shot prisoner’s dilemma is played an 
unknown number of periods (with choices being observable after each period), with the 
game randomly ending after each period (end rate equal to 2%); 
(b) Symmetric Confirmed Proposals: in each pair of subjects one of them (the 
“proposer”) proposes his action (cooperate or defect) and waits to know the action 
(cooperate or defect) proposed by his counterpart (the “responder”) who has previously 
seen his proposal. Then, the proposer can confirm or not the action profile. In case he 
does not, the two roles of proposer and responder are switched and the game restarts. 
The game ends only after a proposer has confirmed his proposal, once seen that of the 
responder. 
(c) Asymmetric Confirmed Proposals: in each pair of subjects only one of them 
can propose his action and wait to know the action proposed by his counterpart, before 
confirming (or not) the action proposed. In case he does not, the game restarts and he 
continues to play as a proposer. Again, the game ends only after the proposer has 
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confirmed his proposal, once seen that of the responder. In this treatment the “power of 
confirmation” is asymmetric. 
In each of the three treatments, the payoffs of the bargaining game are those of 
the prisoner’s dilemma. We know from game theory that the most cooperative 
framework built on a prisoner’s dilemma is the one in which the game is repeated an 
infinite number of times. In fact, the zero-discounting, infinitely repeated version of the 
prisoner’s dilemma has a subgame perfect equilibrium leading to cooperation in each 
repetition. 
From the side of games with confirmed proposals, we prove theoretically that the 
power of confirmation does play a role: when only one of the two players plays as 
proposer in each bargaining stage (asymmetric confirmed proposals), she can reach the 
asymmetric confirmed proposal which is advantageous for her. When, instead, the power 
of confirmation is symmetric (symmetric confirmed proposals), it is not possible to reach 
an asymmetric agreement in equilibrium. Moreover, when the power of confirmation is 
asymmetric, the Nash Equilibrium outcome of the one-shot prisoner’s dilemma is still a 
subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the game, while when players alternate in 
exerting the power to end the game, the non-cooperative outcome is not a subgame 
perfect equilibrium: all the subgame perfect equilibria lead to the cooperative 
(symmetric) confirmed agreement. Therefore, despite the fact that the constituent 
prisoner’s dilemma has a unique Nash non-cooperative equilibrium, the confirmed 
proposal version always includes the cooperative Pareto-superior outcome among its 
subgame perfect equilibria, independently of the allocation of the power of confirmation. 
The non-cooperative outcome is not an equilibrium when the power of confirmation is 
symmetric. In that case, the Pareto-optimal symmetric outcome is the only subgame 
perfect equilibrium outcome of the game. The only confirmed proposal structure 
allowing the proposer to gain from his power of confirmation is the asymmetric one. 
Only in this game the asymmetric outcome involving the highest payoff for the propose 
is a subgame perfect equilibrium. 
Therefore, our first research question is: Does the GCP version of social dilemma 
games, lead unambiguously to the cooperative outcome? To empirically evaluate the 
success of our framework as a cooperation inducing device, we compare it to the well 
known collusion facilitating environment of an Indefinitely (almost infinitely) Repeated 
prisoner’s dilemma Game (treatment (b) and (c) vs treatment (a)). 
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Our second research question is: Can a GCP with asymmetric power of 
confirmation as easily as predicted lead to symmetric confirmed agreements? 
Alternatively, we want to test whether this bargaining structure leads to a less 
cooperative behavior with respect to the case in which both players can alternatively 
make a proposal and confirm it (treatment (c) vs treatment (b)). Finally, we are interested 
in GCP as a form of communication between players. Through the bargaining structure 
developed, we believe that it could be understood how players communicate, without 
using more ‘explicit’ communication devices. Moreover, we could shed some light on 
what a subject wants to communicate to another, on what she is able to communicate as 
well as to understand from the proposals received. 
Our experimental results show that the GCP structure applied to social dilemma 
games lead to cooperation more than do other cooperation-enhancing mechanisms, like 
the corresponding indefinitely repeated game with a tiny (2%) end-game probability. 
Moreover, in the prisoner’s dilemma modelled as a Game with Confirmed 
Proposals, the existence of asymmetric power of confirmation does not significantly 
affect the frequency of cooperation. On the contrary, the existence of an exogenous 
leader increases the likelihood of immediate cooperation, although it entails some risk of 
very long negotiation games. 
Finally, our experimental results show how Games with Confirmed Proposals can 
be used to create a glossary of bargaining semantics for tacit communication among 
agents concerning their rationality/irrationality, patience/impatience, social and 
psychological preferences, etc. through the signals contained in their proposals and 
confirmation strategies. 
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Abstract: The condition measure k(A) used in [Gilpin, A., Pena, J., and Sandholm, T. First-order 
algorithm with O(ln(1/ ε )) convergence for ε -equilibrium in two-person zero-sum games. In 
Proceedings of AAAI’2008 (2008), pp. 75–82] to estimate the complexity of a new algorithm for 
solving two-person zero-sum matrix game is evaluated in this work. In addition to giving an exact 
expression for k(A), we show that this condition measure is closely related to the metric regularity 
modulus of an associated mapping. 
 
 
In [2] a new condition measure was introduced to evaluate the complexity of a 
first-order algorithm for solving a two-person zero-sum game  
 
1 2 2 1
T Tminmax = maxmin ,
x Q y Q y Q x Q
x Ay x Ay
∈ ∈ ∈ ∈
 (1) 
where IRm nA ×∈ , and each of the sets 1Q  and 2Q  is either a simplex (in a matrix game 
formulation) or a more elaborate polytope (in the case of sequential games). It was 
shown in [2] that an iterative version of Nesterov's first-order smoothing algorithm [5] 
computes an ε -equilibrium point of (1) in ( ( )ln(1/ ))O A k A ε  iterations, where ( )k A  is a 
condition parameter that depends only on the matrix A . The dependence of this 
complexity bound on ε  is exponentially better than the complexity bound (1/ )O ε  of the 
original Nesterov's algorithm. The authors in [2] showed that ( )k A  is always finite but 
their proof is non-constructive. In particular, no explicit upper bound on ( )k A  was given. 
We derive two major results related to the computation of the condition 
 148
measure ( )k A . First, we provide an explicit expression for ( )k A  in terms of the solution 
to (1). This is a major step towards performing further complexity analysis of the 
algorithm [2]. Second, we show that this condition measure equals the metric regularity 
modulus of a related functional. The latter result is not exactly unexpected, as recently 
there have been works relating metric regularity to complexity estimates of numerical 
algorithms (e.g. see [1,4]). 
Following [2], we consider a two-person zero-sum matrix game equilibrium 
problem:  
 T Tminmax = maxmin ,
m n n mx y y x
x Ay x Ay
∈Δ ∈Δ ∈Δ ∈Δ
 (2) 
where 
=1
:= { IR | = 1, 0}
mm
m ii
x x xΔ ∈ ≥∑  is the set of mixed strategies for a player with 
m  pure strategies. That is, if player 1 plays mx ∈ Δ  and player 2 plays ny ∈ Δ , then 1 
gets payoff Tx Ay−  and 2 gets payoff Tx Ay . This problem can be cast as as a nonsmooth 
convex optimization problem  
( , )
( , )min
m nx y
F x y
⊆Δ ×Δ
 
where  
 ( , ) max{ | ( , ) }T T
m n
F x y x Av u Ay u v= − ∈ Δ ×Δ  (3) 
Observe (see [2]) that min{ ( , ) | ( , ) } 0m nF x y x y ∈ Δ ×Δ = . A pair ( , )x y  is in a 
Nash equilibrium if ( , ) 0F x y = , and it is in an ε -Nash equilibrium if ( , )F x y ε≤ . Let S  
be the set of exact solutions to the equilibrium problem (2):  
1:= {( , ) | ( ) = 0} = (0) ( ).m n m nS x y F x F
−∈ Δ ×Δ ∩ Δ ×Δ  
The condition measure ( )k A  of the matrix A  is defined as follows:  
 { }( ) = inf | (( , ), ) ( , ) ( , ) ,m nk A k dist x y S kF x y x y≤ ∀ ∈ Δ ×Δ  (4) 
where  
(( , ); ) = min{ ( , ) ( , ) |( , ) },dist x y S x y u v u v S− ∈  
the norm ⋅  is Euclidean: T=w w w , and by ( , )u v  we denote a column-vector 
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composed of u  and v . 
Our main result establishes a characterization of ( )k A  via the metric regularity 
modulus of a related mapping Φ  defined below. This in turn yields an exact formula for 
evaluating ( , ,/ ),p ppd tw G x wdt ≤ . Before formally stating our result, we need to 
introduce some notation. 
Let : m n+Φ →R R  be a multifunction defined as follows:  
[ ( , ), ), ( , ) ,
( , )
, otherwise.
m nF x y x y
x y
⎧ +∞ ∈Δ ×Δ⎪⎪Φ = ⎨⎪ ∅⎪⎪⎩
 
Let , 1,..., ,ia i n=  and Tkb− , = 1, ,k m…  be the columns and the rows of A  
respectively. Let , = 1, ,je j m n+…  denote the unit vectors in IRm n+ , that is, 
( ) = 0 , ( ) = 1.j j je j e∀ ≠A A  For a positive integer p , let 1 : [1 ... 1] pp = ∈ R . Finally, for a 
given point ( , ) n mx y ∈ Δ ×Δ  let  
T T T T
1: 1:
max max( ) := { 1 : | = }, ( ) := { 1 : | = },i ki ki n k mI x i n a x a x K y k m b y b y∈ ∈∈ ∈  
and  
( , ) = { | = 0} { = | = 0}.j pJ x y j x j m p y∪ +  
  
Theorem 1 Let F  be defined by (3) and ( )k A  be defined by (4), and assume 
\m n SΔ ×Δ ≠ ∅ . Then  
( , )
sup( ) = reg (( , ) | ( , )),
\x y m n
k A x y F x y
S∈Δ
Φ×Δ  
where reg (( , ) | ( , ))x y F x yΦ  is the metric regularity modulus of Φ  at ( , )x y  for ( , )F x y .  
For every ( , ) \m nx y S∈ Δ ×Δ  the quantity reg (( , ) | ( , ))x y F x yΦ  can be evaluated 
exactly:  
1
reg (( , ) | ( , )) = ,
dist(0, ( , ) ( , ))
m n
x y F x y
F x y N x yΔ
Φ ∂ + ×Δ
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where ( , )F x y∂  is the (convex) subdifferential of F  at ( , )x y , and ( , )
m n
N x yΔ ×Δ  is the 
convex normal cone to m nΔ ×Δ  at ( , )x y .  
The subdifferential ( , )F x y∂  and the normal cone ( , )
m n
N x yΔ ×Δ  can be 
evaluated exactly:  
( , ) = co{( , ) | ( ), ( )},i kF x y a b i I x k K y∂ ∈ ∈  
( , ) = span{1 } span{1 } cone co{ | ( , )}.m n j
m n
N x y e j J x yΔ × − ∈×Δ  
Theorem 1 readily yields the following characterization for the quantity ( )k A :  
Corollary 2 The condition number ( )k A  defined in (4) is equal to  
 
1sup
dist(0, co {( , ) | ( ), ( )} span{1 } span{1 } cone co{ | ( , )})( , ) \ a b i I x k K y e j J x ym nx y S i jkm n ∈ ∈ + × − ∈∈Δ ×Δ
 (5) 
The proof of Theorem 1 relies on variational analysis techniques. However, 
Corollary 2 can be proved using convex optimization techniques. The latter is direct and 
uses simpler tools but it is somewhat more laborious and does not provide the connection 
between ( )k A  and the metric regularity of the mapping Φ . 
Observe that evaluating the expression (5) is at least as hard as solving (2), as 
we need to know the optimal set S  in advance. This agrees with the phenomenon well-
known in complexity theory: evaluating condition number is in general not easier than 
solving the original problem. For example, this statement is true for such fundamental 
complexity measures as the condition number of a matrix (see [3]) used in estimating 
complexity of numerical linear algebra algorithms, Renegar's condition number (see 
[6,7]) which characterizes difficulty of solving conic feasibility problems, and the 
‘‘measure of condition'' for finding zeros of complex polynomials inroduced by Shub 
and Smale (see [8]). 
In view of the aforesaid, it is highly unlikely that there exists a straightforward 
way to compute our condition measure, so the purpose of this work is not obtainig an 
easily computable expression for ( )k A , but rather gaining a better understanding on how 
exactly the problem data influences the condition measure. Observe that the expression 
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(5) is much easier to evaluate and analyse than the original expression (4). This is 
valuable for the subsequent average-case or smoothed analysis of the algorithm, singling 
out classes of well-conditioning problems, and even making further improvements to the 
algorithm (such as preconditioning). 
 
References 
 
[1] Aragón Artacho, F. J., Dontchev, A. L., and Geoffroy, M. H. Convergence of the proximal 
point method for metrically regular mappings. ESAIM Proceedings 17 (2007), 1–8. 
[2] Gilpin, A., Pena, J., and Sandholm, T. First-order algorithm with (ln(1/ ))O ε  convergence for 
ε -equilibrium in two-person zero-sum games. In Proceedings of AAAI'2008 (2008), pp. 
75–82. 
[3] Higham, N. Accuracy and Stability of Numerical Algorithms. SIAM, 1996. 
[4] Lewis, A. S., Luke, D. R., and Malick, J. Local linear convergence for alternating and averaged 
nonconvex projections. Foundations of Computational Mathematics 9, 4 (June 2009), 
485–513. 
[5] Nesterov, Y. Smooth minimization of nonsmooth functions. Math. Progr. 103 (2005), 127–
152. 
[6] Peňa, J., and Renegar, J. Computing approximate solutions for conic systems of constraints. 
Math. Progr. 87 (2000), 351–383. 
[7] Renegar, J. Linear programming, complexity theory and elementary functional analysis. Math. 
Progr. 70 (1995), 279–351. 
[8] Shub, M., and Smale, S. Complexity of Bézout's Theorem I: Geometric Aspects. Journal of the 
American Mathematical Society 6, 2 (April 1993), 459– 501. 
 
 
 
Journals in Game Theory 
 
 
INTERNATIONAL GAME THEORY REVIEW 
 
 
 
Editors 
Steffen Jorgensen 
Leon A. Petrosyan  
David W.K. Yeung 
 
 
WORLD SCIENTIFIC 
 
 
 152
On a Class of Games with a Polyhedral Set  
of Nash Equilibria 
 
 
Pierre von Mouche 
 
Wageningen Universiteit 
Netherlands 
pvmouche@gmx.net 
 
 
 
Keywords: Cournot oligopoly, Transboundary pollution, Non-differentiable payoff function, 
Aggregative game, Non-uniqueness of Nash equilibria 
 
 
A class of games in strategic form with a polyhedral set of Nash equilibria is 
identified. There is special attention to conditions that guarantee that there is at most one 
Nash equilibrium, and to the relation of this property with differentiability of payoff 
functions. The power of the results is illustrated by applying them to homogeneous 
Cournot oligopoly games and to transboundary pollution games with uniform pollution. 
The way of obtaining the results is by a teamed analysis of marginal reductions. 
 
 
 
Journals in Game Theory 
 
 
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 
 
 
 
Editor 
Ehud Kalai 
 
 
ELSVIER 
 
 
 
 153
Stable Group Purchasing Organizations 
 
 
Mahesh Nagarajan1, Greys Sošić2 and Hao Zhang3 
 
1Sauder School of Business, University of British Columbia, 
Vancouver, B.C., Canada V6T 1Z2 
 mahesh.nagarajan@sauder.ubc.ca, 
2,3Marshall School of Business, University of Southern California,  
Los Angeles, California 90089 
2sosic@marshall.usc.edu, 
 3zhanghao@marshall.usc.edu  
 
 
 
Keywords: Coalition stability, Group purchasing 
 
Abstract: In this paper, we study the stability of Group Purchasing Organizations (GPOs). GPOs 
exist in several sectors and benefit its members through quantity discounts and negotiation power 
when dealing with suppliers. However, despite several obvious benefits, GPOs suffer from member 
dissatisfaction due to unfair allocations of the accrued savings among its members. We first 
explore the benefits of allocation rules that are commonly reported as being used in practice. We 
characterize stable coalitional outcomes when these rules are used and provide conditions under 
which the grand coalition emerges as a tenable outcome. These conditions are somewhat 
restrictive. We then propose an allocation mechanism based on the marginal value of a member's 
contribution and find that this leads to stable GPOs in many scenarios of interest. In this analysis, 
we look at discount schedules that encompass a large class of practical schedules and analyze 
cases when purchasing requirements of the members are both exogenous as well as endogenous. 
We use a concept of stability that allows for players to be farsighted, i.e., players will consider the 
possibility that once they act (say by causing a defection), another coalition may react, and a third 
coalition might in turn react, and so on, nullifying their original advantage in making the initial 
move. 
 
 
Group purchasing organizations (GPOs) are coalitions of several firms (buyers) 
who pool their purchasing requirements and buy large quantities of a particular product 
from a seller. The advantage of belonging to a GPO is evident. GPOs are able to take 
advantage of significant quantity discounts from the seller and transaction costs may be 
lowered by bundling different orders. In certain sectors, GPOs have high negotiation 
power and receive preferred terms of trade.  
GPOs, henceforth also referred to as purchasing coalitions, are seen in various 
industry sectors. The origins of such coalitions can be traced back to the evolution of 
cooperatives, where cooperatives acted as purchasing and selling coalitions. Today, 
purchasing coalitions can be seen in virtually every sector spanning health care, 
education, retail, etc. Despite the touted benefits of forming such organizations, the 
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business and academic literature lament the fact that GPOs do not sustain themselves, 
often due to disagreements between members. GPOs see membership numbers often 
fluctuate. Further, problems often arise due to unequal member contributions, with 
powerful members building barriers to keep out smaller participants from entering the 
GPO. The very nature of these coalitions causes reasons for conflict. Consider a group of 
buyers, each with a certain purchasing requirement, who decide to form a coalition. The 
discount from the seller is based on the aggregated purchasing quantity. Thus, each 
member of the coalition is able to receive a lower price than what he would have 
received based solely on his individual order. However, when a set of buyers with 
heterogeneous requirements form a coalition, it is not immediately clear how the benefits 
of this lowered price are to be allocated among coalition members. This discord leads to 
a lack of commitment among coalition members and to potential instability. A 
comprehensive study of several purchasing consortia in Europe indicates that over a 
quarter of such coalitions are acutely aware of inherent unfairness in splitting the savings 
obtained by the coalition. An often-used mechanism that allocates savings internally to 
the coalition, known as equal price (i.e., one where all members of the coalition pay the 
same price per item), is an excellent example that opens itself to this criticism. The 
common wisdom that gains accrued by the coalitions may far surpass any cause for 
discord is increasingly questioned by coalition members and this may explain the short 
life of several such consortia. Thus, an important strategic issue to be considered when 
setting up a GPO seems to be one of how to allocate the gains realized by such a 
coalition, which is intimately tied to the eventual stability of these coalitions. Despite 
recognizing the importance of this topic, neither the literatures in operations 
management that deals with purchasing nor the ones in economics analyze a 
comprehensive model of purchasing consortia and offer any robust remedies.  
In this paper, we examine how allocations among group members in a 
purchasing coalition should be designed (especially when contributions by individual 
members may not be equal) and analyze the related issues of stability of purchasing 
coalitions. We first search the extant literature (both academic and industry) to find a 
good representation of a quantity discount schedule. The functional form we end up 
using fits best with what is seen in practice and possesses a few attractive analytical 
properties as well. In terms of dividing the gains of a coalition, we use and suggest a few 
allocation rules that make sense from both a practical perspective as well as are related 
to theoretical concepts from cooperative games: (i) the equal allocation principle, which 
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allocates to each member the same portion of accrued savings; (ii) the quantity-based 
proportional allocation rule, which allocates the savings proportionally to the buyers' 
ordering quantities; and (iii) the Shapley value, which tries to compute the marginal 
contribution of an individual member of the coalition as an allocation rule. The issue of 
allocations, as mentioned earlier, is tied to the question of stability of the alliance. We 
use cooperative game theory to analyze the stability of coalitions. A commonly used 
concept of stability, popular in the operations literature, is the core. The core 
distinguishes allocation rules that yield a stable alliance of all players, but suffers from 
the problem of myopia. That is, it precludes the possibility that players and sub-
coalitions may consider the possibility that once they act (say, by causing a defection), 
another coalition may react, and a third coalition might in turn react, and so on, 
nullifying their original advantage in making the initial move. A concept of stability that 
takes such a farsighted view of players is the Largest Consistent Set (LCS, Chwe 1994). 
In our analysis, we allow for players to be farsighted and thus primarily use the LCS to 
evaluate the stability of coalitions. 
Our main findings when considering the aforementioned allocation rules are as 
follows. We first look at a scenario in which the requirement of each firm (i.e., its order 
quantity) is exogenous to the discussion and thus independent of the specifics of the 
discount schedule. Such a scenario is realistic in several public-sector GPOs (the 
healthcare sector being a good example). Here, purchase orders are periodically 
determined based on needs, and less on other factors such as profit maximization or re-
selling decisions. In this setting, when buyers are homogeneous, the alliance of all 
buyers (the grand coalition) is stable and sustains itself independent of the allocation 
rules. This result is not surprising. However, when the buyers are heterogeneous, the 
Shapley value alone produces fair allocations that ensure the stability of the grand 
coalition. When either equal allocation rules or quantity-based proportional allocation 
rules are used and one looks at the farsighted stability of coalitions, there is a strong 
tendency in which the buyers with large orders split to form their own GPO, leaving 
buyers with smaller contributions to themselves. This leads to the following insight–-if 
one needs to sustain a GPO with heterogeneous buyers, contracts that allocate savings 
between buyers need to be carefully arrived at, using, for instance, the Shapley value 
allocations. Several of the currently followed allocation rules that fail to do this will 
result in eventual instability, even if they seem fair (for instance, quantity-based 
proportional allocation) at the outset. 
 156
Next, we look at a scenario in which the quantity required by each buyer is 
endogenous to the model. An illustrative case is that of a profit-maximizing price-setting 
firm which decides how much its requirements are by considering both the quantity 
discount schedule offered by the seller and its own downstream price-driven demand. 
The firm under question simply sets its demand curve and the discount schedule (supply 
curve) equal to each other and derives its requirements based on this intersection. As one 
can imagine, this analysis can be algebraically tedious, as solving for the order quantity 
may not be simple. When we consider linear demand and discount schedules, we are 
able to show that several of our results and insights from previous analysis with 
exogenous demands still hold. In particular, we show that it is still advisable to use a 
Shapley-value-based allocation to guarantee the stability of the GPO. We also show that 
when quantity decisions are endogenous and one uses either the equal allocation or the 
quantity based allocation rules, under certain assumptions our earlier result continues to 
hold (i.e., large coalitions coalesce together and leave the smaller members out). This 
prediction of ours is seen widely in practice and is also the topic of several studies and 
reports on purchasing organizations. 
We believe our findings above yield important insights to firms that 
contemplate joining purchasing coalitions, or to intermediaries who wish to create 
successful and efficient GPOs. Since the creation of GPOs has substantial consequences 
to social surplus and creates efficiencies in many supply chains, we believe it is 
particularly important for the relevant players to understand and pursue strategies that 
will contribute to its success. 
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A claim problem is a triple ( , , )N t x  where N  is a finite set of agents, the 
positive real number t  represents the amount of resources to be divided by agents, the 
vector = { }
i i N
x x ∈  specifies for each agent i  a claim > 0ix . A solution to the rationing 
problem is a vector = { }
i i N
y y ∈  such that 0iy ≥  for all i N∈ , =ii Ny t∈∑ . A claim 
method is a map that associates to any claim problem its solution. Claim methods and 
their axiomatic justifications are described in surveys [1] and [2]. 
Here we consider a generalized claim problem. For a fixed collection of 
coalitions of agents 2NA⊂ , we replace the vector x  (the set of claims of agents) by 
{ ( )}
T A
v T ∈ , where ( )v T  is a claim of T . Thus, a generalized claim problem is a family 
( , , ,{ ( )} ) = ( , , , )
S A
N A t v S N A t v∈ . We may consider a generalized claim problem as a TU–
cooperative game with limited cooperation possibilities. A generalized claim method is a 
map that associates to any generalized problem ( , , , )N A t v  a subset of the set 
{{ } : 0, = }.
i i N i ii N
y y y t∈ ∈≥ ∑  We assume that A  covers N . 
In this paper we consider generalizations of two claim methods: the 
Proportional method and the Uniform Losses method (also called Constrained Equal 
Losses method). 
Let nX R⊂ , 
1
, ,
k
f f…  be functions defined on X . For z X∈ , let π  be a 
permutation of {1, , }n…  such that 
( ) ( 1)
( ) ( )
i i
f z f zπ π +≤ , ( ) =1( ) = { ( )}ni iz f zπθ . Then y X∈  
belongs to the nucleolus with respect to 
1
, ,
k
f f…  on X  if  
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( ) ( ) .
lex
y z forall z Xθ θ≥ ∈  
For generalizations of Proportional method we suppose that ( ) > 0v T  for all 
T A∈ . We consider the following 3 generalized methods. 
1. = { }
i i N
y y ∈  belongs to the A –proportional solution of ( , , , )N A t v  if there 
exists > 0α  such that ( ) = ( )y T v Tα  for all T A∈ , 0
i
y ≥  for all i N∈ , =
ii N
y t∈∑ . 
2. = { }
i i N
y y ∈  belongs to the A –proportional nucleolus of ( , , , )N A t v  if y  
belongs to the nucleolus w.r.t. { }
T T A
f ∈  with ( ) = ( )/ ( )Tf z z T v T  on the set 
{ = { } : 0, = }
i i N i ii N
z z z z t∈ ∈≥ ∑ . 
3. = { }
i i N
y y ∈  belongs to the A –weighted entropy solution of ( , , , ))N A t v  if y  
minimizes  
( )( ( ( ) / ( )) 1)
T A
z T ln z T v T
∈
−∑  
on the set { = { } : 0, = }
i i N i ii N
z z z z t∈ ∈≥ ∑ . 
For each A , > 0t , v  with ( ) > 0v T , the A –proportional nucleolus and the 
A -weighted entropy solution are nonempty and define uniquely ( )y T  for each T A∈ . 
The A -proportional solution is nonempty for all > 0t , v  with ( ) > 0v T  if A  is 
a minimal covering of N . 
The A -proportional nucleolus is contained in the A -proportional solution for 
all > 0t , v  with ( ) > 0v T  if A  is a partition of N . 
The A -weighted entropy solution is contained in the A -proportional solution for 
all > 0t , v  with ( ) > 0v T  if A  is a partition of N . 
A vector = { }
i i N
y y ∈  belongs to the A -weakly proportional solution of ( , , , )N A t v  
if 0
i
y ≥  for all i N∈ , =
ii N
y t∈∑ , ( )/ ( ) = ( )/ ( )y S v S y Q v Q  for ,S Q A∈  with 
=S Q∩ ∅ . 
Necessary and sufficient condition on A  that ensures nonemptyness of the 
A -weakly proportional solution for all > 0t , v  with ( ) > 0v T  is obtained. 
Necessary and sufficient condition on A  that ensures nonemptyness of the 
intersection of the A - proportional nucleolus with the A -weakly proportional solution 
for all > 0t , v  with ( ) > 0v T  is obtained. 
 159
A vector = { }
i i N
y y ∈  is the uniform losses solution of the claim problem ( , , )N t x , 
where 0
i
x ≥ , > 0t , if there exists 1Rμ ∈  such that = ( )
i i
y x μ +− , =ii Ny t∈∑ , 0iy ≥ . 
Then y  satisfies the following 3 conditions. 
C1. 0
i
y ≥ , =
ii N
y t∈∑ , and if >i i j jx y x y− − , then = 0jy . 
C2. { }y  is the nucleolus w.r.t. { }
i i N
f ∈ , where ( ) =i i if z z x− , on the set 
{ = { } : 0, = }
i i N i ii N
z z z z t∈ ∈≥ ∑ . 
C3. y  minimizes 2( )
i ii N
z x∈ −∑  on the set { = { } : 0, = }i i N i ii Nz z z z t∈ ∈≥ ∑ . 
Moreover, if y  satisfies one of conditions C1,C2,C3, then y  is the uniform 
losses solution of the claim problem ( , , )N t x . Therefore, for generalized claim problem 
( , , , )N A t v  with ( ) 0v T ≥  we may define 3 generalizations of the uniform losses solution 
(using conditions C1, C2, C3 respectively): the A -uniform losses solution, the 
A -nucleolus, and the A -least square solution. We also define the A -weakly uniform 
losses solution, where we demand that ( ) ( ) > ( ) ( )v S y S v Q y Q− −  implies ( ) = 0y Q  only 
for =S Q∩ ∅ . 
We obtain conditions on A  that ensure the nonemptyness of the A -uniform 
losses solution, the nonemptyness of the A -weakly uniform losses solution, the 
nonemptyness of intersection of the A -nucleolus with these solutions. The results are 
similar to the corresponding results for generalizations of proportional solution. 
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Abstract: We considered a multivariate generalization of the classical collective risk model, in 
which each component is dependent on the others. The exact solutions and asymptotic 
approximations to the probability of ruin were obtained. Some examples are given for graphical 
illustration. 
 
 
One of the most important problems in risk theory is the calculation of the 
probability of ruin an insurance company. In the classical collective risk model it is 
assumed that claim sizes are independent identically distributed random variables, 
namely the claims` flow is independent. However, in reality the insurance company 
underwrites contracts which are related to different types of claims. For example, let us 
consider the following types of policies: inhabited house fire insurance and flood 
insurance. In case of damage by fire the house can be also flooded by fire-fighting 
operations. So the insurance company will have to compensate twice the same insurance 
services. 
So we considered a multivariate generalization of the classical collective risk 
model, in which each component is dependent on the others. For example, if we have 
two types of insurance contracts the surplus of this company is defined by 
(1,0) (0,1) (1,1)( ) ( ) ( ) ( )R t u ct S t S t S t= + − − −  
where 
u  is the initial capital; 
c  is the insurance premium income per unit of time; 
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(1,0) (0,1) (1,1)( ), ( ), ( )S t S t S t  are payment processes of the first, the second or both types of 
insurance contract. 
As a special case of multidimensional collective risk model the two-
dimensional model was computer simulated. Changing the correlation index between 
claim sizes of the first and the second type of insurance contract we defined an influence 
of dependent claim sizes on probability of ruin. The exact solutions and asymptotic 
approximations to the probability of ruin were obtained. Some examples are given for 
graphical illustration. 
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In the paper some problems are considered motivated by applied financial and 
economics issues. The problems under consideration are in some way related to the 
theory of portfolio investment that goes back to the papers [1-2].  
The first section of the paper deals with dynamic problem of financial portfolio 
management. In contrast to traditional settings [3] we assume that dynamics of the 
averaged characteristics of financial assets , 0,1, ... ,ix i N=  are described by differential 
inclusions 
0
0( , ) , ( ) ,
dx
Q t x x t x
dt
∈ =  
whereas in the classical approaches stochastic differential equations are usually used for 
description of prices dynamics. Using approaches of [4-6] we construct a control 
strategy, which guarantees the efficiency of portfolio 0 1( , , ... , )TNy y y y=  in time.  
Namely, in the framework of the formalization proposed in the paper that 
corresponds to the theory of guaranteed control a family of dynamic reconstruction 
problems of investment portfolio can be considered. In particular, assuming that at the 
initial moment 0t t=  a portfolio 0y  is efficient for the initial state 0x , one can formulate 
the problem of constructing a strategy ( , , )U U t x y=  that guarantees the efficiency of 
investment portfolio and provides the given level of return 00[ ] [ ]t tμ μ μ≥ =  or the given 
level of risk 00[ ] [ ]t tσ σ σ≤ = .  
Here  
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0
0( , , ) , [ ]
dy
U t x y y t y
dt
∈ =  
is an inclusion that describes the dynamic portfolio reconstruction, [ ] [ ] [ ]Tt y t x tμ = ⋅  - 
dynamic characteristic of return, [ ]tσ  - standard deviation of the variable [ ]tμ  (risk).  
If the market is stable, that means that the parameters xi do not change 
( ( , ) {0}Q t x = ) then the strategy is trivial U≡0, and there is no need of portfolio 
reconstruction.  
Solvability conditions of the problem allow us to define an index of stability of 
financial market. Numerical examples related to the present financial crisis are also 
presented. 
In the second part of the paper we show that the portfolio theory initially 
developed for risky securities (stocks) could be applied to other objects. Among the 
research of this area indicate [7-8]. In the present paper we consider several situations 
where such an application is reasonable and seems to be fruitful. Thus, we consider a 
model that corresponds to a new class of so called synthesized financial instruments, 
which are the combinations of real financial assets and active strategies of their usage. 
We also consider the problems of constructing the efficient portfolio of banking services, 
the portfolios of counteragents of a firm and the portfolios of technologies.  
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There are problems related with walks into digraphs in which it is necessary to 
quantify the importance of the nodes in order to measure the contribution of each node in 
the digraph. With this measurement it is possible to make comparative studies among the 
nodes, ranking them or just determining their importance in a process. In this work, we 
restrict walks to cycles, motivated by the minimal cost-to-time ratio cycle problem 
formulation: a tramp steamer is free to choose its ports of call and the order in which it 
calls on them; the voyage from port i to port j earns an established profit Pij and it needs 
a time Tij to do it; so, it is necessary to find the ports and the visit order such that the 
tramp steamer maximizes its cost-to-time ratio. The solution of this problem is well-
known and there exists an algorithm for finding the optimal route, a cycle. We propose a 
method to measure the importance of each port for the tramp steamer based on 
cooperative games. 
Many situations can be modeled as a cooperative game. In our case we adapt 
that technique and motivated by the problem presented before, we introduce a new 
cooperative game defined on the cycles of a digraph, where a real number is assigned to 
each cycle on the digraph. This real number represents the worth that the tramp steamer 
obtains if it visits all the nodes in the cycle in the sequential order. Since every cycle has 
an assigned worth, it is possible to use this information and cooperative game techniques 
to measure how each node contributes to the possible routes of the tramp steamer. We 
use an axiomatic characterization based on the set of axioms which characterizes the 
Shapley value (symmetry, linearity, efficiency and nullity) but we adapt them for this 
new class of cooperative games, obtaining a solution. Also, we show that this solution is 
related with the Shapley value of a game in characteristic function form. 
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We also consider the organization of the nodes of a digraph into groups before 
the negotiation process. In the tramp steamer problem this situation refers to ports 
grouping in trade unions or political organizations such as countries and we present a 
characterized solution, where the payments are assigned in a two-step procedure, 
applying a similar idea of the Owen value. 
A third modification of the original model presented before occurs when a fixed 
real number must be the allocation amount to be distributed among the players. This 
variation could happen when an external authority or a governor organism determines 
the amount to be distributed in the set of players. The fixed amount can be greater or 
lesser than the players can obtain by their negotiation power. So, it is necessary to 
provide a distribution mechanism of the excess or lack resulting from the external 
manipulation. We present this situation in context with games on the cycles of a digraph 
and we show an axiomatic solution based on the idea of an equal allocation of the 
possible difference between the amount that players can obtain by themselves and the 
fixed allocation amount. 
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The following is a model of psychological contracting with unmonitorable 
performance, implicit offers, and screening for non-performance by the announcement of 
the expectation of performance. It is motivated by the $250 billion prescription drug 
industry, which spends $19 billion per year on marketing to US doctors, mostly on 
`gifts', and often, as at Yale, with no monitoring for reciprocation. In one revealing 
incident, a drug firm representative closed her presentation to Yale medical residents by 
handing out $150 medical reference books and remarking, "one hand washes the other." 
By the next day, half the books were returned. I model this with a one shot psychological 
trust game with negative belief preferences and asymmetric information. I show that the 
`shame' of accepting a possible bribe can screen for reciprocation inducing `guilt'. An 
announcement can extend the effect. Current policies to deter reciprocation might aid 
such screening. 
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Abstract: In games with differently directed interests payoff functions of the players contain terms 
which describe their coincident, antagonistic, or both types of interests. Such game theoretic 
models have many natural applications in management problems. 
 
 
A general model of game with differently directed interests may be represented 
as follows (case n=2 is considered for simplicity): 
 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 1
2 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 2.
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) max, ;
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) max,
u x x f x x g x x f x x x X
u x x f x x g x x f x x x X
= + + → ∈
= − + → ∈  (1) 
where terms f describe coincident interests, terms g - antagonistic interests, and terms f1 , 
f2 - independent interests of the players. Specific cases of the model (1) are games with 
partly coincident interests 
 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 1
2 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 2.
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) max, ;
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) max,
u x x f x x f x x x X
u x x f x x f x x x X
= + → ∈
= + → ∈  (2) 
and games with partly antagonistic interests 
 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 1
2 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 2.
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) max, ;
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) max,
u x x g x x f x x x X
u x x g x x f x x x X
= + → ∈
= − + → ∈  (3) 
For example, a well-known Germeyer-Vatel model [1] 
 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1
2 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2
( , ) ( , ) ( ) max, ;
( , ) ( , ) ( ) max, .
u x x f a x a x f x x X
u x x f a x a x f x x X
= − − + → ∈
= − − + → ∈  (4) 
is a specific case of a game with partly coincident interests (2) for which an existence of 
strong equilibrium is proved. 
 168
There are many natural applications of models (1)-(3) to the management 
problems. Thus, a model of motivation (impulsion) management [2] 
 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 1
2 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 2
( , ) ( ) ( , ) max,0 1;
( , ) (1 ) ( ) ( , ) max,0 1,
u x x x f x f x x x
u x x x f x f x x x
= + → ≤ ≤
= − + → ≤ ≤  (5) 
belongs to the type (3). In our previous paper [3] a specific case of the model (2) was 
considered, namely a pricing model of hierarchical control of the sustainable 
development of the regional construction works complex 
 
0 0
( , , ) ( ) ( , ) max
L
u p p p p p M p pδ α ρ= − →  
 
0 max
0 p p p< ≤ ≤  
 
0
( , , ) ( ) ( )(1 ( )) max
F
u p p p p p p p pα ξ α= + − →  
 
max
0 p p≤ ≤  
Here p is sales price; р0 – normative price of social class residential real estate 
development; p - limit price of social class residential real estate development; М >>1– 
penalty constant; 
0
0
0
0,
( , )
1,
p p
p p
p p
ρ
≤⎧⎪⎪= ⎨⎪ >⎪⎩
; δ - Administration bonus parameter for social 
class residential real estate development sales; pmax – «overlimit» price of social class 
residential real estate development (there are no sales if p > pmax); ( )pα is share of 
residential real estate development bought by Administration with warranty; ( )pξ - share 
of another residential real estate development successfully sold by Developer without 
help. 
There are many another examples of game theoretic models of the described 
type in management, such as models of resource allocation considering private interests, 
models of organizational monitoring optimization, models of reward systems, corruption 
models and so on. The games are considered as hierarchical ones. 
 
References 
 
[1] Germeyer Yu.B., Vatel I.A. Games with hierarchical vector of interests, Izvestiya AN SSSR. 
Technical cybernetics. 1974. Vol.3. (in Russian). 
[2] Ougolnitsky G.A. Game theoretic modeling of the hierarchical control of sustainable 
development , Game Theory and Applications. 2002. Vol.8. N.Y., Nova Sci. Publ.  
[3] Ougolnitsky G.A. Optimization and game theoretic modeling of real estate development, 
Contributions to game theory and management. Vol. III. Collected papers presented on 
the Third International Conference Game Theory and Management / Editors L.Petrosjan, 
N.Zenkevich. – SPb.: Graduate School of Management SBbU, 2010. 
 
 169
Mathematical Model of Diffusion in Social Networks 
 
 
Elena Parilina and Olga Bogdanova 
 
Saint-Petersburg State University 
Faculty of Applied Mathematics and Control Processes 
Russian Federation 
calipso.ya@gmail.com 
barlena@gmail.com 
 
 
 
Keywords: Social network, Diffusion function, Mean-field theory 
 
 
At present social networks uniting people either in real or virtual 
communication are widespread. Most people are the users of the Internet as well as 
special social Internet projects such as www.facebook.com, www.odnoklassniki.ru, 
www.livejournal.com, etc. Social networks attract great attention of market analysts 
whose main task is to find new effective strategies to have a market for goods and 
services. It is social networks that let spread information quickly from one network user 
to another, i.e if a network user possesses some product or service, those network users 
who communicate with him can also have the same things with a high probability. In this 
way the network users’ “infection” takes place.  
The work examines the social network consisting of the set of users and the set 
of connections. Each network user in each time period (time is discrete) can be in one of 
the two states: active (possessing the product or service) and potential (not possessing 
the product or service, but able to buy it on condition that some of his active neighbours 
let him have necessary information about the product or service). The paper examines 
the dynamic model, in other words, in each time period the network users choose one of 
the two strategies: to become an active user (an owner of the product or service) or not to 
become an active user. The main property of the social network is the distribution of 
connections, i.e. the probability distribution which shows the part of the users with the 
certain number of the neighbours in the network.  
The paper assumes that a network user becomes an active user with some 
function (diffusion function) which is the function of the neighbours` total number and 
the number of the active neighbours of this user. Some probability model of the 
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dynamics of the active network users` number is suggested. Using the main dynamics 
equation the condition of the network equilibrium (stationary state of the network) is 
defined. The work examines some special types of the diffusion function for which the 
conditions of the network equilibrium are derived.  
The numerical experiments for different types of networks (networks with 
different distributions of connections) are made. 
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The KKM theory, first called by the author, is the study on applications of 
equivalent formulations or generalizations of the KKM theorem due to Knaster, 
Kuratowski, and Mazurkiewicz in 1929. The KKM theorem provides the foundations for 
many of the modern essential results in diverse areas of mathematical sciences including 
game theory. 
Let D〈 〉  denote the set of all nonempty finite subsets of a set D . 
An abstract convex space ( , ; )E D Γ  consists of a topological space E , a 
nonempty set D , and a multimap : D EΓ 〈 〉?  with nonempty values := ( )
A
AΓ Γ  for 
A D∈ 〈 〉 . 
 We have the following diagram for triples ( , ; )E D Γ : 
Simplex ⇒  Convex subset of a t.v.s. ⇒  Lassonde type convex space 
⇒  H -space ⇒  G -convex space ⇔  
A
ϕ -space ⇒  KKM space 
⇒  Space satisfying the partial KKM principle 
⇒  Abstract convex space. 
In this paper, we compare the fixed point method and the KKM method in 
nonlinear analysis. Especially, we consider two methods in the proofs of the following 
important theorems with the chronological order: 
(1) The von Neumann minimax theorem, 
(2) The von Neumann intersection lemma, 
(3) The Nash equilibrium theorem, 
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(4) The social equilibrium existence theorem of Debreu, 
(5) The Gale-Nikaido-Debreu theorem, 
(6) The Fan-Browder fixed point theorem, and 
(7) Generalized Fan minimax inequality. 
Theorems (1)-(6) are usually obtained by the Brouwer or Kakutani fixed point 
theorems on convex subsets of topological vector spaces. In this paper, by applying the 
KKM theory method, Theorems (1)-(3) and (6)-(7) can be generalized to appropriate 
abstract convex spaces. Moreover, Theorems (4) and (5) can be extended by applying a 
fixed point theorem for acyclic maps. 
We give some of our generalizations of the above theorems: 
The Nash equilibrium theorem Let 
=1
{( ; )}n
i i i
X Γ  be a finite family of compact 
abstract convex spaces such that 
=1
( ; ) = ( ; )
n
ii
X XΓ Γ∏  satisfies the partial KKM principle 
and, for each i , let , : = i
i i i
f g X X X R× →  be real functions such that 
(0) ( ) ( )
i i
f x g x≤  for each x X∈ ; 
(1) for each i ix X∈ , [ , ]i
i i i
x g x x6  is quasiconcave on 
i
X ; 
(2) for each i ix X∈ , [ , ]i
i i i
x f x x6  is u.s.c. on 
i
X ; and 
(3) for each 
i i
x X∈ , [ , ]i i
i i
x f x x6  is l.s.c. on iX . 
Then there exists a point x X∈l  such that  
( ) [ , ] for all = 1,2, , .max
i
i i i
y
i i
g x f x y i n
X
≥
∈
l l …  
The Gale-Nikaido-Debreu theorem Let ( , , , )E F 〈⋅ ⋅〉  be a dual system of t.v.s. 
E  and F  such that the bilinear form ,〈⋅ ⋅〉  is continuous on compact subsets of E F× . 
Let K and L be compact convex subsets of t.v.s. E and F, resp., such that K is admissible; 
and P the convex cone { | 0}rK r ≥∪ . Let :T K L?  be an acyclic map such that 
, 0x y〈 〉 ≥  for all x K∈  and ( )y T x∈ . Then there exists x K∈  such that 
( )T x P+∩ ≠ ∅ . 
Here, for a convex cone P  of E , the dual cone is defined by  
:= { | , 0, }.P y F p y p P+ ∈ 〈 〉 ≥ ∈  
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The Fan-Browder fixed point theorem An abstract convex space ( , ; )X D Γ  is 
a KKM space iff for any maps : , :S D X T X X? ?  satisfying 
(1) ( )S z  is open [ resp., closed ]  for each z D∈ ; 
(2) for each , co ( ) ( )y X S y T y− −Γ∈ ⊂ ; and 
(3) = ( )
z M
X S z∈∪  for some M D∈ 〈 〉 , 
T  has a fixed point 
0
x X∈ ; that is 
0 0
( )x T x∈ . 
Generalized Fan minimax inequality Let ( , ; )X D Γ  be an abstract convex 
space satisfying the partial KKM principle, : , :f D X R g X X R× → × →  extended real 
functions, and Rγ ∈  such that 
(1) for each z D∈ , { | ( , ) }y X f z y γ∈ ≤  is closed; 
(2) for each y X∈ , { | ( , ) > } { | ( , ) > }co z D z y x X g x yγ γΓ ∈ ⊂ ∈ ; 
(3) some compactness condition holds for ( ) := { | ( , ) }G z y X z y γ∈ ≤ . 
Then either (i) there exists a x X∈l  such that ( , )f z x γ≤l  for all z D∈ ; or (ii) 
there exists an 
0
x X∈  such that 
0 0
( , ) > .g x x γ  
The following references are basic. 
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Abstract: A TU games solution which is invariant with respect to proportional excess is 
generalized to NTU games. The existence theorem is proved. 
 
 
Proportional excess invariant solution (i.e. solution, which is invariant with 
respect to proportional excess) for positive TU games was defined by E.Yanovskaya 
(2004) in a following manner. Let N be a set of players. A solution Ψ on the set NG +  of 
all positive TU games with players in N  is called proportional excess invariant, or 
shortly proportional invariant (p.i.-solution in what follows) if for every two 
games (N,v) , N+(N,v) G∈  and every (N,v)x X∈ , (N,v)y X∈ , where 
N
+(N,v)={ : ( ) ( )}X x x N v N∈ =R the equalities  
( )/ ( )  ( )/ ( )    for every  v S x S w S y S S N= ⊂  
imply  
( , )    ( , ).x N v y N w= Ψ ⇔ = Ψ  
One of these solutions, which is characterized by efficiency, anonymity, 
restricted linearity, positive homogeneity and proportional invariance properties, can be 
defined by  
( , )
max ( , )   ( ) ( )ln ( ) 
x X N v
s N
N v c s v S x S
∈ ⊂
Ψ = ∑  
for some non-negative numbers ( ) 0c s ≠ ,  - 1,  | |s n n N≤ = . We put ( ) 1 c s =  in what 
follows. The maximum is attained in a unique positive point, and   ( , )x N v= Ψ  should 
be necessarily a solution of the system  
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: :
 ( ) / ( ) = ( )/ ( )  for all ,  
S i S S j S
v S x S v S x S i j N
∈ ∈
∈∑ ∑ . (1) 
Our goal is to generalize this solution to the NTU games, and we will use (1) as 
a basis for such generalization. Firstly recall the definition of the proportional excess for 
NTU games. It was defined axiomatically by author (see, for example, Pechersky, 2007).  
Let NCG+  denotes the space of NTU games possessing the following properties 
for every  S N⊂ , where N is the finite set of players:  
(a) ( ) V S is positively generated, i.e. ( )  ( ( ) ) -S SV S V S + += ∩ \ \ and 
( )S SV V S+ += ∩R  is a compact set, and every ray   {  :  0}, (0,..., 0)xL x xλ λ= ≥ ≠ =0  
does not intersect the boundary of ( )V S  more than once;  
(b) 0  is an interior point of the set \^( ) ( ) N SV S V S R= × . 
(Of course, all ( ) V S are comprehensive). 
Let v be a positive TU game, i. e. ( )  0 v S >  for everyS . Then the 
corresponding NTU game  NV CG+∈  can be defined by 
( )  { :  (  ) ( ) } -  .S SV S x R x S v S R+ += ∈ ≤  
For  S N⊂ a set V(S) S⊂ R  will be called a game subset, if it satisfies (a) and 
(b). The space consisting of all game subsets satisfying (a) and (b) will be denoted 
by SNCG + .  
Let NV CG+∈  be an arbitrary game. Then the proportional excess 
: S NS Nh CG + +× →R R  is defined by  
( , )  1/ ( ( ), )SSh V x V S xγ= , 
where ( ,  )  inf { 0 :  }W y y Wγ λ λ= > ∈  is the gauge (or Minkowski gauge) function. 
If  NV CG+∈  corresponds to a positive TU game v , then 
( ,  )  ( )/ ( ).Sh V x v S x S=  
Now let us modify slightly the definition of p.i.-solution adopting it to the NTU 
case. A solution ψ  (not necessarily single-valued) on NCG+  is called proportional 
invariant if for every two games ,  NV W CG+∈  and every ( ),  ( )x V N y W N+ +∈ ∂ ∈ ∂ , the 
equalities  
( , )  ( , )
S S
h V x h W y=  for every S N⊂  
imply  
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( , ) ( , ).x N V y N Wψ ψ∈ ⇔ ∈  
Theorem 1. There is a p.i.-solution on NCG+ . For every game NV CG+∈  it can 
be defined as the solution of the system  
( ),x V N+∈ ∂  
: :
 ( , )   ( , )
S S
S i S S j S
h V x h V x
∈ ∈
=∑ ∑  for all ,  .i j N∈  
The proof of the theorem uses the Brower fixed point theorem. We denote this 
solution by ψ . 
Proposition 1. Let BG be a family of non-leveled bargaining games in NCG +  . 
Then there is a unique p.i.-solution on BG, and it is the status quo-proportional solution. 
(See the definition and the properties of the status quo-proportional solution in 
Pechersky 2007, 2008). 
Proposition 2. If NCG +  corresponds to a positive TU game v , then 
( ) ( )V vψ = Ψ .  
Proposition 3. P.I.-solution ψ  possesses efficiency, anonymity and positive 
homogeneity properties. 
Let us introduce an operation on NCG + . We call it directional addition, and 
define it as follows. Let ,  SNA B CG +∈ . Then for every Sx +∈ R  there are exactly two 
points y A∈ ∂  and z B∈ ∂  such that  xy xλ=  and xz xμ=  for some positive numbers 
xλ  and xμ . Then the directional sum of A  and B , denoted by dA B⊕  , is defined as 
follows: 
 comp{ ( ) }
d x x x
A B xλ μ⊕ = ∪ + ,  (2) 
where comp F  denotes the comprehensive hull of a set F .  
Let now , NV W CG +∈  with ( ) ( )V N W N= . Define the game dV W⊕  as 
follows: 
 ( )( ) ( ) ( ) 
d
V W N V N W N⊕ = = , (3) 
 ( )( ) ( ) ( )
d d
V W S V S W S⊕ = ⊕  for every S N⊂ . (4) 
Clearly d NV W CG +⊕ ∈ .  
Remark 1. To omit restriction ( ) ( )V N W N= it is possible to use 1 (  )2 x xλ μ+  
in (2) instead of (  )x xλ μ+ .  
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It is not difficult to prove that ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
S d S S
h V W x h V x h W x⊕ = + for every 
S N≠ . 
Proposition 4. Let V , NW CG +∈  with ( ) ( )V N W N= , and ( ) ( )x V Wψ ψ∈ ∩ . 
Then ( )dx V Wψ∈ ⊕ . 
Remark 2. When using the definition mentioned in Remark 1, condition 
( ) ( )V N W N=  can be omitted. It is also clear that the directional sum (1 )daV aW⊕ −  
for every positive number   1a <  can be defined. In that case a simple modification of 
Proposition 4 generalizes the restricted linearity property for TU case. 
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In the paper we propose an approach of multistage link formation between 
players. Let ( , )N v  be a TU game, where = {1, , }N n…  is a finite set of players and 
: 2Nv → \  with ( ) = 0v ∅ . Denote by = {( , ), , , }Ng i j i N j N i j∈ ∈ ≠  a complete graph 
on the player set N  where a pair ( , ) = ( , ), ,i j j i i N j N∈ ∈  is an unordered link 
connecting i  and j . 
Let Ng g⊆ . Following Myerson (1977) for some S N⊆  define /S g  as a partition 
of S  into subsets of players that are connected in S  by g : 
/ = { :S g i i  and j  are connected in S  by ; }g j S∈ , 
and a characteristic function 
/
( ) = ( )g
T S g
v S v T∈∑ . We say that players ,i j S∈  are 
connected in S  if there is a path from i  to j  such that all intermediate vertices belong 
to S . 
For any Ng g∈  as a solution concept of the TU game ( , )N v  we use the Myerson 
value (the Shapley value of the associated TU game ( , )gN v ). 
Consider an approach of link formation. Suppose that a TU game ( , )N v  and a 
graph Ng g⊆  is given. Let for each i N∈  vectors | |1= { , , } Ni i inc c c ∈… \  with = 0iic  
and | |1= { , , } Ni i ind d d ∈… \  with = 0iid  are also given. The component ijc  represents a 
maximal amount that player i  is ready to pay player j  to form a link ( , )i j . The 
component ijd  represents a minimal amount on which player i  is agreed to be paid by 
player j  to form a link ( , )i j . Without loss of generality we assume that the link 
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formation starts from the empty graph 0 =g ∅ . Let the players order 1{ , , }ni i…  is a priori 
given. We begin from 1i . The player 1i  has exactly n  alternatives:  
• not to take any action, and the game process goes to the player 2i ;  
• propose to the player k , 1k i≠  an amount 
1i
c k  to form a link 1( , )i k . If 11 kiic dk ≥  
the player k  is supposed to accept the proposition, and the game process goes to player 
2i .  
So the decision process goes to the player 2i . Note that the graph 0g  is changed 
depending upon the player 1i  choice, and we get a graph 1g . Consider an intermediate 
stage of link formation. Suppose we have a current graph 1tg −  and the player ti  who has 
exactly n  alternatives:  
• not to take any action, and the game process goes to the player 1ti + ;  
• propose to the player k , tk i≠  an amount itc k  to form a link ( , )ti k  if 
1( , )t ti k g −∉ . If kititc dk ≥  the player k  is supposed to accept the proposition, and the 
game process goes to player 1ti + ;  
• break the link ( , )ti k  if 1( , )t ti k g −∈  with player k , tk i≠  paying to him an 
amount kitd , and the game process goes to player 1ti + .  
After n  stages the link formation process is finished. Finally we get an n  person 
game in extensive form on a graph tree K , each vertex of it represents a current link 
relationship between players. In terminal vertices on K  we obtain players payoffs as 
Myerson values. Using Kuhn's technique we give an optimal link structure in terms of 
subgame perfect equilibrium. This result is illustrated by numerical example. 
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We consider 2-player location games played on graphs, where the vertices 
and the edges of the graph may have weights. The graph could be considered to be a 
physical street network with villages as vertices, the vertex weights being the 
number of people, possible customers for the players, living there, and the edge 
weights being the lengths of the corrisponding roads. Each player places a fixed 
number of locations on some vertices. People may or may not go to some location 
(to shop), depending on the distance to the closest location, but if they do, they will 
always choose the closest location, no matter to which one of the 2 players it 
belongs. The payoff for each player is the total number of customers in his or her 
locations. 
We consider several variants, depending on 
• the underlying vertex-weighted and edge-weighted graph G, 
• the number k of locations each player can place, 
• whether the game is simultanous, or sequential with 2 rounds, or 
sequential with 2k rounds, 
• A (non-increasing) function f describing the tolerance of possible 
customers to distance. Only f(x) of the customers will go to a location if the closest 
location has a distance of x. 
• The rule how ties—one person having several locations with closest 
distance to him or her—are broken. Does that person visit any of the locations 
randomly, or use a 50%-50% split between locations of the two players in that case? 
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Note that the simultaneous games are symmetric. The games are ususally 
not zero-sum, except in the case of f(x) = 1, where all customers always visit one of 
the locations. 
Note also that there are questions of how well the resulting pattern of 
locations serves the population as a whole. Home many people visit some of the 
locations? What is the average length to the closest location for those who do? What 
is the average length to the closest location over the whole population? 
Location games have been initiated by H. Hotelling in 1929 [1], considering 
the case of location on a straight line. Later, location games for other geometrical 
patterns have been investigated. Location games on graphs have been investigated 
by V. Knoblauch in two papers in 1991 and 1995. However, her models considered 
differ from ours. In [2], location everywhere on the edges is allowed. In [2], location 
is allowed only on some specified vertices of the graph, and only functions f of the 
form f(x) = 1 for x ≤ m, and f(x) = 0 otherwise, are considered. In this second 
model, Knoblauch could show that every simultaneous 2-person symmetric game is 
equivalent to such a simultaneous location game on a graph. 
In this talk we are going to discuss the following topics: 
• We will discuss the question of what kind of games result from 
simultaneous location games with a function f(x) = 1 (meaning that every person 
will go to the closest location). We will also discuss the existence and number of 
pure Nash equilibria of these games. 
• We will have a closer look into the case of simultaneous games with a 
function f(x) = 1 on special graphs, like trees or chordal graphs. 
• We will discuss the relation to so-called ”'potential games"’ [4] for simlu-
taneous location games with one location to place for each player. We will also 
discuss the existence of pure Nash equilibria. 
• Some examples of simultaneous location games without pure Nash 
equilibria will be presented. 
• We will discuss the welfare for the public of the resulting locations in 
some cases, using the measures discussed above. 
• We will also discuss some of the sequential versions. 
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Abstract: The cooperation plays important role in the bioresource management problems, 
because it causes minimal damage to environment. There are several methodological schemes to 
maintain the cooperation. Here we consider time-consistent imputation distribution procedure and 
special conditions for maintenance the cooperation. 
 
 
Model with logarithmic payoffs 
The fish population grows according to the biological rule  
 
1
= ( ) , 0 < < 1
t t
x x αε α+ . (1) 
We suppose that the utility function of country i  is logarithmic. Then the 
players' net revenue over infinite time horizon are:  
 1 2
1 2
=0 =0
= ln( ), = ln( )t t
t t
t t
J u J uδ δ
∞ ∞∑ ∑ , (2) 
where 1 2, 0t tu u ≥  – countries' catch at time t , 0 < < 1δ  – the common discount factor 
for countries. 
For this model we find Shapley value and time-consistent imputation 
distribution procedure. We consider two conditions which help to maintain the 
cooperation. 
Definition 1. The distribution 1 2( , )ξ ξ  satisfies Yeung's condition [3] if  
1
=0
( ) ( ) (0),
t
t
i i iV t V
τ
τ
δ β τ δ
−
+ ≥∑  
for all 1t ≥ , where 1 2( ) = ( ( ), ( ))t t tβ β β  – time-consistent imputation distribution 
procedure. 
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If this condition is satisfied player i  is irrational-behavior-proof, because 
irrational actions leading to the breaking the cooperative agreement will not bring his 
payoff below his initial noncooperative payoff. 
This condition in our case is equal  
 (0) ( ) (0) ( ), = 1,2.t t
i i i i
t V V t iξ ξ δ δ− ≥ −  (3) 
Definition 2. The distribution 1 2( , )ξ ξ  satisfies incentive cooperative condition if  
( ) ( 1) ( ), = 1,2,i i it V t V t iβ δ+ + ≥  
for all 0t ≥ , where 1 2( ) = ( ( ), ( ))t t tβ β β  – time-consistent imputation distribution 
procedure. 
This condition offers an incentive to player i  to keep cooperation, because at 
every step he gets more gain from cooperation than from noncooperative behavior.This 
condition in our case is equal  
 ( ) ( 1) ( ) ( 1), = 1,2.
i i i i
t t V t V t iξ δξ δ− + ≥ − +  (4) 
As you can notice that incentive cooperative condition yields Yeung's 
condition. We proved that Yeung's and cooperative incentive conditions are satisfied for 
this model. 
 
Model with quadratic payoffs 
The fish population grows according to the biological rule  
 1 2
1
= , > 1,
t t t t
x x u uε ε+ − −  (5) 
where 1 2, 0t tu u ≥  – countries' fishing efforts at time t . 
The players' net revenue over infinite time horizon are:  
 1 1 2 2 2 2
1 2
=0 =0
= ( ( ) ), = ( ( ) ),t t
t t t t
t t
J pu c u J pu c uδ δ
∞ ∞
− −∑ ∑  (6) 
where 0 < < 1δ  – the common discount factor for countries, > 0p  – price for fish, 
> 0c  – catching cost. 
For this model we also find Shapley value and time-consistent imputation 
distribution procedure. We find conditions on 0x  that guarantee the observance of 
Yeung's and incentive cooperative condition. 
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In many situations in which some kind of optimization is desirable, the 
decisions that must be made in the present are unable to produce unambiguous future 
outcomes. They can only affect the probability distributions of various future "costs" or 
losses, and then even the framework for optimization is called into question. 
To get around the difficulty, preferences toward risk must be brought in, and 
these can involve a lot more ideas than expected utility. Moreover some traditional 
approaches with safety margins and probabilistic constraints are open to serious 
criticism. The systematic theory of risk that has been developed in recent years, out of 
motivations in finance and engineering, offers a clear view of how optimization can be 
carried out "coherently" despite such issues. 
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This paper formulates a rationality concept for extensive games in which 
deviations from rational play are interpreted as evidence of irrationality. Instead of 
confirming some prior belief about the nature of non-rational play, we assume that such 
a deviation leads to genuine uncertainty. Assuming complete ignorance about the nature 
of non-rational play and extreme uncertainty aversion of the rational players, we 
formulate an equilibrium concept on the basis of Choquet expected utility theory. We 
relate the equilibrium concept to the foundations of game theory and discuss the 
centipede game and the finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma.  
According to the principle of sequential rationality, a rational player of an 
extensive form game regards his opponents as rational even after a deviation from 
rational play. The internal consistency of this principle is subject of much debate (see, 
e.g., Aumann (1995, 1996, 1998), Binmore (1996), Reny (1993)). Attributing non-
rational deviations to ‘trembles’ of otherwise perfectly rational players (Selten 1975) is 
logically consistent, but raises the second concern with the principle of sequential 
rationality, that is its empirical plausibility. Quite independently of the question whether 
there exists a rationality concept that implies, or is at least consistent with sequential 
rationality, the question arises if there is room for an alternative rationality concept, in 
which deviations from the solution concept are interpreted as evidence of non-
rationality. In this paper, we attempt to formulate such a rationality concept on the basis 
of Choquet expected utility theory. 
In a seminal series of papers, Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, and Wilson (1982) 
(henceforth KMRW) developed the methodology for analysing games with possibly 
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non-rational opponents. In their models, there is some a priori uncertainty about the 
rationality of the opponent. Under subjective expected utility, players act as if they 
possess a probability distribution over the ‘type’ of the opponents’ non-rationality. They 
maximise utility given their beliefs, and in sequential equilibrium their beliefs are 
consistent with the play of rational opponents. KMRW have shown how even small 
degrees of uncertainty about rationality can have large equilibrium effects. They showed 
that this can explain both intuitive strategic phenomena, particularly in industrial 
organization, and, at least to some degree, experimental evidence.  
One problem in this approach, however, is for an outside observer to specify the 
probability distribution over the types of the non-rational opponents before experimental 
or field data are available. A second problem is that analysing the strategic interaction as 
a game with incomplete information implies that the other players, whether rational or 
not, can be modelled as ‘types’, who possess a consistent infinite hierarchy of beliefs 
about the strategic interaction. Thus, the players in this methodology are not really non-
rational; rather, they are rational but have preferences that differ from those that the 
game attributes to ‘rational’ players.  
In this paper, we argue that a consistency argument addresses both of these 
problems. A game-theoretic solution concept that singles out rational strategies 
implicitly defines all other strategies as non-rational. Thus, consistency requires that 
beliefs about non-rational players should not exclude any of these non-rational strategies. 
In other words, if the rationality concept is point-valued, the beliefs about non-rational 
play should include all deviations, and thus must be set-valued. So in this sense, the 
rationality concept itself pins down beliefs about non-rational play, but excludes 
subjective expected utility theory (henceforth SEU) as the adequate model of these 
beliefs. Thus, SEU is not an appropriate framework for beliefs about non-rationality 
when rationality is endogenous. Thus, this paper argues that, after an opponent deviates 
from rational play, a rational player faces genuine uncertainty. What matters, then, is the 
rational player’s attitude towards uncertainty. This paper formulates the equilibrium 
concept for the case in which rational players are completely uncertainty averse. It is this 
case that has led to the development of decision theories with set-valued and non-
additive beliefs as an explanation of the Ellsberg (1961) paradox. Consequently, we base 
the equilibrium concept on Choquet expected utility theory (henceforth CEU) developed 
by Schmeidler (1989). 
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This paper joins a growing literature that applies CEU to games. The first of 
these were Dow & Werlang (1994) and Klibanoff (1993). Dow & Werlang (1994) 
consider normal form games in which players are CEU maximisers. Klibanoff (1993) 
similarly considers normal form games in which players follow maxmin-expected utility 
theory (Gilboa & Schmeidler 1989), which is closely related to CEU. In Hendon, 
Jacobsen, Sloth & Tranæs (1995) players have belief functions, which amounts to a 
special case of CEU. Extensions and refinements have been proposed by Eichberger & 
Kelsey (1994), Lo (1995b), Marinacci (1994) and Ryan (1997). Epstein (1997a) 
analysed rationalizability in normal form games. These authors consider normal form 
games and do not distinguish between rational and non-rational players. The paper 
closest to ours is Mukerji (1994), who considers normal form games only but argues that 
the distinction between rational and non-rational players is necessary to reconcile CEU 
with the equilibrium concept. For normal form games our concepts differ only in 
motivation and technical team. The present paper mainly concerns extensive form 
games. Extensive games have been studied by Lo (1995a) and Eichberger & Kelsey 
(1995). Lo (1995a) extends Klibanoff’s approach to extensive games, Eichberger & 
Kelsey (1995) are the first to use the Dempster-Shafer updating rule (see section 3) in 
extensive games. They do not distinguish between rational and non-rational players.  
This paper is organized as follows: The next section discusses an example. 
Section 3 presents Choquet expected utility theory and discusses the problem of updating 
non-additive beliefs. In section 4 we formulate the equilibrium concept for two player 
games with perfect information. In section 5 we discuss the centipede game and the 
finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma in order to relate the equilibrium concept to the 
foundations of game theory. Section 6 elaborates on the extension of the solution 
concept to general extensive games. Section 7 concludes. There is one appendix on 
teams of updating non-additive beliefs.  
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Abstract: We consider game G with ordered outcomes of two players. In general case, such a 
game even need not have an equilibrium point when this game is finite. In our previous paper it is 
shown that for finite game G there exists an equilibrium point in its mixed extension but the 
existence of Nash equilibrium need not be satisfied. In this report, we find some conditions under 
which a game G have Nash equilibrium point in mixed strategies. The main result is connected 
with a concept of balanced matrix. 
 
 
We consider games with ordered outcomes of two players in the 
1 2, , , , ,G I J A Fω ω=< > , 
where I  is a set of strategies of player 1, J  is a set of strategies of player 2, A  is a set 
of outcomes, 1ω  and 2ω  are orderings on A  which represent preferences of players 1 
and 2, respectively, :F I J A× →  is a realization function. In general case, such a game 
need not have an equilibrium point even when this game is finite. 
In our previous paper it is shown that for finite game G  there exists an 
equilibrium point in its mixed extension but the existence of Nash equilibrium need not 
be satisfied. In this report, we find some conditions under which a game G  have Nash 
equilibrium point in mixed strategies. The main result is connected with a concept of 
balanced matrix. 
Let A  be an arbitrary set and :F I J A× →  be a function. For any vectors 
( )i i Ix x ∈=  and ( ) Jj jy y ∈= , where 0, 1i i
i I
x x
∈
≥ =∑  and 0, 1j j
j J
y y
∈
≥ =∑  put 
( , )
( , )
( )x y i j
F i j a
F a x y
=
= ∑  
Definition. A matrix ( ( , ))F i j  is called balanced if there exist vectors ,x y  with 
strict positive components such that for any ,i I j J∈ ∈ ,a A∈  the following conditions 
hold 
( , ) ( , )( ) ( )i y x yF a F a=  and ( , ) ( , )( ) ( )x j x yF a F a= . 
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Given a game G with ordered outcomes, we can construct its mixed extension 
(see our previous paper in GTM 2009). A necessary condition for Nash equilibrium 
point in mixed extension of game G is given by the following theorem. 
Theorem 1. Let 0 0( , )x y  be Nash equilibrium in mixed extension of game G . 
Then the matrix which is a restriction of matrix of outcomes ( ( , ))F i j  under the pair of 
spectrums 0 0( , )Spx Spy  is balanced. 
Corollary 1. Suppose there exists a Nash equilibrium point in mixed extension 
of game G . Then the matrix of outcomes of game G  contains a balanced submatrix. 
Note that the last condition is defined only by realization function of game G  
and not depend on order relations , 1,2.i iω =  
We now state necessary and sufficient condition for Nash equilibrium in mixed 
extension of game G . We denote by iϖ  the extension of order relation iω  and by ( , )x yF  
the extension of realization function F on the set of probability measures. 
Theorem 2. A situation in mixed strategies 0 0( , )x y  is Nash equilibrium point in 
mixed extension of game G  if and only if the following conditions hold: 
The restriction of matrix of outcomes under the pair of spectrums 0 0( , )Spx Spy  is 
balanced matrix; 
1
0 0 0( , ) ( , )i y x y
F Fϖ≤  for all 0i Spx∉ ; 
2
0 0 0( , ) ( , )x j x y
F Fϖ≤  for all 0j Spy∉ . 
Corollary 2. A game G have a quite Nash equilibrium point in mixed strategies 
if and only if its matrix of outcomes is balanced. 
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I Behaviours and norms convergence. 
Analysis of competition and cooperation with the aim of understanding how 
behaviours may converge and lead to the development of norms, has been the subject of 
protracted research in social sciences, and particularly in anthropology (Mead [7]). In 
philosophy and sociology the idea of a convention has been developed, to explain the 
emergence and persistence of the practice of rules (starting with the seminal work of 
Lewis [5]). In legal theory a broad discussion has taken place where some authors have 
argued that the law is essentially a matter of convention (on judges converging on 
fundamental rules (Hart [3]), while others have denied that conventions explain judicial 
behaviour. According to Dworkin ([2]), such choices are explained by the attempt to 
make the law “as good as it can be”, in the framework defined with respect to popular 
will (fairness) and fitness with legal history. On its side Game Theory has provided core 
concepts and tools, through the development of N-player games (Rapoport [11]), 
cooperative negotiation concepts (Nash [8]), Kalai & Smorodinsky [4]) or bargaining 
models (Osborne & Rubinstein [9]), and evolutionary games (Maynard Smith [6]). Thus, 
N-player games through analyzing the formation of coalitions, have specified the 
conditions under which these coalitions could lead to qualified majorities, and hence to 
the adoption of laws and regulations . Likewise, distributive and integrative negotiations 
have been differentiated (Raiffa [10]), while evolutionary games have been used to 
analyze the convergence of behaviours (Rudnianski, Ellison & Huo [12]). 
Now if reaching an agreement somehow means that the different parties’ points 
of view converge, the development of norms is certainly not a pre-requisite to the 
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occurrence of an agreement, and vice versa an explicit agreement is not a necessary 
condition for behaviours to converge. Likewise, the occurrence or the non-occurrence of 
an agreement is most of the time taken into account implicitly in the assessment of the 
states of the world resulting from implementation of the players’ strategies. 
Nevertheless in some types of social interaction the parties involved may take into 
account the occurrence of a convergence when assessing a state of the world. This must 
have been certainly the case for parties involved in the Copenhagen negotiations on 
climate change: One can reasonably assume that a vast majority of these parties at least 
would have seen favorably the occurrence of an agreement. Such could be also the case 
for general assemblies of private companies shareholders, or in the field of legal affairs, 
for law makers, judges applying imprecise legal corpuses, and thus contributing to 
develop jurisprudence, or lawyers (Sartor, Rudnianski & all [13]). 
The proposed paper will precisely analyze the relations between the occurrence 
of convergence and the development of norms in three steps 
II Big Mama 
The first step introduces and analyzes the following metaphor. 
Alice, Bob and Carol just went out of a ballet, and they want to have supper. All 
restaurants nearby are already closed, except “Big Mama” which takes its name after the 
woman who is both the waitress and the cook of the place.  
Big Mama agrees to serve them supper but warns: “you can choose from the menu the 
course you want, but it is already late and I am alone in the kitchen. Hence the more 
different courses you ask, the more you will have to wait, and the courses that are more 
wanted will be served before the others” 
If the three parties are rational, their decisions will obviously depend on the 
utilities they associate with each course, and that are based both on their personal tastes 
and the waiting time 
On the basis of those utilities, the paper analyzes: 
- the conditions under which Alice, Bob and Carol will have their supper served by Big 
Mama 
- how coalitions between the parties can form 
- the conditions under which all parties may converge and elect the same course. 
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III Generalization 
The second part of the paper extends the analysis in different directions 
associated respectively with: 
- the decision rules 
- the number of players 
- the total number of courses figuring on the menu  
- the number of different courses allowed by Big Mama 
- the discount factor deriving from the time required to be served. 
For some particular sets of the above variables, the solutions found are 
interpreted in the light of the Condorcet Paradox. 
Now, it is a well known fact that the repetition of a game may sometimes 
facilitate either cooperation between the players, as is the case for instance with the 
iterated Prisoners Dilemma (Axelrod [1]), or the occurrence of an agreement (as shown 
by Rubinstein’s bargaining model [9]). In that perspective the paper will analyze how 
repetition of the game may reshape the coalitions, and the conditions under which an 
agreement can occur, and the related norms develop. 
IV Application to the development of jurisprudence 
The third and last part of the paper will apply the findings of the Big Mama 
metaphor’s to the case of judges who may differently understand the legal texts while 
believing nevertheless that convergence toward a single interpretation of the law (i.e. 
toward jurisprudence) is a matter of importance. 
The paper will in particular analyze the case of compensatory damages, 
assuming that a legal article stipulates that “the one who causes a damage has to 
compensate it”, and considering then the following three possible interpretations of the 
term “damage”: 
1) damage means only financial damage 
2) damage also includes damage to health even if there is no financial 
impact(for instance, the damage caused is a reduced capacity to practice sport) 
3) on the top o the two previous damages, moral damage has also to be taken 
into account. 
It will be assumed that the judges only focus on the social value that can derive 
from Justice, and are not considering the personal advantages they could obtain by 
adopting a certain behavior. 
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This research focuses on game for new insights for leadership assessment and 
development. It introduces theory on triads of typical-maximal-ideal (a) individually 
considerating, (b) intellectually stimulating, (c) leading by exception (active), (d) 
idealized influence (attributed), (e) idealized influence (behavioral), and (f) contingently 
rewarding leadership performances (for example via triad of typical, maximal, and ideal 
contingently rewarding leadership performances) adding diversification and precision to 
leadership assessment. It explores the proposition that within each triad - each of typical, 
maximal, and ideal leadership performances is theoretically and conceptually distinct 
and supports this distinction through databased empirical analyses by using mean 
difference via one sample t-test and one way analysis of variance. Thereafter, it uses 
each triad of the distinct typical, maximal, and ideal leadership performances to 
introduce and empirically test the mechanism to quantify respondents’ intrinsic desire 
and inherent potential to enhance their respective leadership performances. Finally, it 
suggests precedents of each leadership performance and presents implications for 
leadership development training on the basis of correlations and multiple regression 
analyses.  
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Abstract: Let G be a game with preference relations of players I. Then we can construct a game of 
coalition if strategies and preference relations of coalitions are given. Let G, H be two games with 
preference relations. A homomorphism from game G into game H is said to be a coalition 
homomorphism if it preserves preference relations for coalitions. We study the following 
problems. We find conditions under which a homomorphism of games is a homomorphism for 
games of coalitions. We stand a correspondence between acceptable outcomes of games which are 
in homomorphic relations of various types. We find connections between acceptable outcomes of 
game with preference relations and a-core for games with payoff functions. 
 
 
1. The cooperative aspect of a game is connected with its coalitions. Consider a 
game of players { }= 1, ,N n…  with preference relations  
( ) ( )= , , , .i ii N i NG X A Fρ∈ ∈〈 〉  
For any coalition T N⊆  we need define its set of strategies TX  and its 
preference relation Tρ . We consider TX  in the form  
=T i
i T
X X
∈
∏  
and a preference relation for coalition T  in one of the following ways:  
A) ( )1 2 1 2T ia a i T a a
ρ ρ
< ⇒ ∀ ∈ <   – Pareto concordance of preferences of players, 
OR  
B) ( )
( )
1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2
< < ,
T i
T i
a a i T a a
a a i T a a
ρ ρ
ρ ρ
⎧⎪⎪⎪ ⇒ ∀ ∈⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪ ⇒ ∀ ∈⎪⎪⎩ ∼ ∼
 – modified Pareto concordance of preferences of 
players. 
2. In this paper we consider the following optimal solutions: 
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K -equilibrium points and K -acceptable outcomes. 
Let K  be an arbitrary family of coalitions in game G . 
Definition 1. A strategy 0T Tx X∈  is called a refutation of coalition T  against outcome 
a  if for any strategy \ \N T N Tx X∈  the condition 0 \< ( , )T T N Ta F x x
ρ
 holds. An outcome a  is 
called K -acceptable if any coalition T K∈  does not have a refutation against this 
outcome.  
Definition 2. A strategy 0T Tx X∈  is called a refutation of coalition T  against situation 
x X∈  if the condition 0 \( )< ( , )T T N TF x F x x
ρ
 holds. A situation 0x X∈  is called K -
equilibrium if any coalition T K∈  does not have a refutation against this situation.  
 3. In this section we find some connections between optimal cooperative 
solutions of games which are in homomorphic relations. 
Let ( ) ( )= , , ,i ii N i NU B σ∈ ∈Γ 〈 Φ〉  be one more game of the same players and 
1= ( , , , )nf φ φ ψ…  be a homomorphism from game G  into game Γ .  
Definition 3. A homomorphism f  is said to be:  
• a coalition homomorphism if it preserves preference relations for coalitions, i.e. 
for any coalition T N⊆  the condition  
1 2 1 2( ) ( )
T T
a a a a
ρ σψ ψ< ⇒ <   
holds;  
• a strict coalition homomorphism if for any coalition T N⊆  the system of the 
conditions  
1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2
< ( )< ( ),
( ) ( )
T T
T T
a a a a
a a a a
ρ σ
ρ σ
ψ ψ
ψ ψ
⎧⎪ ⇒⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪ ⇒⎪⎪⎩ ∼ ∼
 
is satisfied;  
• a regular coalition homomorphism if for any coalition T N⊆  the system of the 
conditions  
1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2
( )< ( ) < ,
( ) ( ) ( ) = ( )
T T
T
a a a a
a a a a
σ ρ
σ
ψ ψ
ψ ψ ψ ψ
⎧⎪ ⇒⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪ ⇒⎪⎪⎩ ∼
 
is satisfied.  
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The main result of this paper is finding of a correspondence between sets of K -
acceptable outcomes and K -equilibrium situations of games which are in homomorphic 
relations of indicated types. 
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This paper continues the research described in the previous paper presented in 
GTM2009 [1] which describes the application of game theoretic approach in resource 
management with specific application to development of optimal strategies of 
phosphorus applications for soil fertilisation. In [1] we considered not only competitive 
strategies, which were treated as the Nash equilibrium game solutions but also strategies 
which imply cooperation between farmers. These strategies were modelled using the 
cooperative Pareto optimality concept. The paper presents algorithms for finding 
competitive and cooperative solutions of the game for the particular case when no time 
scheduling is included in the game parameterisation. The results obtained in [1] showed 
that the cooperative solutions lead to much lesser negative environmental impacts than in 
the case of non-cooperative strategies. This paper allowed us to improve these results by 
using coalitional strategies. 
The major problem associated with this research was related to the fact that set of 
Pareto optimal solution for this game of 30 players (farmers) was too restrictive. In our 
model Pareto optima were obtained by maximising the weighted sum of player payoff 
functions where we have assumed that the weights are equal. Such an approach provided 
us with a better phosphorus management strategy compared to Nash equilibrium solution 
in most but not for all farmers. The major question remained how to find the ‘better’ 
cooperative optima, which will secure strict domination over Nash equilibrium solutions 
for all players? In the present paper, we employed the Shapley value calculation 
technique in order to address this problem. 
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Let 
i
u  be the utility function of each player (refer to [1] for the definition of this 
and other related functions). In order to find Nash values, the following equations must 
be solved: 
0i
r
i
u
α
∂ =∂ , 1,...,i N= ; 1,...,r R=  
In order to find a Pareto optimum, the following equations must be solved: 
1
( )
0
N
i
i
r r
i i
u
Z
α α
=
∂ ∂= =∂ ∂
∑
, 1,...,i N= ; 1,...,r R=  
Z  is the total weighted utility of all players and the Pareto optimum presents the 
maximum total utility of all player when they cooperate together.  
The next stage in solving a cooperative game theory problem is in seeking a fair 
distribution of the gain to each player. It is clear that if individual utility values based on 
the cooperative strategy are assigned as gain to each player, some of the player will be 
worse off when compare with non-cooperative strategy. Therefore, in this case there is 
no rationale for them to cooperate. To calculate a fair allocation of total gain in a 
cooperative way, we use Shapley values, which are well known to have attractive 
property of a fair allocation. The Shapley value to Player i among the set of players 
N ={1,2,…,n} calculated by using the following equation: 
 { }
{ }
!( 1)!
( ) [ ( ) ( )]
!i S N i
S N S
S i S
N
ϑ ϑ ϑ
⊆ −
− −Φ = ∪ −∑ , 1,2,...,i n=  (1) 
where N is the set of players, S is a subset N and ϑ·(·) is the characteristic function of the 
cooperative game. Characteristic functions are often assumed to be super-additive, i.e. 
they satisfy 
1. ϑ (∅) =0 and  
2. ϑ (A∩B)≥ ϑ (A) + ϑ (B) for any mutually exclusive sets A and B, i.e. 
A∪B=∅. 
To calculate the Shapely values for n players involves 2 1n −  pieces of 
computations. In our problem we have 30 players, so to calculate Shapely values for all 
players from the formula would involve 230-1 (10727*105) computations. We use 
MATLAB program in order to perform this huge number of computations and use them 
to obtain Shapley values.  
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A program in MATLAB 7 was written to calculate Shapely values considering 
above notes and it was run with (run time was 637005*108 sec. for the computer with 
the following characteristics: Intel 2 CPU, 1.83 GHz with 512 MB Memory RAM. 
The Nash, Pareto and Shapley values were calculated for all 30 players of our 
model. The Pareto optima dominated over Nash equilibria for 27 out of 30 players, 
however three players earned less utility when the Pareto approach is applied. However, 
the total objective function, summarised for all players, of Pareto solution is greater than 
Nash one. The results for Shapely values calculated for each player indicated total 
domination of Shapley of Nash solutions: all players earned more utility compare to 
Nash values, due to the individual rationality as property of Shapely values. The major 
conclusion we made is that coalitional strategies provide more optimal managerial 
option than those associated to the Pareto cooperative solutions. 
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The evolution of the internet brought about new distribution opportunities. 
Nowadays all companies face the decision whether to sell products or services online, 
offline or through both channels. This work studies the influencing factors for which 
multi-channel or pure-play distribution result as equilibrium market structures.  
A game theoretic model is derived to predict the market equilibrium given the 
possibility of distributing products through the offline and the online channel. Under the 
assumptions that channels are imperfect substitutes and that distribution costs differ 
between channels, the distributors’ market entry is modeled as a simultaneous decision 
problem. The model is applied to both a vertically integrated and a vertically separated 
distribution setting.  
In the vertically integrated setting it can be shown, that equilibrium market 
structure is dependent on the cost difference and the level of channel competition. Either 
exclusively the more efficient channel is served, resulting in a pure-play equilibrium, or 
multiple distribution channels will coexist. 
In the vertically separated setting a product can be sold through a monopolistic 
online retailer and a monopolistic offline retailer. Independent of differences in 
distribution costs, both retailers will decide to enter into sales as long as profits are non-
negative. When deciding on market entry, the two retailers account for their own profits 
resulting from the corresponding post-entry competition. Retailers do not give 
consideration to external effects of their market entry. If substitutability of channels is 
high this may lead to an inefficient market entry of the retailer facing higher distribution 
costs. In such cases, coordination tools, enforcing exclusion of the disadvantaged 
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retailer, yield overall efficiency gains. Thus the equilibrium market structure for 
vertically separated settings depends on whether such coordination tools are 
implemented or not. 
Overall it is found that the equilibrium market structure depends on multiple 
factors. First, it depends on the number of intermediary levels included in the 
distribution process and on the level of coordination between these levels. Second, 
channel specific parameters such as distribution costs and channel substitutability have a 
major impact on the equilibrium market structure. It can be shown that due to 
consumers’ channel preferences, the coexistence of multiple distribution channels is 
possible even if one channel faces higher distribution costs than the other.  
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Abstract: In this paper, we use a numerical method to determine control laws for a few pursuit-
evasion games. We consider two and three player games that have ‘‘switched'' control laws. We 
determine the optimal control inputs for the static HJI equation for the time-to-reach function is 
solved using the Gauss-Seidel (GS) Sweeping method proposed by Kao, Osher and Qian (Journal 
of Computational Physics, 2004). We provide theoretical results to qualify the computed value 
functions (and optimal inputs) and discuss higher-order approximations to reduce computational 
cost and multigrid algorithms to improve the rate of convergence. From the game- heoretic 
solution, trajectories for the various initial conditions are simulated to determine control laws for 
the players. For the two player game, the switched control laws result from the presence of 
universal surfaces. For the three player game, the switched behavior of the overall game is 
characterized by a switching surface composed of initial conditions of the evader, relative to the 
pursuers. Depending on the relative positions of the players, the game degenerates to either a 
game between one pursuer and the evader (a one-on-one game) or a game with both pursuers 
involved in the pursuit (a two-on-one game). Hence, the switched control laws for the pursuers can 
be represented through a combination of a logical input, that determines if the pursuer is involved 
in the pursuit and continuous control inputs that define the trajectory that the pursuers follow to 
capture the evader. 
 
 
The Continuously Stable Strategy (CSS) and Neighborhood Invader Strategy 
(NIS) concepts, originally developed as intuitive static conditions to predict the dynamic 
stability of a monomorphic population, are shown to be closely related to classical game-
theoretic dominance criteria when applied to continuous strategy spaces. Specifically, for 
symmetric and non symmetric two-player games, a CSS in the interior of the continuous 
strategy space is equivalent to neighborhood half-superiority while an NIS is equivalent 
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to full neighborhood superiority. These conditions generalize risk dominance and p∗  - 
dominance concepts for two-strategy two-player games. 
The CSS and NIS are also important for dynamic stability under the replicator 
and best response dynamics as well as for adaptive dynamics. In particular, these 
dominance criteria applied to two-species models give a game-theoretic method to 
predict the equilibrium behaviour of interacting populations. 
In this paper we explore rent seeking contests (see Nitzan (1994) and Tollison 
(1997)), where the set of players is weak heterogeneous concerning their preferences. 
The players have negatively interdependent preferences in different parameter values. 
For a long time the assumption of preferences being independent from other players' 
payoff has been unquestioned in economic. In the more recent literature especially the 
literature about evolutionary game theory it became more common to relax this 
assumption of purely self-interested preferences. Hehenkamp et al. (2004) show that in 
rent-seeking contests, as analyzed here, it is evolutionary stable to behave like a player 
with interdependent preferences. Nevertheless the idea of interdependent preferences is 
rather old. Duesenberry (1949) laid a first empirical basis of interdependent preferences. 
A game-theoretic approach for the design of switched control laws was formulated in the 
context of hybrid systems by Tomlin, Lygeros and Sastry [1]. The discrete and 
continuous control inputs were derived using a two player zero-sum game theory 
formulation with the controller pitted against an unknown disturbance. The discrete 
inputs are determined from a discrete Hamilton-Jacobi (HJ) equation and the continuous 
inputs from the time-dependent Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs (HJI) equation. Applications to 
problems in aircraft conflict resolution, aerodynamic envelope protection and vehicle 
collision avoidance were presented along with computational tools based on numerical 
and other approximation methods. This game-theoretic formulation can also be used for 
differential games. One approach to this problem is to computationally solve the 
appropriate HJ equation and determine switched control laws (if they exist) from the 
solution. It is the use of this approach for differential game with two and three players 
that is the focus of this study. The static HJI equation for the time-to-reach problem is 
solved using a numerical method and control laws are extracted from the game-theoretic 
solution. 
In this paper, we use a numerical method to determine control laws for a few 
pursuit-evasion games. We consider two and three player games that have "switched" 
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control laws. We determine the optimal control inputs for the static HJI equation for the 
time-to-reach function is solved using the Gauss-Seidel (GS) Sweeping method proposed 
by Kao, Osher and Qian [2]. We provide theoretical results to qualify the computed 
value functions (and optimal inputs) and discuss higher-order approximations to reduce 
computational cost and multigrid algorithms to improve the rate of convergence. From 
the game-theoretic solution, trajectories for the various initial conditions are simulated to 
determine control laws for the players. For the two player game, the switched control 
laws result from the presence of universal surfaces. For the three player game, the 
switched behavior of the overall game is characterized by a switching surface composed 
of initial conditions of the evader, relative to the pursuers. Depending on the relative 
positions of the players, the game degenerates to either a game between one pursuer and 
the evader (a one-on-one game) or a game with both pursuers involved in the pursuit (a 
two-on-one game). Hence, the switched control laws for the pursuers can be represented 
through a combination of a logical input, that determines if the pursuer is involved in the 
pursuit and continuous control inputs that define the trajectory that the pursuers follow to 
capture the evader. 
The algorithm to implement the GS Sweeping algorithm consists of three steps: 
1) initialization of values within the computational domain, 2) GS Sweeping updates and 
3) enforcing computational boundary conditions. For our differential game, there are 
either three or four continuous states and the computational grid is built from uniform 
discretizations of size xΔ  in each of the continuous states. 
1. Assign a value to all the interior points in the computational grid which is 
larger than the true solution. These values will be updated by the sweeping algorithm. 
2. During each iteration, use the GS Sweeping formula, to update the values in 
the computational grid. We use 8 or 16 sweeps for the three or four dimensional 
computational grid in our problems. Each sweep consists of a forward or backward 
sweep of a particular coordinate direction while keeping the direction of the sweep in the 
other directions fixed. 
3. Enforce boundary conditions to update values on the edges of the 
computational grid. 
4. Repeat steps 2 and 3 until the maximum change in the value at any point 
within the computational grid is less than a predefined threshold, e . 
In the final version of the paper, we will show that the value functions are 
viscosity solutions. In addition, we will discuss the use of higher-order approximations 
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to reduce computational costs and multigrid algorithms to improve convergence of the 
GS Sweeping algorithm. 
Sample optimal trajectories for a three player game are shown in Fig. 1(a) and 
1(b). 
 
 (a) One-on-One Game (b) Two-on-One Game 
Figure 1: Bifurcation of the game space leading to one-on-one and two-on-one 
games 
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Abstract: A fuzzy cooperative game model for coalition formation is developed and applied for 
configuring of supply networks. See the file attached. 
 
 
In a today’s highly competitive market manufacturers face the challenge of 
reducing manufacturing cycle time, delivery lead-time and inventory. As a consequence, 
new organizational forms of enterprise integration emerge to address these challenges 
resulting in more agile structures known as adaptive, agile and open supply chains and 
networks. In contrast to conventional chains and supply networks, open supply networks 
(OSNs) are characterized by the availability of alternative providers and the expediency 
of dynamic configuration and reconfiguration of the network depending on the order 
stream and economic benefit of every enterprise. A possible form of this flexible 
configuration consists in generation of enterprise coalitions. 
Unfortunately, adoption of more flexible and dynamic practices, which offer the 
prospect of better matches between suppliers and customers as market conditions 
change, has proven elusive, due to the complexity of many supply chain relationships 
and the difficulty of effectively supporting dynamic trading practices. Due to the 
conflictions among the objectives of each organization and non-integrated decision 
making processes, there has been a need for new coalition formation mechanisms, which 
help to resolve those conflictions and to agree upon effective solutions. 
Coalition formation represents a rapidly developing field of research. One of the 
possible approaches to coalition formation is represented by the theory of games [1]. Till 
now, in many research efforts non-cooperative games have been applied to model supply 
chains and the interaction of the enterprises as a zero-sum game. In that context, all the 
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players are considered being self-interested trying to optimize their own profits without 
taking into account their effects on the other players. The main problem is to find the 
optimal strategy for each player. On the contrary, the theory of cooperative games offers 
results that show the structure of possible interaction and the conditions required for it. 
In many cases, negotiations and bargaining take place before any concerted strategy is 
used, when the players have a vague idea of what the expected coalition benefit will be. 
Thus, profit distribution can prove to be fuzzy, uncertain, and ambiguous [2]. Using the 
theory of fuzzy cooperative games (FCGs), we can process the uncertainty and pass from 
the introduction of a fuzzy profit concept through the bargaining process to the 
conclusion about the corresponding fuzzy distribution of individual payoffs. 
To model the OSN configuration process, in this paper fuzzy coalition games 
with a solution set are considered, more particularly games with associated core [3]. The 
core of a game with respect to a given coalition structure is defined as a set of coalition 
configurations that don’t necessarily have unique payoff distributions. Those coalition 
structures that maximize the total profit (i.e. the sum of all coalition values in the 
considered structure) are called coalitions with a stable core (C-stable), or effective 
coalitions. Unfortunately, games with the core have well-known drawbacks: the core 
might be empty for certain cooperative games and is exponentially difficult to compute. 
Because of these problems, using the C-stable coalition has been quite unpopular so far. 
In this paper we show that these problems can be solved in a proposed generalized 
model of a FCG.  
A FCG is defined as a pair (I,w) , where I is nonempty and finite set of players, 
subsets of I joining together to fulfil some task jt  are called coalitions, and w is called a 
characteristic function of the game, being :2I +w R→  a mapping connecting every 
coalition K I⊂  with a fuzzy quantity +w(K) R∈ , called characteristic function of the 
game, with a membership function : [0,1]K Rμ → , where a characteristic function of the 
crisp game v(K)  is the modal value of w(K)  and for the empty coalition 0w( ) =∅ . The 
solution of a cooperative game is a coalition configuration (S, x) which consists of (i) a 
partition S of I, the so-called coalition structure, and (ii) an efficient payoff distribution x 
which assigns each agent in I its utility out of the value of the coalition it is member of in 
a given coalition structure S. A coalition configuration (S, x) is called stable if no agent 
has an incentive to leave its coalition in S due to its assigned payoff xi. Let us define a 
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fuzzy core for the game (I,w)  with the imputation ,( )ij i I j JX x R+∈ ∈= ∈  as a fuzzy subset 
CF of R+ : 
 
,
: ( ( ), ),min( ( , ( ))
j
j
F ij ij ij ij ij jK k
i I i K
j Jj J
C x R w I x y x y w Kν ν+
∈∈ ∈∈∈
⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪= ∈ = =⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
∑ ∑; ;  (1) 
where xij is the fuzzy payment of an agent i participating in a coalition, , 1,2,...,j i n= , 
1,2,...,j l= , = [K1, K2, ..., Kl] k  is the ordered structure of effective coalitions; ijy  - is a 
fuzzy partial order relation with a membership function : [0,1]R Rν = × →; , and  
1, if an agent participates in a coalition ;
0 otherwise.ij
i j
y
⎧⎪⎪=⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
 
The core FC  is the set of possible distributions of the total payment achievable 
by the coalitions, and none of coalitions can offer to its members more than they can 
obtain accepting some imputation from the core. The first argument of the core FC  
indicates that the payments for the grand coalition are less than the characteristic 
function of the game. The second argument reflects the property of group rationality of 
the players, that there is no other payoff vector, which yields more to each player. The 
membership function : [0,1],
FC
Rμ →  is defined as: 
 
,
( ) min : ( ( ), ),min( ( , ( ))
F
j
j
C ij ij ij ij ij jK k
i I i K
j Jj J
X x R w I x y x y w Kμ ν ν+
∈∈ ∈∈∈
⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪= ∈ = =⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
∑ ∑; ;  (2) 
A game (I, w) may be superadditive, subadditive, or simply additive. The 
properties of the game are defined in three lemmas and two theorems. One of them 
proves that the fuzzy set of coalition structures forming the game core represents a 
subset of the fuzzy set formed by the structure of effective coalitions. In turn, this 
inference allows us to specify the upper possibility bound for the core, which is a very 
important condition for the process of solution searching, because in this case, the 
presence of a solution that meets the efficiency condition may serve as the signal to 
terminate the search algorithm.  
Theorem. Let (I, w) be a fuzzy coalition game. Then for some structure of 
effective coalitions k , its possibility is at least equal to the possibility of forming the 
core. 
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It is necessary to note that the statements take into account only the 
characteristics of the game (I, w); therefore, any real argument can be introduced into the 
fuzzy core. For example, such restrictions as a number of agents in each coalition and 
those defining coalitions to be overlapping or not or regulating the tasks order are 
admissible. This feature is very important for the application of the model for OSN 
configuration management. 
To find the analytical (exact) solution of the FCG, it is necessary to determine 
the fuzzy super-optimum and the fuzzy relation of domination [2], which is extremely 
difficult in real applications. Therefore, it is proposed to use a heuristic technique of 
finding solutions that are close to the optimal one. In the considered case, the techniques 
of soft computing using genetic algorithms (GA) in the context of fuzzy logic are 
applied. It is equivalent to binary encoding of the fuzzy core with the fitness function 
equal to the supremum of all minimums of the membership function. Application of GA 
allows one to obtain an approximate solution for the games with a large number of 
players and a membership function of any type. Being an anytime algorithm that steadily 
improves the solution, the GA can find the best solution under the time constraints. 
In the conducted experiments on model complexity the number of iterations 
needed to approach the optimal solution served as the investigated variable with the 
following factors: the number of agents and coalitions, the accuracy, and the order of 
fuzzy payments. Results show that the number of iterations (computation time) decreases 
or remains constant when the number of agents increases. In other words, it takes less 
time to form coalitions. On the other hand, the results demonstrate almost linear relation 
between the numbers of coalitions and agents. On the whole, the experiments justified 
that all factors are highly significant; the only surprise was that the order of fuzzy 
payments substantially influence the number of iterations (the convergence time). 
To apply the proposed model in real life scenarios, a multiagent software 
environment was developed consisting of three types of agents: individual, coalition and 
integrator. Agents are associated with the OSN as follows: the integrator agent simulates 
original equipment manufacturer (OEM); the coalition agents are responsible for 
component production and assembling; and the individual agents represent row material 
suppliers and component producers. The model was applied for configuring of a 3-
echelons automotive OSN taking into account that an enterprise may belong to different 
echelons (the case of overlapping coalitions). The simulation results are considered. 
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Abstract: In the paper we will discuss how to modify the guaranteed pursuit strategies in order to 
avoid a chatter. 
 
 
Let the state ( )tz  in the playing space n⊆Z R  obey the equation = ( , , )p ez f z u u , 
(0) = iz z . The pursuer P  and the evader E  choose their controls ( )p tu  and ( )e tu  from 
Up  and Ue , which are compact convex sets in 
npR  and neR , 0t ≥ . A pursuit game B  
is called alternative if it may be terminated by P  on any of two smooth terminal 
hypersurfaces Ma  and Mb , and corresponding payoffs Ma  and Mb  of Boltza type have 
the same integrand abL  and differ only in their terminal parts aK  and bK  [1]. Assumed 
that , abLf , aK  and bK  are at least twice continuously differentiable functions in 
respective domains. We associate with B  two games aB  and bB  that correspond to the 
fixed alternatives, a  and b , and have Ma  and Mb  as the terminal surfaces, aT  and bT  as 
the terminal instants, and aP  and bP  as the payoffs. For a given initial state Zi ∈z  and a 
pair of admissible strategies ( , )p eS S , the payoff in B  equals ( , , )ik p eP S Sz  where 
( )
(
= min ( , , ), ( , , ), , )
i i
a p e b p eik p e
T T S S T S SS Sz z z , ( , , ) = { , }
i
p ek S S L a b∈z . Also, let |a bB  be the 
game with the terminal manifold |M = M Ma b a b∪  and the payoff |a bP  equal to ( )imP z  
where ( ) = { , }im L a b∈z  is assigned by P  at the initial instant. 
Suppose that solutions for aB  and bB  are known. Let lpS  and leS  be the optimal 
strategies of the players, ( )lV z  be the value function, 0( , )l tz z  be the optimal trajectory 
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and ( )lτ z  be the optimal duration in lB  for Z∈z , l L∈ . The value function |a bV  of |a bB  
depends on the current z  and initial iz  states and is described as follows 
(| )( , ) = ( ),
ima b iV V zz z z  where ( )im L∈z  is chosen by P  for the whole duration of the 
game such that ( )( )( ) = min ( ), ( ) .im i a i b iV V Vz z z z  
Let 0D  be the hypersurface of codimension 1n −  where both alternatives are of 
the equal value, 0D = { : ( ) = ( )},i a i b iV Vz z z  and Zia  be the subset where a  dominates b , 
0Z = { : ( ) < ( )}.i a i b ia V Vz z z  We distinguish a negligible violation of the initial dominating 
condition for a  along the optimal trajectory of aB  when ( ) ( )a i b iV V≤z z  and 
( ) ( )> 0 : ( , ) = ( , ) ,a i b ia at V t V t∃ z z z z  and a substantial violation when  
( ) ( )> 0 [0, ( ) ] [ , ] : ( , ) > ( , ) .' i ' ' a i b ia a at t t t V t V tε τ ε ε∃ ∃ ∈ − ∀ ∈ +z z z z z  
Let Da  be the subset of 0D  where the initial dominating condition for a  is stable, 
and Da  be the subsets of 0Da  where it is violated substantially. Let Za  be the subset of 
0Za  where the initial dominating condition for a  is stable, and Ba  and Za  be the subsets 
of 0Za  where it is violated negligibly and substantially. Define Db , Db , Bb , Zb  similarly. 
In a game B  with symmetric terminal alternatives, Da  and Db , and Da  and Db  
coincide. Denote them hereafter as |Da b  and |Da b . Also, there exist the set |A Da b⊂  of 
common limiting states of Ba  and Bb  where the time derivative of ( ) ( )a bV V−z z  equals 
zero along the both optimal trajectories with fixed alternatives. Assume that P  plays 
with apS  and bpS  in Za  and Zb  and, therefore, gains at least ( )| ( ) = min ( ), ( )a b a bV V Vz z z  
there. We call a pursuit strategies guaranteed if it provides a payoff less than | ( )a bV z  for 
all 
| |
Z = Z Z Da ba b a b∈ ∪ ∪z  where P  doesn't fix a particular terminal alternative. It turns 
out that P  must target A  as a transitional hypersurface there, and along a potentially 
optimal trajectory the state cannot arrive at A  bypassing 
|
D
a b
 [1, 2]. 
A solution on 
|
D
a b
, which is a hypersurface of codimension 1n − , can be 
obtained only when E  keeps the states there using a discriminating strategy, which 
involves instantaneous knowledge of P 's control. Feedback approximations of a 
constructed evasion strategy in 
|
Z
a b
 may lead to a chatter [3, 4]. In the paper we will 
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discuss how to modify the guaranteed pursuit strategies in order to avoid a chatter along 
|
D
a b
. 
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Abstract: One game-theoretical model of environmental project is considered under condition of 
a random game duration. The game ends at the random moment in time with Weibull distribution. 
According to Weibull distribution form parameter, the game can be in one of 3 stages such as “an 
infant" stage, "an adult" stage and "an aged" stage. The solutions obtained with a help of 
Pontryagin maximum principle both for non-cooperative and cooperative forms of the game are 
analyzed for each stage. 
 
 
The game-theoretical model of environmental project [1] with 2 non-identical 
players had been considered under condition that the game has a fixed terminal time T. 
We consider the modification of this model with elements of stochastic framework, in 
the sense that the terminal time T is a random value [2-4] in order to increase the 
realness of the modeling. It turns out that this formulation of the game can be simplified 
to standard formulation for dynamic programming. With the help of Pontryagin 
maximum principle we find the solutions both for non-cooperative and cooperative 
forms of the game under condition of Weibull distribution for the random value T [4]. 
According to Weibull distribution form parameter, the game can be in one of 3 stages 
such as “an infant” stage, “an adult” stage and “an aged” stage. The solutions are 
analyzed for each stage of the game and the interpretation in the context of the 
environmental economics is given. 
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Switching costs refer to the costs that buyers have to incur when switching 
suppliers. There are two types of switching costs: exogenous and endogenous switching 
costs. The endogenous switching costs arise from firms’ marketing decisions and hence 
the size of endogenous switching costs is determined by the firms. In contrast, the 
exogenous switching costs are not under firms’ control. (An extensive review of both 
types of switching costs is provided by Farrell and Klemperer (2007).) The objective of 
this paper is to study the relation between exogenous and endogenous switching costs. 
We develop a two-period symmetric duopoly model where both competitors decide the 
size of endogenous switching costs in the form of future rewards according to the 
exogenous switching costs and the extent of horizontal differentiation (measured by the 
unit transportation cost in a Hotelling model). We find that the equilibrium endogenous 
switching costs decreases with the size of exogenous switching costs but increases with 
the extent of differentiation. While both types of switching costs help retaining 
customers, the endogenous switching costs also help acquire customers. Interestingly the 
efficiency of using endogenous switching costs as a customer-acquisition tool decreases 
with the exogenous switching costs because a higher retention rate leads to more 
customers redeeming the rewards in the second period. Thus, as the exogenous switching 
costs decreases, the endogenous switching costs as a customer-acquisition mechanism 
becomes more efficient as compared to other acquisition tools such as first-period price. 
Consequently in the equilibrium we observe greater endogenous switching costs and 
higher first-period prices.  
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Abstract: In this paper we consider a new solution concept of cooperative TU-games, called as 
the generalized nucleolus. It is based on the ideas of the prenucleolus and the SM-nucleolus. We 
show that the generalized nucleolus of an arbitrary n–person TU-game coincides with the 
prenucleolus of a certain n–person constant-sum game, which is constructed as a weighted sum of 
a game and its dual. Also we discuss other properties of this solution. 
 
 
In the paper we describe a new solution concept of a cooperative TU-game 
( , )N v , called the generalized nucleolus. It is based on the idea of the SM-nucleolus [5], 
some properties of which for different classes of cooperative game were studied in [6], 
[7]. The generalized nucleolus takes into account both the constructive power ( )v S  and 
the blocking power *( )v S  of coalition S with coefficients α  and 1 α−  accordingly with 
0, 1α ⎡ ⎤∈ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ . A meaning of the constructive power ( )v S  is clear. That is the worth of the 
coalition, or exactly what S can reach by cooperation. By the blocking power1 of 
coalition S we understand the amount *( )v S  that the coalition brings to N if the last will 
be formed – its contribution to the grand coalition. The value *( )v S  is the difference 
between the amounts which can be received by the compliment \N S  when it 
cooperates with S (in this case the grand coalition forms) and does not cooperate with S. 
In fact, if S leaves the grand coalition, then the complement coalition gets ( \ )v N S . 
                                                 
1 For the first time the blocking power of a coalition was taken into account in the Modiclus [4]. 
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However, acting together they can receive ( )v N . Thus, the difference between ( )v N  and 
( \ )v N S  is a subject which should be taken into account in a solution of a game. In our 
opinion, the blocking power can be judged as a measure of a necessity of S for N – how 
much S contributes to N. So, each coalition S is estimated by N in this spirit. According 
to this motivation we suppose that a solution of a cooperative game should take into 
account the constructive power ( )v S  and the blocking power *( )v S . Then the following 
question occurs: in what ratio the constructive power and the blocking powers should be 
considered in a solution of a TU-game. In this paper, introducing the generalized 
nucleolus, we consider all possible ratios between the constructive and blocking powers. 
In our work we show that for every fixed 0, 1α ⎡ ⎤∈ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  the generalized nucleolus of 
an arbitrary n–person TU-game coincides with the prenucleolus of a certain n–person 
constant-sum game, which is constructed as the weighted sum of the game and its dual. 
Geometrically, the generalized nucleolus is a connected set of preimputations 
representing a sum of segments in nR . This set has two extreme points: one of which 
corresponds to 1α = , the other one corresponds to 0α = . 
Also in the paper we consider several well-known solutions of cooperative TU-
games such as the Shapley value [3], the prenucleolus [2], the SM-nucleolus [5], the core 
[1]. It is shown that the generalized nucleolus and the prenucleolus coincide for arbitrary 
game ( , )N v  for 1α =  (particularly, this indicates that for balanced games the 
intersection of the generalized nucleolus and the core is a nonempty set containing at 
least the prenucleolus). For 1
2
α =  the generalized nucleolus coincides with the SM-
nucleolus of a game. For three person cooperative TU-games we have the following 
curious result: the generalized nucleolus coincides with the Shapley value in case 1
2
α = .  
Finally, in order to illustrate some properties of the new solution we give 
several examples. In Example 1 we consider a five person cooperative game and 
construct the generalized nucleolus. It is easy to see that the generalized nucleolus 
coincides with the Shapley value for 67
80
α = . Obviously, the generalized nucleolus 
coincides with the SM-nucleolus for 1
2
α =  and the prenucleolus for 1α = . Example 2 
helps us to understand how the generalized nucleolus changes if we increase the 
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constructive power of coalition S={1,2,3} as compared with the one in Example 1. On 
the top of this we apply the generalized nucleolus to the weighted majority games. In 
Examples 3, 4 we construct the generalized nucleolus and find the conditions under 
which the generalized nucleolus coincides with the Shapley-Shubik, Banzhaf and 
Johnston indices. 
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Abstract: In this paper, we present an approach to design control strategies for multi-player 
nonzero sum differential games. In particular, we show how closed-form strategies for players in 
nonzero sum games can be formulated and designed using differential inequalities and the 
comparison principle. We will also show how the collaboration and the competition between the 
players can be incorporated into the players’ goal functions and to illustrate the approach we 
consider problems related to multi-agent systems with multiple objectives such as trajectory 
tracking, coverage control, persistent surveillance, and collision avoidance. 
 
 
In this paper, we present an approach to design control strategies for multi-
player nonzero sum differential games. Following ideas presented in [5] and [6] we show 
how closed-form strategies for players in nonzero sum games can be formulated and 
designed using differential inequalities [2, 3] and the comparison principle.  
To approximate the minimum 
min
a  of a set of nonnegative numbers 
1 2
{ , ,..., }
n
a a a we recall the following functions: 
 
1/
1
1
( , , , )
i
n
n
i
a a a
δ
δσ δ
−
−
=
⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ ⎟… = ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠∑ , 
1/
1
1
1
( , , , )
i
n
n
i
a a n a
δ
δσ δ
−
− −
=
⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ ⎟… = ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠∑  (1) 
which converge to 
min
a  as δ  increases. These functions satisfy that ()σ ⋅  is a lower 
approximation and ()σ ⋅ is an upper approximation of 
min
a . Similarly, to approximate the 
maximum 
max
a  of a set of nonnegative numbers 
1 2
{ , ,..., }
n
a a a we recall the following 
functions: 
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1/
1
1
1
( , , , )
i
i
n
n
a a n a
δ
δρ δ −
=
⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ ⎟… = ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠∑ , 
1/
1
1
( , , , )
i
n
n
i
a a a
δ
δρ δ
=
⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ ⎟… = ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠∑ , (2) 
which converge from below and above to the exact maximum as δ  goes to infinity, 
respectively. In addition, using some known results in inequalities related to means [1, 
4], we can show that the lower approximations 
1
, , ),(
n
a aσ δ … and 
1
, , ),(
n
a aρ δ …  are 
monotonically increasing functions of δ , while 
1
, , ),(
n
a aσ δ …  and 
1
, , ),(
n
a aρ δ …  are 
monotonically decreasing functions of δ .  
Let us first assume that the multiple objective functions in a nonzero-sum multi-
player differential game are denoted by 
i
v , {1,2,..., }i M∈  where M denotes the number 
of objectives not necessarily equal to the number of players in the game denoted by N. In 
general the number of objectives is assumed to be larger than the number of players, that 
is, M N> . The objectives are satisfied if the trajectories of the differential equations 
modeling the behavior of the players either enter or stay away from the sets defined by 
objective functions as { ( ) }
i i i
v x q≤  where 
i
x  represents the state variables related to 
objective i and 
i
q ’s are appropriately chosen constants. The goal functions for each 
player will be denoted by 
p
w  (the index p corresponds to player p) and their construction 
will use the approximations of the minimum and maximum given by (1) and (2). Note 
that, for each player, the goal functions will depend on the corresponding objective 
functions, that is, we have 
1 2
( , )
p p
w w v v=  if player p’s objective functions are 
1
v  and 
2
v . 
This construction is formalized by establishing a link between the minimum and the 
maximum approximation functions with logical “and” and “or” functions according to 
the particular goals of the players. Once the goal functions are determined, the design of 
the players’ strategies is based on a Liapunov-like approach involving differential 
inequalities and the comparison principle [5, 6]. For example, in the nonautonomous 
case where the dynamics of the players are given by 
 
0 0 0
( , , ), [0( ) , , 1, ,, )
p p p p p p
x f t x u x t x t p N+= = ∈ == +∞ … \  (3) 
we will have a set of inequalities like 
 ( , )/ ,
pp p
dw d G t x wt ≤ , (4) 
for suitable functions ()
p
G ⋅  that provide closed-form strategies ()
p
u ⋅  and guarantee 
desired results based on the properties of the maximal solution of the differential 
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equation ( ) ( , ( ), )pz t G t x t z= , 0 0( )z t z=  [2]. The state variables associated with player p 
are gathered in vector 
p
x . We also use differential inequalities bounding time derivatives 
of goal functions from below and the corresponding minimal solutions to establish the 
accomplishment of objectives (see [6] for more details). 
We will also show how the collaboration and the competition between the 
players can be incorporated into the goal functions. In this work, we consider problems 
related to multi-agent systems with multiple objectives such as trajectory tracking, 
coverage control, persistent surveillance, and collision avoidance. 
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Abstract: A macroeconomic model due to E.G. Al'brekht is under consideration. The model is 
described by two ordinary differential equations. The problem of identification for parameters of 
the model is solved as statistic data are given. The model is studied in order to get scenarios of a 
short-term prediction and to achieve optimal decision making for two participants of the market in 
an non-antagonistic game. 
 
 
A macroeconomic model due to E.G. Al'brekht is under consideration. The 
model is described by two ordinary differential equations. The problem of identification 
for parameters of the model is solved as statistic data are given. The model is studied in 
order to get scenarios of a short-term prediction and to achieve optimal decision making 
for two participants of the market in an non-antagonistic game.  
A macroeconomic model due to E.G. Al'brekht [4] is under consideration. 
Symbol p  denotes the gross product, q  denotes production costs, h  denotes profit. The 
function ( , ) =G p q h  is called the macroeconomic potential of the system. We assume 
that the function ( , )G p q  has the polynomial form  
(1) ( )( , ) = [ ( , ) ( , )],mG p q pq a f p q f p q+ + +…  
where coefficients of the polynomials (0) =f a , (1)f , … , ( )mf  have to be defined. 
The statistic data of the form  
* * * * * * * * *
0 0 0 1 1 1( ( ), ( ), ( )),( ( ), ( ), ( )), , ( ( ), ( ), ( )).N N Np t q t h t p t q t h t p t q t h t…  
are given. 
The dynamics of the macroeconomic system are described by the following 
differential equations  
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1
( , )
= ( ) ,
dp G p q
u t
dt p
∂
∂ 2
( , )
= ( ) ,
dq G p q
u t
dt q
∂− ∂  
where 1( )u t , 2( )u t  can be considered as controls. Economic reasons provide restrictions 
on values of the controls:  
1 1 2 2( ) , ( ) ,u t U u t U∈ ∈  
the symbols 1U , 2U  denote compact sets. 
We assume that the admissible controls 1( )u t , 2( )u t  are elements of the set  
1 2 1 2
= { () = ( (), ()) : [0, ]u u u T U U∀ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ×TU 6  are measurable} 
We define coefficients in ( , )G p q  via applying the least-squares method to the 
relations  
* * *( ) = ( ( ), ( )), = 0,1, , .i i ih t G p t q t i N…  
The problem of reconstruction of controls 1 2( ), ( )u t u t  generating motions 
( ), ( )p t q t  close to the statistic data is considered as the optimal control problem. The 
controlling macroeconomic system is aiming to minimize the pay-off functional  
1 2
2 2
* 2 * 2 1 2
0
( (), ( ), (), ( )) =
( ( )) ( ( ))
= ( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( ))
2
T
I p q u u
u t u t
p t p t q t q t dtε
⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅
⎡ ⎤+⎢ ⎥− + − +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫
 
on the set TU . Here *( )p t , *( )q t  are linear interpolations for the statistic data, ε  is a 
parameter of regularization. 
The numerical method [5] is used to solve the optimal control problem [6]. The 
obtained constructions of the grid optimal synthesis are applied to get scenarios of a 
short-term prediction in order to achieve optimal decision making for two participants of 
the market p  and q  in an non-antagonistic game, where  
max( , ) , ( , ) .min
p q
G p q G p q→ →  
See also ([7];[8])) to compare different approaches to the problems. 
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Abstract: The goal of this work is to extend the model from Altman E., Avrachenkov K., Garnaev 
A. "Closed form solutions for water-filling problems in optimization and game frameworks" for the 
case with different fading channel gains and also taking into account cost of power unit which can 
produce essential impact on behaviour of users. The equilibrium strategies for the extended model 
are found in closed form. 
 
 
Introduction 
In wireless networks and DSL access networks the total available power for 
signal transmission has to be distributed among several resources. This spectrum of 
problems can be considered in game-theoretical multiusers scenario which leads to 
‘‘Water Filling Game'' or ‘‘Gaussian Interference Game''([4], [5], [6], [7], [2], [3]), 
where each user perceives the signals of the other users as interference and maximizes a 
concave function of the noise to interference ratio. A natural approach in the non-
cooperative setting is the application of the Iterative Water Filling Algorithm (IWFA) 
[8]. In [2], [3] a closed form approach to Nash equilibrium was developed for symmetric 
water filling game. The goal of this work is to extend this approach for scenario with 
different fading channel gains and also taking into account cost of power unit which can 
produce essential impact on behaviour of users. 
Two Players Game 
We consider game-theoretical formulation of the situation where two users 
(transmitters) transmit signals through n  sub-carriers taking into account tariff assigned 
by provider. A strategy of user j  ( = 1,2j ) is vector 1= ( , , )j j jnT T T… , where 0jiT ≥  
and 
=1
n j j
ii
T T≤∑ , where > 0jT  is the total signal which user j  has to transmit. The 
payoff to users are quality of service (in our case it is Shannon capacities) minus 
transmission expenses. Thus, the payoffs are given as follows:  
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1
1 2 3
3 0
=1 =1
( , ) = ln 1 , [1,2],
n n
j ji
ij
i ii i i
T
v T T C T j
gT N
−
−
⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ ⎟+ − ∈⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ +⎝ ⎠∑ ∑  
where 0 > 0iN  is the uncontrolled noise, ig  is fading sub-carrier gains for for sub-carrier 
i . C  is a cost per transmitted power unit.  
Threorem 1 Let < 1ig . The equilibrium strategies 
1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2( , ) = ( ( , ), ( , ))T T T Tω ω ω ω  as functions on Lagrange multipliers have to have the 
following form: 
(a) Let 1 2ω ω≤ . Then  
1 1 2 0 0 0
1 2 2 1
2 1 2 0 0
2 2 1
1 1 1
( , ) =
1
1 1 1
( , ) =
1
i
i i i i i
i
i i i i
i
g
T N N g N
C g C C
T N g N
g C C
ω ω ω ω ω
ω ω ω ω
+ +
+
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥− − − − −⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠+ − + +⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎢ ⎥− − −⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠− + +⎣ ⎦
 
(b) Let 1 2>ω ω . Then  
1 1 2 0 0
2 1 2
2 1 2 0 0 0
2 2 1 2
1 1 1
( , ) =
1
1 1 1
( , ) =
1
i i i i
i
i
i i i i i
i
T N g N
g C C
g
T N N g N
C g C C
ω ω ω ω
ω ω ω ω ω
+
+ +
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎢ ⎥− − −⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠− + +⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥− − − − −⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠+ − + +⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 
Let 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
=1
( , ) = ( , ) ( , ),where ( , ) = ( , )
nj j
ii
H H H H Tω ω ω ω ω ω ω ω ω ω+ ∑ . 
Threorem 2 Let < 1ig  for any i . If 1 2(0,0)H T T≤ +  then the game has 
unique Nash equilibrium 1 2( , )T T , where 
(a) If 1 1(0,0)H T≤  and 2 2(0,0)H T≤  then 1 2( , )T T  = 1 2( (0,0), (0,0)T T . 
(b) If 1 1(0,0) >H T  and 2 2(0,0) <H T  then 1 2( , )T T  = 1 1* 2 1*10 10( ( ,0), ( ,0))T Tω ω , where 1*10ω  
is unique solution of equation 1 1* 110( ,0) =H Tω . 
(c) If 1 1(0,0) <H T  and 2 2(0,0) >H T  then 1 2( , )T T  = 1 2* 2 2*01 01( (0, ), (0, ))T Tω ω , where 2*01ω  
is unique solution of equation 2 2* 201(0, ) =H Tω .  
Threorem 3 Let < 1ig  for any i . Let also 2 1>T T . If 1 2(0,0) >H T T+  then 
the game has unique Nash equilibrium 1 2( , )T T  and it is given as follows: 
(a) If 2 1* 210( ,0)H Tω ≤  then 1 2 1 1* 2 1*10 10( , ) = ( ( ,0), ( ,0))T T T Tω ω , where where 1*10ω  is unique 
solution of equation 1 1* 110( ,0) =H Tω . 
(b) If 2 1* 210( ,0) >H Tω  then 1 2 1 1* 2* 2 1* 2*11 11 11 11( , ) = ( ( , ), ( , ))T T T Tω ω ω ω , where 1*11ω  and 2*11ω  is 
unique solution of system of equations  
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1 1* 2* 1 2 1* 2* 2
11 11 11 11( , ) = , ( , ) = .H T H Tω ω ω ω  
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Abstract: In a basic model of organizational systems control theory a system is considered where 
a sole principal controls several agents. In a wide range of practical situations the agents try to 
build some network structure by establishing bonds to each other. The principal's role (the control 
problem) is to force formation of certain bonds between agents. Given the control action the 
agents play a network formation game (NFG). Control theory imposes strong requirements on the 
game-theoretic solution concepts employed. Traditional solution concepts, like Nash equilibrium, 
when applied to NFGs, fail to satisfy these requirements. Thus, several special strategic solution 
concepts were developed in the literature for NFGs. In the report these concepts are compared 
and aligned into the line from the weakest to the strongest. A general setting is considered of 
incentive problem where the principal can immediately set the bonus to the agents for the 
formation of specific networks. This problem is solved in complete information framework for 
several NGG solution concepts. 
 
 
This paper studies a model in which a population of fully rational and forward-
looking individuals is exposed to a welfare reducing infectious disease. Individuals non-
cooperatively choose whether to undergo privately costly treatment which, if successful, 
restores the individual's susceptibility. It is shown that the game has strategic 
complementarities, in the sense that the benefits to treatment for a given individual are 
increasing in the treatment of other individuals. For extreme levels of disease prevalence, 
equilibrium play is uniquely determined and socially optimal. For intermediate levels of 
disease prevalence, multiple perfect foresight equilibrium paths coexist and can lead to 
different steady states. Furthermore, equilibrium play may be socially suboptimal. 
JEL Classification: C73, I18. 
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Abstract: An irrational-behavior-proofness (I-B-P) condition in cooperative differential games 
under which even if irrational behaviors appear later in the game the concerned player would still 
be performing better under the cooperative scheme is proposed by D.W.K. Yeung (2006). In this 
paper we study this condition for Pareto solution in linear-quadratic discrete-time dynamic 
games. The discrete-time government debt stabilization game is considered as an example. 
 
 
We consider the class of n -person discrete-time dynamic games which are 
described by the state equation 
 
=1
( 1) = ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ),
n
i i
i
x k A k x k B k u k+ +∑  (1) 
0
k k≥ , 
0
k +∈ K , 0 0( ) = .x k x  
Here, x  is the m -dimensional state of the system, iu  is a r -dimensional 
(control) variable player i  can manipulate, 0 0( ) =x k x  is the arbitrarily chosen initial 
state of the system, +K - is a set of non-negative integer numbers. ( ), ( ) ( )iA k B k Z +∈ K  are 
matrices of appropriate dimensions, where ( )Z +K  – is a set of real bounded matrices. Let 
= {1, , }N n… . The performance criterion player i N∈  aims to maximize is  
 
=
0
= ( ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ))T T
i i i i i
k k
J x k P k x k u k R k u k
∞
+∑ , (2) 
where ( ), ( ) ( )i iP k R k Z +∈ K  ( ) = ( ),Ti iP k P k  ( ) = ( ) = 1, ,Ti iR k R k i n∀ … . 
We will assume that the players use feedback strategies, ( , ) = ( ) ( )i iu k x M k x k , to 
control the system.  
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Definition 1. A set of feedback strategies  
 { ( , ) = ( ) ( ), = 1, , }
i i
u k x M k x k i n…  (3) 
is called permissible if the following conditions are satisfied. 
1) ( ) ( ) = 1, , .iM k Z i n+∈ ∀ …K  
2) The resulting system described by  
 
=1
( 1) = ( ( ) ( ) ( )) ( )
n
i i
i
x k A k B k M k x k+ +∑  (4) 
is uniformly asymptotically stable (when k → ∞ ).  
In this paper we concretize the D. W. K. Yeung’s condition for Pareto solution 
in proposed class of games.  
As an example we consider the discrete-time variant of the government debt 
stabilization game proposed in (van Aarle, Bovenberg and Raithe, 1995). 
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Abstract: In simple weighted committees with finite number n of members, fixed weights and 
changing quota, there exists a finite number r of different quota intervals of stable power 
n(r  (2 )-1)≤ generating finite number of power indices vectors. If voting power is equal to 
blocking power, then number of different power indices vectors corresponding to majority quotas 
is equal to at most int (r/2) + 1 . If the fair distribution of voting weights is defined, then fair 
distribution of voting power means to find a quota that minimizes distance between relative voting 
weights and relative voting power (optimal quota). Index of fairness is introduced as a function of 
quota. The problem of optimal quota has an exact solution via finite number of majority marginal 
quotas. 
 
 
Simple weighted committee is a pair [N, w] , where N be a finite set of n 
committee members 1,2,...,i n= , and 1 2 nw = (w , w , ..., w ) be a nonnegative vector of 
committee members’ voting weights (e.g. votes or shares). By 2N we denote power set 
of N (set of all subsets of N). By voting configuration we mean an element 2NS ∈ , 
subset of committee members voting uniformly (YES or NO), and ( ) i
i S
w S w
∈
= ∑ denotes 
voting weight of configuration S. Voting rule is defined by quota q, satisfying 
0 ( )q w N< ≤ , where q represents minimal total weight necessary to approve the 
proposal. Triple [ , , ]N q w  we call a simple quota weighted committee. Voting 
configuration S in committee [ , , ]N q w  is called a winning one if ( )w S q≥  and a losing 
one in the opposite case. Winning voting configuration S is called critical if there exists 
                                                 
2 Contact address: Frantisek Turnovec, IES Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University in 
Prague, Opletalova 26, 110 00 Prague 1, Czech Republic. e-mail: turnovec@fsv.cuni.cz . 
 237
at least one member k S∈  such that w(S\k) < q (we say that k is critical in S). 
Winning voting configuration S is called minimal if any of its members is critical in S. 
A priori voting power analysis seeks an answer to the following question: Given a 
simple quota weighted committee [ , , ]N q w , what is an influence of its members over the 
outcome of voting? Absolute voting power of a member i is defined as a probability 
[ , , ]i N qΠ w that i will be decisive in the sense that such situation appears in which she 
would be able to decide the outcome of voting by her vote (Nurmi (1997)), and a relative 
voting power as 
[ , , ]
[ , , ]
[ , , ]
i
i
k
k N
N q w
N q w
N q w
π
∈
Π= Π∑  
Two most frequently used measures of a priori voting power are Shapley-Shubik 
power index (based on concept of pivot and Penrose-Banzhaf power index (based on 
concept of swing) 
Concept of fairness is being discussed related to distribution of voting power 
among different actors of voting. This problem was clearly formulated by Nurmi (1982): 
“If one aims at designing collective decision making bodies which are democratic in the 
sense of reflecting the popular support in terms of the voting power, we need indices of 
the latter which enable us to calculate for any given distribution of support and for any 
decision rule the distribution of seats that is ‘just’. Alternatively, we may want to design 
decision rules that – given the distribution of seats and support – lead to a distribution of 
voting power which is identical with the distribution of support.” 
Voting power is not directly observable: as a proxy for it voting weights are used 
(number of seats, number of votes, shares of population, square roots of shares of 
population, membership fees to some multilateral organization etc.). Therefore, fairness 
is usually defined in terms of voting weights (e.g. voting weights proportional to results 
of election). 
Assuming, that a principle of fairness is selected for a distribution of voting 
weights, we are addressing the question how to achieve equality of voting power (at least 
approximately) to fair voting weights. The concepts of strict proportional power and 
randomized decision rule introduced by Holler (1985) and analyzed in Berg and Holler 
(1986), of optimal quota of Słomczyński and Życzkowski (2007), and of intervals of 
stable power (Turnovec (2008)) are used to find, given voting weights, a voting rule 
minimizing a distance between actors’ voting weights and their voting power. 
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In the first section of the paper basic definitions are introduced and the applied 
power indices methodology shortly resumed. The second section introduces concepts of 
quota intervals of stable power and optimal quota. It is shown that in a simple weighted 
committees with finite number n of members, fixed weights and changing quota, there 
exists a finite number r of different quota intervals of stable power ( 2 1Nr ≤ − ) 
generating finite number of power indices vectors. If voting power is equal to blocking 
power, then number of different power indices vectors corresponding to majority quotas 
is equal to at most int (r/2) + 1 . If the fair distribution of voting weights is defined, then 
fair distribution of voting power means to find a quota that minimizes distance between 
relative voting weights and relative voting power (optimal quota). Index of fairness is 
introduced as a function of quota. The problem of optimal quota has an exact solution 
via finite number of majority marginal quotas. While the framework of analysis of 
fairness is usually restricted to Penrose-Banzhaf concept of power, we are treating it in a 
more general setting and our results are relevant for any power index based on pivots or 
swings and for any concept of fairness. 
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Abstract: We consider several problems of optimal organization for revenue collecting 
inspections. We study whether it is possible to organize an effective control over 100000 agents 
and suppress corruption in case when very few reliable persons are available for this purpose. We 
determine the optimal strategy including selection of agents for the primary audit and revisions, 
salaries at different levels. We show that under general assumptions 5-level inspection and one 
honest person are enough for efficient tax enforcement. . 
 
 
The state inspections play an important role in the modern economy. The tax 
inspections and the customs control the payment’s values and check examptions from 
payments for different economic agents. The agency should prevent tax or customs 
evasion but not interfere with the agents eligabale for examption from the payment. The 
efficiency of an inspection should be measured by the social welfare increase proceding 
from its activity.  
For many countries in transition, in particular for Russia, corruption is an 
important problem in tax and customs inspections’ organization. Bribery is one form of 
corruption that is the most difficult to reveal. There exists a wide literature that discusses 
problems of optimal inspection organization (in particular for tax inspection) and the 
problem of corruption.  
One branch of the literature (Chander, Wilde, 1992, Acemoglu, Verdier, 2000) 
considers civil society institutes (independent mass media and so on) as a main 
mechanism of corruption revealing. Another direction (Vasin, Panova, 2000) studies 
internal control strategies for suppression of corruption. The latter paper assumes that 
there is a possibility to hire sufficient number of honest collabolators for reviewing 
primary audits, but actually the controlling center typically has very few reliable persons, 
and their time is a very expensive resource. 
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Then one possibility is to form a controlling hierarchy. Consider a country 
where a benevolent leader aims to organize an efficient tax audit. There are N  firms. 
Each gets high or low income with probabilities h  and 1 h−  respectively. The 
additional tax from the high income is T , and the penalty for evasion is F . For the 
inspection, the leader can use a small number M  of reliable associates and also employ 
any number of rational inspectors who maximize their expected incomes with account of 
possble salaries, bribes and penalties. Salary Ms  permits to employ a sufficient number 
of such inspectors, and c  is the cost of one audit by an associate. Consider a strategy of 
the revenue service organization. It includes probability 1p  of primary audit for any low-
income declaration. In order to prevent bribing of a primary auditor, any report 
confirming low income is under reviewing with probability 2p . And so on, any i -level 
audit confirming the low income is under reviewing ( 1i + -level audit) with probability 
1ip +  until the upper level k  where associates work. A salary of an i  - level inspector is 
i Ms s≥ , 1,..., 1i k= − . Each revealed inspector who has not reported tax evasion is fired 
and gets after that alternative salary alts . This value is uncertain: we assume that 
( , )alt M Ms s s∈ −Δ . Thus, a government strategy includes the number k of audit levels, 
auditing probabilities 1,..., kp p  and salaries 1 1,..., ks s − .  
A formal problem is to find the optimal strategy that provides honest behaviour 
of all agents and maximises net tax revenue (NTR) under this condition. Note that, for 
risk-neutral inspector, firing is equivalent to monitary fine ( )altF s s α= − , /(1 )α δ δ= − , 
where δ  is a discount coefficient. Let i i Md s s= − denote the increment of the salary at 
level i  above the maximum alternative salary.  
Proposition 1. Assume that auditors at level i  check honestly. Then mutualy 
beneficial collusion between 2i−  level inspector and his auditor is impossible if and 
only if 2
2 1
ˆ ( )ii i
i i
d
p p d
d d
−
− −
+Δ≥ =+ +Δ
G
 for 3,...,i k= . Tax evasion is unprofitable if and only 
if 1 1ˆ( )
T
p p d
F
≥ = G  and collusion between tax payer and his auditor is impossible if and 
only if 2 2
1
ˆ ( )
F
p p d
F d α≥ =+
G
.  
Consider k-stage game corresponding to the random interaction of inspectors in 
the hierarchy.  
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Proposition 2. The subgame perfect equilibrium corresponding to the honest 
behaviour in the interaction of inspectors and taxpayers exists if and only if the auditing 
probabilities meet Proposition 1. 
Under fixed ,k d
G
 the NTR reaches its maximum at ˆ ( )i ip p d=
G
, 1,...,i k=  and is 
equal to  
1 1 2 2 3 1 1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( , ) ( )(1 )( ( )( ( ) (... ( )( ( ) )...)M M k M k kR k d hT p d h s d p d s d p d p d s d p d c− −= − − + + + + × + +
G G G G G G 
 
The expected number of audits by associates is 
1
ˆ(1 ) ( )
k
i
i
N h p d
=
− ∏ G . 
Proposition 3. For 0Δ =  the lower estimate of the optimal revenue is 
( (1 ) 2 )M
T
R N hT h s
F
= − − . For , 1,..., 1k iid i kε −= = −  ( , )R k d
?
 tends to R  as 
0, kε → → ∞ . The optimal revenue is equal to R  if 1
1
min( )M
Fd s
F dα+ +  reaches its 
minimum under 1 0d = . 
For 0Δ>  and different k  we solved the problem of NTR maximization by the 
dynamic programming method. We also determined the necessary number of associates 
to realize the optimal strategy.  
Consider the following example. The additional tax from the high income is 
300000T =  rubles and the penalty for evasion is 8F T= . The number of tax payers is 
100000N = , the probability to get high income is 0,5h = . Associates get 3000000c =  
rubles per one check. Each auditor can make 60 inspections or revisions per year. Let a 
discount coefficient equal 0,1δ = .  
Under these conditions, the gross tax revenue should be 15NhT =  bn. rubles. 
The optimal NTR is * *R NhT E= − , where *E  is total audit costs under the optimal 
strategy *d
G
. The table below shows the optimal NTR, the ratio Z  of the cost *E  to the 
lower estimate of the costs (1 ) M
T
C h s N
F
= − , the necessary number M  of honest 
associates, optimal salaries (in thousands rubles per year) and auditing probabilities for 
different ,k  Δ , Ms . 
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k 4 5 
Ms 225 270 405 450 225 270 405 450 
Δ  90 180 90 180 90 180 90 180 
NTR 14 615 670 14 415 960 14 576 700 14 376 600 14 781 
240
14 659 590 14 739 900 14 617 500 
M 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 
Z 16,40 20,77 10,03 13,30 9,33 12,10 6,17 8,16 
1s 225 270 405 450 225 270 405 450 
2s  1287 1908 1467 2106 999 1548 1197 1746 
3s  13 473 16 542 13 653 16 794 225 270 405 450 
4s 180 000 180 000 180 000 180 000 4 167 5 778 4 347 5 958 
5s      180 000 180 000 180 000 180 000 
1p  0,125 0,125 0,125 0,125 0,125 0,125 0,125 0,125 
2p  1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 
3p  0,078 0,099 0,078 0,098 0,104 0,123 0,102 0,122 
4p  0,080 0,100 0,080 0,101 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 
5p      0,022 0,032 0,022 0,032 
 
The results confirm possibility of efficient tax enforcement with suppression of 
corruption and tax evasion. Starting with 4-level inspection, the optimal auditing costs are 
less than 5% of the gross tax income. In order to control 100000 taxpayers it suffices to 
employ 220 risk-neutral inspectors and 2 associates. The average number of audits per one 
taxpayer is less than ¼. 
 
 243
Investments under Oligopolistic Competition in a Vintage 
Differential Game 
 
Stefan Wrzaczek1 and Peter M. Kort2 
 
1Vienna University of Technology, 
Austria 
wrzaczek@server.eos.tuwien.ac.at 
 
2University of Tilburg, 
Netherlands 
 
 
 
Keywords: Differential game, Vintage, Time- and age-consistency 
 
 
Due to technological progress new machines are more productive. Thus it is not 
only important for firms to chose the optimal amount of investments, but also the 
optimal age of the machines. Feichtinger, Hartl, Kort and Veliov (2006a and 2006b) 
study this topic in case of a monopolistic firm by using distributed optimal control 
theory. We extend this approach to an oligopoly. The market is assumed to consist of 
two big firms, who are connected by the price they get for the products. The higher is the 
production of firm i the lower is the price of firm j and vice versa. 
In order to include the vintage effect of investments we have to combine 
distributed optimal control theory with differential game theory (referred to as vintage 
differential game). As in that framework there are two independent variables (age and 
time) the usual concept of time consistency (as well as subgame perfectness) can be be 
defined for both directions. The differences between both concepts will be pointed out 
intuitively by simple examples. In our model we study an open-loop Nash equilibrium, 
for which time consistency can be shown. The proof of the time consistency can be 
extended to a whole class of vintage differential games. In contrast an important 
difference between age- and time-consistency can be derived, i.e. there are models that 
are time- but not age-consistent. Further we provide conditions under which a vintage 
differential game can never be time consistent. An intuitive reasoning of these conditions 
finish the theoretical part of the contribution. 
We derive several properties of the optimal investment path of the model as 
well as comparative statics. For the expressions we are able to give interesting economic 
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intuitions. Futher it is possible to determine the terms that arise due to including 
competition to the model of a monopolistic firm. 
In the numerical part we analyse several different scenarios of the model. We 
study the effects of different parameters influencing the prices of the competing firms. 
Firstly we can show that the optimal investments decrease the higher the productivity of 
new machines is. This result can also be obtained analytically. Futher we compare the 
investments when the firms can anticipate the shock and when they do not (because of a 
lack of knowledge). The results show quite different investment patterns, as well as a 
possible shift in the market share (when the firms anticipate the shock differently). 
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Abstract: In this paper game theoretic mathematical models of logistic systems are treated. We 
consider the network of nodes connected by the logistic canals. In each node production and 
commercial structures (distributors) with their warehouses are allocated, and a demand for 
substituted goods has deterministic nature. The demand for a good is influenced by the quantity 
and price that is we consider quantitative and price competition among distributors. For the 
modelling of management systems each production and commercial structure applies the 
relaxation method of inventory regulation with admission of the deficit. 
 
 
Distributors are considered as players in non cooperative game. The logistic 
networking process are divided into two levels: at the first level the management systems 
of logistic processes are optimized by choosing internal strategies { }
1
l
l
l
l
p p
k k
T R== ∈
lT  
and { }
1
nl n
i i
S R== ∈lS (interior problem), where lkT  is the period of a cycle over routing 
path which have number lk , lp  is a quantity of the routing paths for the distributor with 
number l  in the network ( )lp n≤ , 1,...,l N= , liS  is maximal inventory level of 
distributor l  in the node number i , 1,...,i n= ; at the second level (exterior problem) a 
non-cooperative game for the price and quantitative type of competition is considered 
and solved. In this problem we use Nash equilibrium in pure (external) strategies as a 
solution. In the case of quantitative (model of Cournot) competition vector of amount of 
supplied goods to warehouses located in all nodes { }
1
nl n
i i
Q R== ∈lQ is an external 
strategy of player l . In case of price competition (modified model of Bertrand) we 
assume vector { }
1
nl n
i i
p R== ∈lp  as an external strategy of player l , where lip  is the 
selling price for good supplied by distributor with number l  at the node with number i . 
We use marginal revenue for distributors as payoff functions to the players in the game. 
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For the both cases of competition sufficient conditions for existence of Nash 
equilibrium in pure strategies are formulated. In addition, formulas for calculating 
optimal strategies in internal problem are provided.  
 
Theorem 1. Suppose in Cournot model the following conditions hold for 1,...,i N= : 
1) Reveres demand function ( ),ip Q -iQ is twice differentiable, deceasing and concave with 
respect to (1)i iQ ∈ Ω  for any fixed set of (1) (1)/ i∈ Ω Ω-iQ ; 
2) Function ( ),
i
i i
Q
b Q -iQ
 is continuous with respect to (1)iΩ  and convex with respect to -iQ  
or the following inequality takes place ( if ( ),i ib Q -iQ  - twice differentiable ); 
2 2
2
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
3 4 ( , ) 2 ( , )
i i i i i i i i i
i i i i i i i i
i i i
b Q Q b Q Q b Q Q
Q b Q Q Qb Q Q
Q Q Q
− − −
− −
⎛ ⎞∂ ∂ ∂⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ≥ +⎟⎜ ⎟⎟⎜ ∂ ∂ ∂⎝ ⎠
 
3) There exists ( )(1) (1),i i iQ a b∈ : 
3/2
( , )
( , ) 1/2
2
( , )
( , )
i i i
i i i i
i i i i
i i i
i i i i i
b Q Q
b Q Q Q
K g h S
p Q Q c
g h b Q Q
−
−
−
−
∂− ∂< ⋅ ++  
for .i iQ Q≥   
Then there exists Nash equilibrium in pure strategies ( )1 2, ,..., NQ Q Q∗ ∗ ∗ , )(1),i i iQ a Q∗ ⎡∈ ⎢⎣  , 
1,...,=i N and this strategies form appears a solution of the following system  
3/2
( , )
( , ) 1/2( , ) 2
( , ) 0, 1,..., .
( , )
i i i
i i i i
i i i i i i
i i i i
i i i i i i
b Q Q
b Q Q Qp Q Q K g h Q
Q p Q Q c i N
Q g h b Q Q
−
−−
−
−
∂−∂ ∂+ − ⋅ − = =∂ +  
Theorem 2. Suppose in modified model of Bertrand the following conditions hold 
for 1,...,i N= : 
1) Function ( ),iD p -ip  is continuous, decreasing, differentiable and convex with respect 
to 
ip ∈ (1)iΩ  for each fixed (1) (1)/ i∈ Ω Ω-ip ; 
2) Functiion ( ) ( ), ,i i i iD p b p-i -ip p  is continuous convex with respect to (1)i ip ∈ Ω for fixed 
admissible -ip ; 
3) Function ( ),i i ip D p -ip is concave with respect to (1)i ip ∈ Ω  for fixed 
(1) (1)/∈Ω Ωi-ip . 
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Then in the game (4) there exists Nash equilibrium in pure strategies which is a solution 
of the system 
3/2
( , )
( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , )
2 ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
, 1,..., .
2 ( , )
i i i
i i i i i i
i
i i i i i i
i i i i i i
i i ii i
i i
i i i i
D p p
b p p D p p
p
D p p b p p
b p p D p p D p pp p
c i N
b p p p
ξ
−
− −
− −
− − −
−
∂ + =∂
∂ ∂− ∂∂ ∂= + =∂
 
If there exists ( )(1) (1),i i ip a b∈  so that  
3/2
( , ) ( , )
2 ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( , )
2 ( , )
i i i i i i
i i i i i i
i i ii i
i i i i i
i i i i
D p p b p p
b p p D p p D p pp p
D p p c
b p p p
ξ
− −
− − −
−
−
∂ ∂− ∂∂ ∂< + ∂  
 
i ip p≥  , then )(1),i i ip a p∗ ⎡∈ ⎢⎣  . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Journals in Game Theory 
 
 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY 
 
 
 
Editor 
Shmuel Zamir 
 
 
SPRINGER 
 
 
 
 248
Memento Ludi: Information Retrieval from a Game-
Theoretic Perspective 
 
 
Roman R. Zapatrin1 and Georges Parfionov2 
 
1Department of Information Science, The State Russian Museum, 
 Inzenernaya 4, 191186, St.Petersburg, Russia 
Roman.Zapatrin@gmail.com,  
 
2Department of Mathematics, SPb EF University, 
 Griboyedova 30–32, 191023 
 St.Petersburg, Russia 
GogaParf@gmail.com 
 
 
 
Keywords: Inverse problem, Information retrieval, Users behavior 
 
Abstract: We develop a macro-model of information retrieval process using Game Theory as a 
mathematical theory of conflicts. We represent the participants of the Information Retrieval 
process as a game of two abstract players. The first player is the `intellectual crowd' of users of 
search engines, the second is a community of information retrieval systems. In order to apply 
Game Theory, we treat search log data as Nash equilibrium strategies and solve the inverse 
problem of finding appropriate payoff functions. For that, we suggest a particular model, which 
we call Alpha model. Within this model, we suggest a method, called shifting, which makes it 
possible to partially control the behavior of massive users. This Note is addressed to researchers 
in both game theory (providing a new class of real life problems) and information retrieval, for 
whom we present new techniques to control the IR environment.. 
 
 
The techniques we present are inspired by the success of macro-approach in 
both natural and social science. In thermodynamics, starting from a chaotic motion of 
billions of billions of microparticles, we arrive a simple transparent strongly predictive 
theory with few macro-variables, such as temperature, pressure, and so on. In models of 
market behavior the chaotic motion is present as well, but there are two definite parties, 
each consisting of a big number of individuals with common interests, whose behavior is 
not concorded. 
From a global perspective, information retrieval looks similar: there are many 
individual seekers of knowledge, on one side, and a number of knowledge providers, on 
the other: each are both chaotic and non-concorded. There are two definite parties, 
whose members have similar interests, and every member of each party tends to 
maximally fulfill his own interests. How could a Mathematician help them? At first 
sight, each party could be suggested to solve a profit maximization problem. But back in 
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1928 it was J. von Neumann who realized this approach to be inadequate: you can not 
maximize the value you do not know [1]. In fact, the profit gained by each agent depends 
not only on its actions, but also on the activities of its counterpart, which are not known. 
Then the game theory was developed replacing the notion of optimality by that of 
acceptability. Similarly, the crucial point of information retrieval, in contrast to data 
retrieval, is to get some satisfaction (feeling of relevance) rather than retrieve something 
exact. The analogy 
 
Data Retrieval →  matching Optimization→  maximum 
Information Retrieval → relevance 
 
  Game Theory→  equilibrium 
 
was a starting point for us to explore applications of game theory to the problems of 
information retrieval. 
The standard problem of game theory is seeking for reasonable (in various 
senses) strategies. When the rules of the game are given, there is a vast machinery, 
which makes it possible to calculate such strategies. In information retrieval we have two 
parties whose interaction is of exactly game nature, but the rules of this game are not 
explicitly formulated. However, we may observe the consequence of these rules as users 
behavior, that is, we deal with the inverse problem of game theory, studied by Dragan 
[2] for cooperative games. In this Note we expand it to non-cooperative case.It turns out 
that the solution of the inverse problem is essentially non-unique: different rules can 
produce the same behavior. We suggest a particular class of models, called Alpha 
models describing an idealized search system similar to Wolfram Alpha engine. 
What can search engine managers benefit of these techniques? Game theory can 
work out definite recommendations how to control the interaction between the parties of 
the information retrieval process. This sounds unrealistic: can one control massive 
chaotic behavior? Thermodynamics shows us that the answer is yes. We can not control 
individual molecules, but in order to alter their collective behavior we are able to change 
macroparameters: the engine of your car reminds it to you. In our case the payoff 
functions of the Alpha model are just those parameters. 
So far, we have described the process of Information retrieval as a non-
antagonistic conflict between two parties: The User and The Provider. The mathematical 
model of such conflict is a bimatrix cooperative game. Starting from the assumption that 
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de facto search log statistics is the Nash equilibrium of certain game, we provide a 
method of calculating the parameters of this game, thus solving the appropriate inverse 
problem. 
A significant, somewhat counter-intuitive consequence of Nash theory is that in 
this class of games the equilibrium, i. e. stable, behavior of the User is completely 
determined only by the distribution of priorities of the Provider. From this, we infer 
suggestions for the provider how to affect the behavior of massive User. 
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Abstract: A game-theoretical model of quality choice under competition is suggested. It is 
presented as a two-stage game where production companies compete on an industrial market and 
consumer's taste to quality in non-uniformly distributed. The strong Nash equilibrium in the 
investigated game was obtained in explicit form which allowed us to evaluate prices, companies 
market shares and revenues in the equilibrium. A case study for Internet-trading systems was used 
to approve the suggested quality choice mechanism. 
 
 
In the paper a game-theoretical model of quality choice under competition is 
suggested. The game-theoretical model is presented as a two-stage game where 
production companies compete on an industrial market and consumer's taste to quality is 
non-uniformly distributed. From a practical perspective, the aim of the paper is to check 
the validity of the suggested game-theoretical model. 
Thus, two firms are assumed to produce homogeneous product differentiated by 
quality on some industrial market. The game consists of the following two stages: 
1. At the first stage companies simultaneously define quality level; 
2. At the second stage they choose product prices. At this stage both 
simultaneous and sequential choices are analyzed. 
Each consumer buys at most one unit of the good. Consumers differ in their 
willingness to pay for quality level s, which is described by the parameter [ ]0,bθ ∈ . This 
parameter is called “taste for quality”. The utility of a consumer with a willingness to 
pay for quality θ  when buying a product of quality s  at a price p is equal to:  
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,
( )
0,
s p p s
U p
p sθ
θ θ
θ
⎧ − ≤⎪⎪= ⎨⎪ >⎪⎪⎩
. 
The investigated industrial market is considered to be partially covered. 
Besides, in our model the case when taste for quality parameter is non-uniformly 
distributed over the interval [ ]0,b , namely the triangular distribution is investigated. 
The payoff function of the firm i  which produces the product of quality is , 
where [ , ]is s s∈ , is the following: 
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2( , , , ) ( , ) ( , , , )i i iR p p s s p s s D p p s s= , 1,2i = , 
where 1 2 1 2( , , , )iD p p s s  − the demand function for the product of quality is , which is 
specified. 
The strong Nash equilibrium in the investigated game was obtained in the 
explicit form which allowed us to evaluate prices, companies’ market shares and 
revenues in the equilibrium. 
The paper includes a case study for Internet-trading systems which was used to 
approve the suggested game-theoretical approach to quality choice. Processing an 
empirical data which was obtained from consumer questionnaire survey let us evaluate 
Internet-trading systems quality and using the model we can show the ways of 
performance improvement to production companies.  
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Abstract: A game-theoretic model of territorial environmental production is studied. The process 
is modeled as cooperative differential game. The stable mechanism of distribution of the common 
cooperative benefit among players is proposed. We proved that the cooperative total stock of 
accumulated pollution is strictly less then the pollution under Nash equilibrium for the whole 
duration of the game. The perfect Nash equilibrium is found. We design a stable Shapley value as 
a cooperative solution, which is time-consistent. The Shapley value is also strategic stable and 
satisfies the irrational-behavior-proofness condition. The numerical example is given. 
 
 
Consider a region market with n firms which supply one product. Let I  be the 
set of firms involved in the game: {1,2, , }I n= … . Denote by ( )i iq q t=  the output of firm 
i  at the instant of time t . The price of the product ( )p p t=  is defined as follows: 
( ) ( )p t a bQ t= − , where a 0, b 0> > , 
1
( ) ( )
n
i
i
Q t q t
=
= ∑ - the total output. The price 
function ( )p t is inverse demand function: 
( )
( ) .
a p t
Q Q t
b
−= =  
The production cost of any firm equals ( ( )) ( ), 0, .i i iC q t cq t c i I= > ∈  
The game starts at the instant of time 0t  from the initial state 0s , where 0s  is the 
stock of pollution at time 0t . Let us denote by ( )ie t  the emission of firm i at time t . The 
emission of firms are linear subject to output: 
( ( )) ( ), 0.i i ie q t q tα α= >  
Denote by ie  maximum permissible emission for firm i : 0 ( ( )) .i i ie q t e≤ ≤  
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Denote by ( )s s t=  the total stock of accumulated pollution by time t . The 
dynamics of pollution accumulation is defined by the following differential 
equation: 
1
( ) ( ) ( ),
n
i
k
s t q t s tα δ
=
= −∑  
0 0
)(s t s=  
where δ  is the rate of pollution absorption, 0α >  is the parameter. Any firm has 
two types of costs, which isn't directly connected with the production process: 
abatement costs and damage costs. The abatement costs at moment of time t  equals  
( ) ( )(2 ( )) (2 ), 0, 0 ( ) .
2 2i i i i i i i i i
E t e t e e t q e q e t e
γ γ α α γ= − = − > ≤ ≤  
Damage costs depends on the stock of pollution: 
( ( )) ( ), 0, .i i iD s t s t i Iπ π= > ∈  
Any firm tries to maximize the the profit  
0
0
( )
0 0( , ; ) { ( ) ( ) ( )}
t t
i i i i i i i
t
s t q e pq C q D s E q dtρ
∞
− −Π = − − −∫  
where 1 2 0( ) ( ( ), ( ), , ( )),nq q t q t q t q t t t= = … ≥  is trajectory of production 
output, 0 1ρ< <  is the common social discount rate. 
We compute the characteristic function for all possible coalitions and apply 
the Shapley value to determine a fair distribution of the common cooperative benefit 
among players. There are three important aspects which must be taken into account 
when the problem of stability of long-range cooperative agreements is investigated 
[3]: time-consistency of the cooperative agreements, strategic stability and irrational 
behavior proofness. We design a stable mechanism for allocation over time of total 
individual benefit so that the initial agreement remains valid for the whole duration 
of the game. The mechanism is also strategic stable and satisfies the irrational-
behavior-proofness condition. We proved that the stable Shapley value total stock of 
accumulated pollution is strictly less then the pollution under Nash equilibrium for 
the whole duration of the game. 
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Abstract: In this paper two definitions of strong equilibrium are considered: strong equilibrium in 
broad and narrow senses. The main result of the paper is sufficient conditions for strong 
equilibrium existence in differential games. A special technique based on scalarization of vector 
criteria is used to construct strong equilibrium in broad sense. This approach is tested on example 
of the differential game with three players.  
 
 
Strong equilibrium definition 
 
Consider the differential game 
0 0
( , )x T tΓ −  with initial state 
0
x  and finite 
duration 
0
,T t−  where 
0
0,t ≥  
0
T t≥  [3, 4]. Denote set of players as = {1, , , , }.N i n… …  
The dynamics of the game has the following form: 
  
1 0 0
( ) = , ( ), ( ), , ( ) , ( ) = ,
n
x t f t x t u t u t x t x⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ …  (1) 
where ( ) ,x t R∈  ( )
i
u t , 
0
[ , ]t t T∈  - control function of player ,i N∈  ,t  ( ) ,
i i
u t U R∈ ⊂  
=1
= .
n
n
i N
i
U U R⊂∏  Suppose, that for function 1, ( ), ( ), , ( )nf t x t u t u t⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦…  conditions for 
existing and uniqueness on 
0
[ , ]
N
t T R U× ×  are hold. 
The payoff of player i N∈  is defined as:  
 
0 1 2 1 2
0
( , ( ), ( ), ()) = , ( ), ( ), ( ), , ( ) ( ) ,
i n i n i
t
T
J x u u u g t x t u t u t u t dt q x T⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⋅ ⋅ ⋅ +⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦∫… …  
where ( )
i
u ⋅  is continuous function ( ),
i
u t  
0
[ , ].t t T∈  
Let S N⊆  is a coalition in the game 
0
( ).xΓ  Denote strategy of the coalition S  as 
( ) = { ()} .
S i i S
u u ∈⋅ ⋅  A strategy of additional coalition \N S  denote as \ ( )N Su ⋅  or ().Su− ⋅  
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Definition. The set of strategies * * * *
1 2
( ) = ( (), (), , ( ))
N n
u u u u⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅…  is said to constitute a strong 
equilibrium in broad sense for differential game 
0 0
( , )x T tΓ −  if M N∀ ⊆ , ()
M
u∀ ⋅  the 
following is not hold: i M∀ ∈   
 * [ ] * [ ]
0
0
( , ( ), ()) = , ( ), ( ), ( ) ( )M M
i M M i M M i
t
T
J x u u g t x t u t u t dt q x T− −
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⋅ ⋅ + ≥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦∫  
 * * * * * *
0
0
, ( ), ( ), ( ) ( ) = ( , ( ), ( ))
i M M i i M M
t
T
g t x t u t u t dt q x T J x u t u t− −
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤≥ +⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦∫  
and 
0
i M∃ ∈  such that:  
 * [ ] * [ ]
0
0 0 0
0
( , (), ()) = , ( ), ( ), ( ) ( ) >M M
i M M i M M i
t
T
J x u u g t x t u t u t dt q x T− −
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⋅ ⋅ +⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦∫  
  * * * * * *
0
0 0 0
0
> , ( ), ( ), ( ) ( ) = ( , (), ()),
i M M i i M M
t
T
g t x t u t u t dt q x T J x u u− −
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤+ ⋅ ⋅⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦∫  
where 
  [ ] [ ] * [ ]
0 0
( ) = , ( ), ( ), ( ) , ( ) = ,M M M
M M
x t f t x t u t u t x t x−
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  
  * * * * *
1 0 0
( ) = , ( ), ( ), , ( ) , ( ) = .
n
x t f t x t u t u t x t x⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ …  
The set of all strong equilibrium situations in road sense in the game 
0 0
( , )x T tΓ −  
we define as ( )0 0( , ) .SME x T tΓ −  
Consider the following vectors:  
  ( )[ , ] [ , ] [ , ] [ , ]1= , , , , ,n i n i n i n i ni n Eλ λ λ λ ∈… …  
where [ , ] = 0,n i
j
λ  j i≠  e [ , ] = 1.n i
i
λ  
Theorem. If for any coalition ,S N⊆  S ≠ ∅  in a game 
0 0
( , )x T tΓ −  exists a 
number 
0
Si S∈  and continuously differentiable on [0, ]T R×  solution of the following 
system of differential equations  
 [ ,[ ] * [ ] *0
=1
]
( , ) , , ( ), ( , ) ( , ) , , ( ), ( , ) =max
n Sn iS S
t S S x i i S S
iu
S
V t x f t x u t t x V t x g t x u t t xϕ λ ϕ− −
⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤+ +⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎭⎩
∑  
 [ ,[ ] * * [ ] * *0
=1
]
= ( , ) , , ( , ), ( , ) ( , ) , , ( , ), ( , ) = 0
n Sn iS S
t S S x i i S S
i
V t x f t x t x t x V t x g t x t x t xϕ ϕ λ ϕ ϕ− −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤+ +⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦∑ , (2) 
 
,
0[ ] [ ] [ ]
=1
( , ( )) = ( ) ,
Sn n i
S S S
i i
i
V T x T q x Tλ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑  
where for all S N⊆  maximum in LHS is a unique couple  
 ( ){ }* 0, ( ) , , [ , ] ,i it x t U i N t t Tϕ ∈ ∈ ∈  
where ( )* , ( ) ,i it x t Uϕ ∈  i N∈  are continuous on 0[ , ]t T R×  functions, then the couple 
( ){ }* * 0( ) = , ( ) , , [ , ]i i iu t t x t U i N t t Tϕ ∈ ∈ ∈  is strong equilibrium in broad sense in the game 
0 0
( , ).x T tΓ −   
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To apply the theorem in an example, consider some properties of the following 
PDE:  
2
1 2
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( ) = 0bt
V t x V t x V t x V t x
x ae r t
t x x x
η η⎛ ⎞∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎟⎜ ⎟+ + + +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎝ ⎠ , 3( , ) = ,V T x xη  (3) 
where a , b , 
1
η , 
2
η , 
3
η  are known constants, 
2
b η≠ , ( )r t  – continuously differentiable 
function on 
0
[ , ]t T .  
Lemma. Equation (3) has a unique solution ( , )V t x  on 
0
[ , ]t T  and:  
 2
3
( )( , )
= .
T tV t x
e
x
ηη −∂ ∂  
 
Example 
 
Consider the game 
0 0
( , )x T tΓ − , where = {1,2,3}N , = 3n ,with state dynamics:  
 
1 1 2 2 3 3 0 0
( ) = , ( ) = .x t ax b u b u b u x t x+ + +  (4) 
Player 1 N∈  tends to maximize the following functional:  
2 2 2 2 [1]
{1} 0 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
0
3
, , , = ( ) ( ),
4
t
T
J x u u u u u u u x u x u x x r t dt x T
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥− − − + + + − + +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫  (5) 
the aim of player 2 N∈  is functional 
{2} 0 1 2 3
, , ,J x u u u⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ : 
2 2 2 2 [2]
{2} 0 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
0
1
, , , = ( ) ( ),
4
t
T
J x u u u u u u u x u x u x x r t dt x T
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥− − − + + − + +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫  (6) 
and the aim of player 3 N∈  is functional 
{2} 0 1 2 3
, , ,J x u u u⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ :  
2 2 2 2 [3]
{3} 0 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
0
3
, , , = 3 3 ( ) ( ),
4
t
T
J x u u u u u u u x u x u x x r t dt x T
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥− + − + − + − + +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫  (7) 
where [1]( )r t , [2]( )r t , [3]( )r t , 
0
[ , ]t t T∈  – continuously differentiable functions. In the 
game (4)-(7) strong equilibrium SME is found. 
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